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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation argues that the critical methods developed by and used within 
the field of religious studies can be reimagined as an expression of the modern desire for 
Utopia. It investigates how applications of critical social theory occlude the category of 
experience either deliberately or through methodological slight. Utopia addresses this 
problematic of representing the existential dimension of social life through its particular 
formulation of social contradiction. Analyzing Utopia's own representational situation 
within modernity affords scholars in religion a means to consider their investments in and 
desires for representing society as a totality that creates the conditions for and anticipates 
resolutions to these contradictions.  
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Introduction 
The Desire for Utopia in the Critical Study of Religion 
 
 In this dissertation, I contend that the critical methods developed by and used 
within the field of religious studies can be reimagined as an expression of the modern 
desire for Utopia. Utopia indexes a host of ambivalent hopes and dreams, and in its 
colloquial sense, has little in common with the methods of historicization, ideology 
critique or realist politics that contribute to this branch of religious studies. In looking 
closely at Utopia's appeal, I have been struck by how it generates an equal dose of 
frustration as it represents social contradictions without presenting viable resolutions. 
Thus, in its representation or figural form, Utopia brings about a new kind of experience 
for readers, one that allows readers to feel social contradiction and to sense, at least 
partially, the social obstacles to resolving those contradictions. Considering how 
successful Utopia is in generating and representing the frustrated feelings of the social 
present, it is odd how its scholarship, in its dependence on social theory, ignores or 
occludes subjective, existential feeling altogether. This disjunction between the work of 
this literary figure and the means of analyzing it forms the basis of my dissertation. 
Critical methods in the study of religion share this problem of representing the social 
present within their own representations of social totality. My turn to Fredric Jameson 
and his psychoanalytic and Marxian approach to Utopia exposes this investment in social 
totality as a desire imbued with Utopia's ambivalence. When held up as a Utopian form, 
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critical religious studies reflects obliquely the existential and experiential contents it has 
otherwise eschewed.  
 Colloquially, Utopia signals a place of perfection and implies a good life lived in 
harmony with others but which is ultimately impossible. As a neologism created by 
Thomas More in 1516 to name both the island and the title of his satire by the same 
name, Utopia carries conflict within its etymology. The root, "topos" is Greek for "place 
or region" with the prefix of "ou" that negates, generating "non-place." Translated into 
Latin as U-topia, the word shifts to its homonym, eu-topos or “good place."1 More's two-
part book is known for its travel narrative of a land far away whose inhabitants seem 
inordinately happy. The reality of the place and the happiness of the inhabitants, 
however, is undermined throughout as the main narrator, Hythloday, whose name 
translates from Latin as “nonsense peddler,” regales his audience with a picture of a far 
away place with a quirky resemblance to their hometown of London. Utopia as a word 
has been, since this time, positively and negatively valenced, made overdetermined by 
use across different historical moments and for different discursive communities. Utopia 
signals a host of associations that may make it unstable as a category. Instead of moving 
from Utopia because of this ambivalence, my project takes its ambivalence as an 
occasion for analysis. 
 Utopia's contradictory character actually presented a problem for the field of 
religious studies in a formulation by Jonathan Z. Smith. Early in his career, Smith 
                                                
1 According to Robert Adams introduction to More's text, translations from the Latin into English present a 
particular challenge to the translator. The translator must preserve the complex linguistic innuendoes that 
saturate the text while also making the text colloquial as it would have been for his intended audience of 
highly-educated humanists. For these reasons, I have found annotations to More's text useful such as found 
in Adam's version. The footnotes explain the word play and provide supplementary texts that both show the 
intellectual atmosphere of More’s time and also explain the impact of his text on future authors of the 
genre. Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Robert M. Adams, Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton, 1975). 
  3 
  
proposes that religion carries within it a tension towards place-making or orienting 
enterprises and a resistance or refusal to orient. In several early essays, Smith opposed the 
"locative" tendency of religion to a "utopian" one. Smith notes that while myths and 
rituals center or help the practitioner of religion locate or find place, religious traditions 
also preserve the role of chaos through characters and rituals. The force or source of this 
chaotic element is itself difficult to locate in Smith, and over time, Smith tries on various 
terms to mark this movement or function that is not towards place or emplacement, 
claiming in different essays how chaos, incongruity, or disjunction function in relation to 
religious myths as well as to religion scholarship itself. In one account in the essay "The 
Wobbling Pivot," Smith lands on the term "utopian" to describe the "no-place" 
perspective that values being out of place, out of orientation, to resist the confinement of 
the locative. 2  Through other iterations of this problematic of religion's relation to place, 
Smith eventually moves on from "utopia," turning to "incongruity" and then "difference" 
to signal the tensions of human existence, the social worlds that mark human life, and the 
scholarly projects that describe and then analyze or "redescribe" these lives. Utopia, as a 
no-place, is also a good place and thus, suggests its own place-making as it seeks escape. 
Utopia, on closer scrutiny by Smith, turned into another locative project.3  
 Utopia, in some sense, becomes a lost category in religious studies and while it is 
still used, it is done so with only weak reference to its sense of "no-place."4 The import of 
                                                
2 Jonathan Z. Smith, “The Wobbling Pivot,” The Journal of Religion, 52, no. 2 (1972), republished in Map 
Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions, (New York: Brill, 1978), 101. For a larger discussion 
of this in the formation of his work, see “When the Chips Are Down,” in Relating Religion: Essays in the 
Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1–60. Much of Smith's work are essays 
that are republished in a collected volume. I will refer to essay names, the titles of the collections, and the 
relevant page number numbers from the collections. 
3 Smith, "The Influence of Symbols on Social" in Map Is Not Territory, 129-146. 
4 In her introduction to a recent set of essays on contemporary religion in Southeast Asia, Joanne Punzo 
Waghorne recounts Smith's formula of utopia in opposition to locative, thinking of the no-place of the 
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Smith's insistence of religion scholarship as second-order discourse has not been lost, 
however.5 Smith's work has been widely engaged by scholars using historicization and 
social theories who see the value of category formation as a scholarly task. Scholars in 
religious studies using critical social theory have endeavored to clarify the terms and 
conditions of knowledge production in the field, drawing attention to enterprises that 
either have sidestepped or ignored questions of category formation and use. In light of the 
social theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, these scholars have 
challenged phenomenological projects like Mircea Eliade's that treat religion as a sui 
generis category and exempt religion from critical social analysis.6 Instead of describing 
religion, the religion scholar’s task, for these scholars, is Smith's redescription—to 
interpret the primary materials of religion into the language of analysis, explanation, and 
history. 
 My project addresses these critical perspectives in religious studies and draws on 
our shared concern that academic discourses are strongest when they are self-conscious 
of their contexts and constructions. I agree that an unexamined use of phenomenology of 
religion leads to confusion and obfuscation of the political and economic roles that 
                                                                                                                                            
present as an urban "Third Space" that is contested territory. I think this a fitting term for the Asian urbanity 
described in the book's essays. "Negotiating Place, Non-place, and No-place," in Place/No-Place in Urban 
Asian Religiosity, Springer Asia Series (Singapore: Singer, 2015), 7. 
5 Smith, "Religion, Religions, Religious," in Relating Religion, 194. 
6 The concern is raised by Russell McCutcheon thusly: “On the one hand, the study of religion is the 
generally liberal pursuit of universal and yet deeply personal feeling gained largely through paraphrasing 
texts, claims, and behaviors inspired by, or which somehow are said to manifest, essential meanings and 
values, all of which is derived from experiences of god, the gods, the sacred, the wholly other, the 
numinous, or the mysterium. On the other hand, the study of religion is but one instance of the wider, cross-
disciplinary study of how human beliefs, behaviors, and institutions construct and contest enduring social 
identity—talk about gods and talk about mythic origins are but two strategies for doing this. Although the 
former employs such methods as phenomenology and hermeneutics to study normally unattainable deep 
essences by means of surface descriptions, the latter employs social scientific tools to study how human 
communities construct and authorize their essentialist myths (by [sic] they grouped together and named as 
nationalist, ethnic, or even religious)”  Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the 
Public Study of Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 16. 
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religion has played both historically and in contemporary academic discourse, and that 
this confusion re-inscribes categories that the academic study of religion should take as 
its task to question. However, in foregrounding how religion functions, these critical 
methods reduce attention to—or simply dismiss—how the subject either recognizes or 
resists these redescriptions. Put simply, while the critical turn in religion scholarship 
accounts for society and social relations, it cannot or does not account for personal 
experience.  
 In researching Smith's work and his legacy, I was alert to how utopia disappeared 
but how other topics remained. Smith sustains attention to the difficulty of scholarly 
production, the felicity of some categories over others, and the dialectical nature of 
scholarship as it labors under same sky as the subjects it studies but challenges itself to 
present a different relation to these religious forms. In pursuing the multifaceted relations 
of the utopian, the chaotic, and the incongruous of Smith, I discovered the recent 
scholarship of Tyler Roberts, a Philosopher of Religion at Brown University. In 
Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism after Secularism, Roberts lifts out 
how Smith makes parallels between the function of religion and religion scholarship in 
their task of orienting human life in time and space.7 Whereas Smith brought incongruity 
and locative into dialectical tension, Roberts charges that Smith's work has been more 
recently used to dismiss incongruity altogether. Looking at scholarship in religion that 
uses social constructionist methods, Roberts re-reads prominent voices such as Russell 
McCutcheon, Willi Braun, and Steven Wassertrom and sees their work as too invested in 
"locating" subjects in society. Roberts concludes that scholarship becomes overly rigid 
                                                
7 Tyler T. Roberts, Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism After Secularism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013). 
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and didactic when it always looks to situate or locate religion. He argues that the field of 
religious studies misses its remit by the academy if it depends solely on its social science 
side. In turn, scholarship loses the existential dimensions of human life, with the result 
being a flattened subject, unrecognizable as the dynamic, conflicted, embodied person 
that humanistic approaches emphasize. Roberts proposes a critical tack that is also 
constructive—a tack more amicable to theological and psychoanalytic discourses—that 
theorizes incongruity for religious studies scholarship as what is at risk and held in 
potentia in encounters with texts, traditions, others, and the unknown aspects of the self. 
In by theorizing "encounter," Roberts argues how scholars and religious others alike 
confront and make use experiences of incongruity. 
 Roberts's excellent book offers an astute means of reflecting on Smith's terms and 
of proposing a path to sustain incongruity as a category for scholarship. I, too, think that 
commitments to social scientific approaches can blind current research to incongruity as a 
category of scholarly concern and as a dimension of human life. However, I do not 
believe that critical approaches to religious studies can be effectively challenged from 
alternative discourses that leave behind political economy as guiding frame for the force 
of religious interest. I agree that religious studies is uniquely situated within scholarly 
discourse to attend to incongruity, however, I also am convinced that social life is more 
than the sum of individual psychologies, to paraphrase Durkheim. Refocusing 
incongruity through social theory would yield how conflict, disjuncture, and gaps are not 
only cognitive operations but historically distinct and fully material.  
 As a first move in my remapping of incongruity through social theory, I have 
returned to Marx and recognized how incongruity is materially-related to the 
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contradictions of history and production that Marx outlined in his historical materialism. 
Where in Roberts, incongruity remains at the register of individual experience, even as it 
encounters the otherness of self, text, and empirical others, Marx binds contradiction to 
both the finitude of being and conflicts in modes of production. This seems a ripe path for 
considering incongruity through social theory for religion. Critical methods in the study 
of religion rely on Marxian ideology critique and dialectical methods to interrogate the 
impacts of social life on subjective formation. Critical scholarship has also tracked the 
histories of the categories we as scholars use and pointed out their western, Protestant 
pedigree and resonances. However, less has been made of Marxian contradiction in 
contemporary critical projects. Marxian contradiction is not generally considered as an 
organizing category for the study of religion. Whereas Roberts aims recover the 
experiential by way of explicitly humanistic discourses, my project suggests another 
route to this lost or occluded dimension—the existential, lived or "experiential" aspect in 
religious studies—by way of the archive of social theory. I contend that a fuller 
consideration of Marxian contradiction can support that category of socially-constructed 
experience in religious studies. Let me explain. 
 In resituating the concern with incongruity within social theory as Marxian social 
contradiction, I have been struck by how critical projects in religion actively resist or 
avoid the subjective or existential register. This elision of personal experience in social 
theory is the succinct problematic of my dissertation, and it remains a problematic, that 
is, a terrain for questions and investigations and not an issue open to a single or best 
answer. Issues of representation are endemic to religious studies as "religion" has been a 
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category for what, as Mark C. Taylor says, what "slips away."8 Religious studies, as a 
corner of the liberal arts, has worked with heterogeneity, alterity, and differences in its 
contents, methods, and theories. Examples of this include the use of apophatic theologies, 
its study of prohibitions of likeness in Abrahamic traditions, or its methods of discourse 
analysis that track cooperation of practices and phenomena. Instead of carving up religion 
for what is or is not irreducible, inviolable, representable, or debateable, I interpret the 
field of religious studies as one that tracks the political, historical, and linguistic valences 
of representation, forming sets of questions or "problematics" to study. By these 
parameters, I ask about the role of subjective experience for Roberts and the critical 
scholars he addresses. This is not to assert the legitimacy or accuracy of their claims but 
to speculate about the resemblance between the way religion fixes or stabilizes the 
incongruity of lived reality—the unknowns of temporal, material existence—and how 
religious studies fixes or stabilizes collectives and events into themes, terms, or groups 
for study. The status of experience, as I see, presents as an antinomy which inheres in the 
study of religion, one that excites and propels our field. I have found the scholarship of 
Tomoko Masuzawa as modeling this kind of approach of problematics. Masuzawa  
makes use of the contradictions of our discipline, such as our reliance on the category of 
origins despite its problems and the mixed legacy of Christian universalism, to great 
effect to reflect dialectically about the practice and limitations of methods in our field.  
 From within this nexus of incongruity and Marxian social contradiction, and the 
obstacles which inhere to religion and representation generally and to "experience" for 
critical methods specifically, I return to Smith's lost term "utopia." In investigating the 
                                                
8 As Mark C. Taylor says in interpreting Friedrich Schleiermacher: "since religious awareness slips away in 
the very effort to grasp it, the unity or identity it portends can only be 'present' as 'absent.'" Mark C. Taylor, 
Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 22. 
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term's provenance, its relationship to a distinctive literary form, and its expansion into 
social theory via Marx, I see Utopia as a complex term with the potential to connect the 
social perspectives of critical theory with the experiential, personal view dismissed or 
occluded from social construction. I thus aim in this dissertation to give an account of this 
category of Utopia as a category relevant to critical social theory. My account cannot 
attack on all fronts religion's engagements with alterities and difference. It thus is 
contained to the logics and limits of representation, with attention to the seam of the 
socially-shaped subject who feels and thinks her temporal existence uniquely. I aim to 
argue and demonstrate how the figure of Utopia could reframe religion’s problematic of 
representation, and that the opposition of subjective perspectives and social theories of 
religion could be remapped within a field of Utopian desire. 
Utopian desire as a category for critical religious studies 
 
 Much research about Utopia today is concerned with how Utopia lost its viability 
over the twentieth century. When considering the disappearance of Utopian thought and 
literature, scholars note twentieth-century political crises and violence of large nation-
state conflicts in Europe.9 Some focus on Utopia's dispersal into technological utopianism 
or bourgeois notions of romantic love.10 These support a broader conception of the 
displacement of Utopia with a "neoliberal utopianism."11 Literary theorist Northrop Frye 
sees the decline of Utopia as a contraction of education itself, namely, that the paralysis 
                                                
9 Krishan Kumar, "Utopia and Anti-Utopia in the Twentieth Century," in Utopia: The Search for the Ideal 
Society in the Western World, ed. Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent, New York 
Public Library (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251-66. 
10 Eva Illouz, Consuming the Romantic Utopia: Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Howard P. Segal, Utopias: A Brief History from Ancient 
Writings to Virtual Communities, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); and Lucy Sargission, Fools 
Gold? Utopianism in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
11 David Harvey, Spaces of Hope, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
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of the Utopian imagination is connected to the confusion about the objectives of the inner 
structure of the educational system, one that no longer relates arts and sciences as they 
once did.12 Within all of these assertions are at least two implicit claims: one, that there 
was once a Utopia that the West has since backed away from and two, that there is some 
meaning to be gained by thinking against the grain of the historical moment, to reassert 
Utopia either on the popular front or as a scholarly object.  
 These two claims—that Utopia is weaker than it once was and that its 
contemporary scholarship is a political act—is consistent across these scholarly 
appraisals of Utopia. One of the most visible of these appraisals comes from British 
sociologist Ruth Levitas, whose work has had significant bearing on the formation of 
interdisciplinary field of "utopian studies."13 In 1990 with the publication of her book The 
Concept of Utopia, Levitas looked to the Marx, his interlocutors from the Frankfurt 
School and to British Marxists to renarrate Utopia as an tool for social transformation. 
Responding to the proliferation of new writings on utopianism out of the political and 
social climate of the 1960s and 70s, Levitas diverges from a taxonomic or historical 
                                                
12 Northrop Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias" in Utopias and Utopian Thought, ed. Frank E. Manuel 
(Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 25-49. 
13 The study of utopia as an object occupies historians of Utopia and literary theorists at several points. The 
Manuels' point to Louis Rebaud in 1840 with Etudes sur les reformateurs ou socialistes modernes branding 
utopies sociales subversive in Fritzie P. Manuel and Frank E. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western 
World, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 10. They insert that a 1704 publication was 
misattributed to Georg Pasch and thus, received no attention. Lewis Mumford’s Story of Utopia (1922) and 
Joyce Hertzler’s History of Utopian Thought (1923) provide the basis for a history of the idea. The 
institutionalization of the field took off with the formation of The Society of Utopian Studies in 1975 and 
its annual conference. The peer-reviewed journal, Utopian Studies appeared in 1987 with the publication of 
select proceedings from the 1984 conference. In a similar vein and also in the mid 1970s, a professional 
organization for the study of American communal societies, the Communal Studies Association, began 
meeting in 1974 at locations of relevant interest to the society and has been publishing its peer-reviewed 
journal for 25 years. This development of the field is important to show how relatively recent it is to speak 
of utopia as an object of scholarly reflection as compared to religion as a field. Other narratives of this 
history can be found in Robert Tally's to his Utopia in the Age of Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2103) 
and in Chapter Three, "Daring to Dream," in Tom Moylan's Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, 
Utopia, Dystopia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), which provides a blend of fiction and theoretical 
perspectives. 
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approach of others writing in the 1980s and instead, relates the diverse forms, contents 
and functions as dimensions of a single concept—"a desire for a better way of being and 
living.”14  Utopia, in its variety of forms and contents, fulfill, distort, and/or constitute 
what humans need, and thus, represent to them how and what to desire. Her concept has 
been used widely since and grounds current scholarship to label both the realized and 
unrealized of architecture, intentional communities, biomedicine, technology, political 
treatises, engineering, sexualities, economics and ecology.15 
 Levitas reclamation of utopia as an abiding and formative aspect of social theory 
and as embedded in all projects of social change is compelling. In more recent work, she 
has made a strong case for how the methods of sociology are indebted to utopia.16 I 
engage her work at multiple points in this study but differentiate my own approach from 
hers in key ways. The most significant of these is in how I relate Utopia narrowly to its 
literary form as developed in early modernity. As is evident with the waxing and waning 
of the term, Utopia is a barometer for history's effects. More's text connects the genre of 
utopian fiction through its name and marks its conventions. For these reasons, I capitalize 
the term, using Utopia and not the lower-case, utopia. This allows me to index More's 
text and the literary genre that it references. This is not simply a semiotic convention but 
my argument: to capitalize Utopia is to historicize the term, to connect it to its places and 
times and its constructions within intellectual and economic locations particular to 
European capitalism, nation-state formation, liberal and Marxist politics, Renaissance 
humanism, scientific knowledge production, transcontinental ocean travel and 
                                                
14 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 7. 
15 Most recently in Sargisson's Fools Gold? and Segal's Utopias: A Brief History.  
16 Ruth Levitas, Utopia as Method: the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013). 
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colonialism. To capitalize Utopia is also to situate its use as an aesthetic figure used to 
respond and reconstruct these histories by and for Western knowledge communities.17 
Capitalizing Utopia serves to relay these connections that may be referred to but not 
visible when seen as lower case. This is, in part, precisely because of Western forms of 
knowledge that apply words universally. Utopia, then, is the aesthetic figure of Utopian 
literature, a figure that resonates across the centuries for its ability to present—but not 
resolve—social contradictions. By considering the formation of Utopia as a modern 
figure derived from its narrative form, I align my argument with those critical approaches 
that use Smith and trace religious studies as a uniquely modern construction that blends 
European Christian hegemony, Enlightenment science, and colonialism to make its 
distinct academic character.  
 I follow this historicizing method from critical methods in religious studies 
because it allows me better to unfold the signifying features of Utopia. Approaches like 
Levitas's that apply "utopia" broadly to non-western or pre-modern cases or cultural 
products obscure or dilute Utopia's ambivalence or contradiction. Using the lower-case 
form "utopia," these theorists identify a need to collect the diversity of Utopia's 
contemporary contents, forms, and functions under a single definition. They broadly 
define utopia as a case of social dreaming, a human impulse to fill in the gaps of time, or 
as with Levitas, a desire for a better way of living. While there is some attempt to limit 
the appearance of utopia to times and places where there is more openness or receptivity 
to the opportunities for change of a more structural variety or to tame the diversity of 
utopia by offering taxonomies to catalogue different utopian types, these approaches 
                                                
17 Gregory Flaxman, "The Future of Utopia" in symplokē, 14, no. 1/2, Discouragement (2006): 197-215, : 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40550721. 
  13 
  
generalize utopia in hopes of offering a definition that matches the hopefulness that 
utopia implies.  
 I fault these approaches on several grounds. In making Utopia generalizable to a 
variety of conditions, they erase non-European particularity and histories. In seeking a 
broad enough definition to collect the diversity or make sense of its overdeterminations, 
they lose purchase on the conflicted, contradictory character of Utopia. These 
contradictions are, as I argue, not a problem of perspective or definition but the key to 
making sense of what Utopia is. For example, how it is that some Utopias are focused on 
leisure while others on work, or how some are set in cities while others in the 
countryside. Other contradictions include how Utopia is a tool for practical political 
change but is also impossible, or how Utopias can be both rigid and hierarchical and 
egalitarian. A category useful and relevant to the critical study of religion would need to 
make sense of Utopia's contradictions without subsuming them.  
 Thus, my reading of Utopia and its relation to the study of religion is not one of 
religious Utopias, nor does it address expressions of Utopia in intentional communities or 
communal experiments.18 Historicizing Utopia as a figure of contradiction related to its 
literary form remaps its relation to religion beyond familiar formulations. One familiar 
trope is to treat modern utopian literature in a line with other, pre-modern hopes and 
                                                
18The directions of analysis of religion and utopia are multiple, from literary studies of ancient texts like 
Augustine's City of God or the Benedictine monastic code to modern ones such as Campanella's 
Christianianpolis or the programs of Etienne Cabet and Robert Owen, the Ephratites, Shakers or Oneida 
perfectionists in the United States or the Kibbutzim of modern Israel.  A well-researched and colorful 
introduction to these and other intersections of religion and Utopia can be found in Gregory Claeys, 
Searching for Utopia: The History of An Idea (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2011). As for a survey of 
the various ways scholars have marked this intersection or dialectical relation of religion and utopia, or of 
what counts for religion in utopia or utopia in religion, I am unaware of such a work. A place to start a 
project of this would be to consider more fully Krishan Kumar's claim that "Christian civilization may be 
unique in giving birth to utopia." Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 
1987), 19.  
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aspirations, as if all directed by a single religious ambition. The reverse also applies, 
where one ontological utopian impulse is treated as animating all cultural production, 
including religion. These methods do not necessarily exclude historical analysis that 
would treat religious and utopian features as changing or differently valenced through 
time. However, both approaches tend to treat one term as ahistorical or as the point for 
the information on which to pivot.  
 For example, in the case of Ernst Bloch's work, utopia is regarded as an 
anticipatory impulse that is a result of time's structure—an ontological condition that is 
easily turned into a theological or universal. I will discuss this slippage at several points 
in the chapters ahead, especially as it is used by Levitas. Where he most frequently uses it 
is to lift Marx from the debates of whether or not Marx is properly utopian, how to 
interpret Marx's critique of the Utopian Socialists, and how utopia can be retrieved for 
postmodern situations. By most accounts, Marx would seem utopian for the teleology of 
his project and the glimpses of the future beyond capitalism where a man [sic] mixes his 
days with hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, rearing cattle in the evening, 
and critiquing after dinner.19 Yet, Marx is also read more closely as anti-utopian for 
dismissing the explicit programs of the industrialists like Owen or Christian-inspired 
communalism of Saint-Simon for the way that they promised present relief and thus, 
focused attention away from the structural critiques of capitalism. Bloch takes Marx—
and utopia—out of these arguments and plots Marxism along paths of both critique and 
comfort. The potentials of the temporal moment, for Bloch, structure the struggle towards 
liberation as itself a pleasurable, embodied project, one that enjoys its compensations of 
                                                
19 "The German Ideology," Marx-Engels Reader , ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 
160.  
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visual art, music, narrative, stories, fairytales, wishes, religious practices and cosmic 
myths for the way they both are artifacts of humanity's creative capabilities and guides 
for the struggle. This is, in Bloch's words, the "warm stream" of Marx that shows 
humanity as tender and courageous at the same time as it critiques the structures of 
oppression.20  
 Bloch's approach intersects my project at multiple points. I critique those who 
cling to the ontological category of a utopian impulse and thus, distance Utopia from its 
form, as Levitas does. But Levitas's close reading of Bloch pays off in other ways. 
Levitas calls attention to Bloch's Marxian anthropology—the "warm stream" of Marx—
as highly relevant to the recuperation of Utopia and social theory both for contemporary 
social change. This is where she calls in the term "desire" to stand in against the 
deadening effect of social critical methods noticed by Roberts. Levitas does not work 
closely with the term desire and misses the role that formalizing ideas for social change 
has in turning them into Utopias. It is these two points, along with the ahistorical tinge of 
her concept, that force me to look elsewhere for a category of Utopia consonant with 
critical religious studies.  
 Bloch's focus on cultural products as the site for Utopia caught Marxian literary 
theorist Fredric Jameson's attention and in turn, has directed my own inquiry. I contend 
that it is by way of aesthetic productions and the analysis of these productions—which 
are themselves aesthetic products—that scholars come in contact with "warm stream" of 
                                                
20 "Marxism as a doctrine of warmth is thus solely related to that positive Being-in-possibility, not subject 
to any disenchantment, which embraces the growing realization of the realizing element, primarily in the 
human sphere. And which, inside this sphere, signifies the utopian Totum, in fact that freedom, that 
homeland of identity, in which neither man behaves towards the world, nor the world behaves towards 
man, as if towards a stranger." Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen 
Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 209. 
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Marxian anthropology by way of the "cold stream" of critique. Jameson identifies in 
Bloch the religious quality of Marxism that points to an anticipated time where social life 
is not a matter of alienated labor. Whereas Bloch calls out this anticipation of a 
transformed future as a quality of time itself, Jameson attends to how aesthetic 
productions like literature and even Marxist theory are the means to make sense of the 
alienations, the social contradictions, as they appear in capitalist production. According to 
Jameson, the anticipation of a transformed future—the utopian moment in Bloch—is 
fundamentally inaccessible and "can never reveal itself directly but must always speak in 
figures, which always calls out structurally for completion and exegesis."21 Thus, it is 
only by way of the forms of culture that we can access the existential, lived dimension of 
reality beyond our own parochial viewpoints. When handling cultural productions, 
however, we cannot escape the social, political, economic conditions that engendered 
them. Therefore, interpreting cultural productions becomes both the means to access the 
Utopian hope for transformation and the historical circumstances that condition and 
characterize the terms of this transformation.  
 Jameson's move to form and figure is the first in several ways that Jameson's 
work helps me isolate where "experience" may be available for scholars using social 
critical theory. As I argue through Jameson, analyzing culture with a dialectic of ideology 
critique and attention to form affords oblique access to the existential register of social 
life. Jameson's theoretical and interpretive projects see cultural products as the occasion 
to analyze social and existential life together. As humans piece together the scraps of 
their experiences and give them form, what they produce carry the not only the weight of 
                                                
21 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 142. 
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their cultural moments and social formations but also what seem to be the "private" 
fantasies and neurosis peculiar to them. Jameson's method does not psychologize or even 
psychoanalyze authors. Instead, he sees how the theories of Marx and Lacan and other 
"greats" of the modern "west" can be read as another way that scholars are like authors; 
and like the pensée sauvage figured by Levi-Strauss, they give shape to the sensorium as 
they find their way in the world. 
 This reflexiveness about the scholarly task and its analogies in other domains 
excites my interest in Jameson's work in a second way for this project. My project does 
not read Utopia through religion or vice versa but treats both as modern knowledge 
productions formed around questions and obstacles to representation. This is a method of 
thinking by way of set of questions while recognizing the limits of all constructions. 
Jameson's work frequently begins with a question or dilemma faced in thought. Jameson 
is perhaps most widely known for his work analyzing the culture of postmodernity--a set 
of aesthetic patterns that he relates to the late-stage of capitalist production where 
industrial machines have been dismantled in favor of the speed of electronic circuits and 
have left a wake of disorienting architecture. I do not see his commentary on architecture 
as promising as his method of abstracting questions from the change we see. Jameson 
himself has written through a series of cultural moments that have produced a dizzying 
array of change in the way we communicate, conduct business, acquire and distribute 
material goods, and interact with strangers, new ideas, and our communities. To think 
these changes from the present (factoring in the social, economic, and political realities) 
and to track how material culture is ideologically-striated, pleasurable, and open for 
critique give handholds for the proliferation that is cultural life in 2017.  
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 The third influence of Jameson on my approach is specifically for the way 
Jameson leverages the Utopian form as indicative of the social contradictions particular 
to modern, consumer capitalism. Jameson's interpretation of Utopia as the premier 
literary expression of the larger modern impulse to aesthetic closure gave me occasion to 
reflect on how scholarship relies on closure as a condition of its possibility. My argument 
that critical theories and methods in the study of religion are, first, aesthetic objects that 
are constructed as circuits of desire, stems from the import of representations and they 
way they substitute or stand in for a lost object (in psychoanalytic terms) or for other 
representations (in linguistic terms). In relating Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to 
Marxist materialism, Jameson delivers a method of interpretation that situates ideology 
and its critique as both productions of satisfaction—both routes to pleasure—thus 
inscribing the scholar-subject into her own historicized location.  
Chapter Summaries 
 
 In Chapter One, I expand on the themes introduced in this introduction, especially 
how critical scholarship has resisted the experiential dimension that Roberts elevates. I 
argue that social theory has resources for addressing Robert's concerns, and I review 
critical social theory for its methods in ideology critique, dialectical interpretations, and 
historiczation. I note how Marxian contradiction has been less engaged by these scholars 
and can be seen to remap incongruity with attention to political economy. I introduce the 
scholarship of Fredric Jameson by way of religion scholar Constance Furey to show how 
his work with Utopia has been recently used for thinking with religious studies and 
outline where my project in Utopian desire fits within current critical scholarship. 
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 In Chapter Two, I engage the contemporary scholarship in utopian studies and 
chart my argument that Utopia, as a distinctly modern figure related to its literary form, 
provides the most useful frame for studying the problematic of representing the 
existential dimension of social life within critical social theory. This argument challenges 
several well-known and highly-cited definitions for how they do not account for the 
charged, ambivalent quality of Utopia. I counter that Utopia, wrapped in terms of 
"dream," "impulse," and "desire," generates its appeal out of its on formalization and 
reification. Utopia is more useful when its contradictions are not contained in a definition 
about desire but met through interpretative procedures using a theory of desire. 
 In Chapter Three, I develop my theory of Utopian desire by showing how Utopian 
narratives generate the feeling of encountering the structural conditions and cognitive 
effects of social contradiction. I first discuss the conventions of the literary form, its 
status as a genre, and how, as travel narratives, Utopias engage spatial operations of 
comparison. Fredric Jameson's Marxian and Lacanian interpretive tools are well-
developed to show how the analysis of cultural forms is a dialectical operation, able to 
reflect on its own movement of thought while lining out the multiple social and libidinal 
attachments that produce aesthetic products. Jameson's own account of the contradictions 
which inhere with and across the Utopian form interacts with the conventions introduced 
earlier in the chapter. His theorization intensifies how Utopia figures a modern, 
existential longing for resolution and collective social arrangements, delivering this as a 
desire for the potentials contained in society as a totality. 
 In Chapter Four, I expand on how critical social theory is invested with Utopian 
desire by way of Levtias, Jameson, and religion scholar Tomoko Masuzawa. I discuss 
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how each scholar, by different means, have sought to show how social critique is 
affectively and libidinally invested or activated. I contend that social critique is activated 
with Utopian desire when it articulates a social totality and, in doing so, anticipates the 
analytic potential of that representation—the dual expression of living within and 
desiring to live beyond social contradiction. Critical scholarship can reflect more readily 
the existential, lived dimension of social life when it attends more closely to how it, like 
Utopia, is a wish-fulfilling aesthetic creation that configures and reconfigures its 
descriptions and explanations of society.  
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Chapter One 
From Locative to Utopian: The Modern Project of Critical 
Religious Studies 
 
 This chapter examines contemporary religious studies debates about the uses and 
limits of social constructionist methods, particularly as they relate to the category of the 
subject. Scholars using social theory and critical methodologies have emphasized the 
subject as a product of social forces, resisting claims to "religious experience." Some 
scholars have turned their methods towards the field of scholarship itself, questioning the 
privilege of categories like "experience" or "religion." I introduce these debates by way 
of Philosopher of Religion Tyler Roberts who argues against these approaches. Roberts 
claims that they fix subjects within social fields and do not present the dimensions of 
human life that are more uncertain, ones that that give rise to ethical responses. He 
maintains that critical approaches have lost site of the "incongruity" that religious 
behaviors are constructed to address. I contend that Roberts's characterization of critical 
methods misses how social theory, when more closely considered, presents ethical 
responses through the methods of ideology critique, dialectical thought, and 
historicization. I explain that incongruity is not cancelled or controlled by historical 
methods but is active within them, recognizable as historical, material, and social 
contradictions. This close reading of both Roberts and his interlocutors produces a 
framework for reimagining subjectivity for critical theory with an emphasis on 
contradiction. I propose that critical methods can do more to foreground the 
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contradictions which inhere in social life and can map these as historical formations 
without a loss of their constructionist approaches.  
  I propose the category of Utopian desire as a frame for this further 
methodological engagement with contradiction. Critical scholar Jonathan Z. Smith used 
"Utopia" as a category early in his project of redescription. I consider the history of this 
term and propose it again through a different formulation by way of the more recent work 
of Tomoko Masuzawa, Constance Furey, and Fredric Jameson. I argue that Utopia, 
specifically limned as desire, is a way to remap "experience" by means not considered by 
either Roberts or the scholars of critical religious studies. As I construct the category, it 
foregrounds contradiction and presents it as an object that refracts the existential, lived 
dimension of social life, holding onto critical social theory. I introduce this category at 
the end of the chapter for how it reframes the representation of experience within critical 
methods as an obstacle not easily resolved, one that an explicit appeal to humanistic 
language offered by Roberts does not satisfy and is not yet countenanced by critical 
studies.  
Outline 
 The first part of this chapter presents Tyler Roberts's objections to social 
constructionist approaches in religious studies and considers his counterproposal that 
both religion and religious studies both be considered as projects of "encounter." I revisit 
the criticisms of phenomenological methods that privilege description and depend on a 
sui generis object of study have led to a surge in social scientific approaches that handle 
religious behaviors as ordinary phenomena. I look at how Roberts's criticisms of social 
scientific approaches in the works of scholars I treat as a subset of the field—critical 
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religious studies. Roberts foregrounds the work of J. Z. Smith and his framing of 
religions as "locative" and "utopian." Honing in on the "locative" aspect, Roberts tracks 
how Smith's category of "locative religion" can be used to describe critical religious 
studies scholars who want to fix or situate all subjects and objects as products of social 
construction. While I agree that problems inhere in some aspects of these approaches, I 
contend that Roberts fails to consider the importance of political economy in his proposal 
of "encounter" as a way to reintroduce ethics and subjective experience into the field. I 
argue that social theory has resources for addressing the concerns that Roberts's raises 
when moving away from his characterization of critical methods. When engaged through 
a different lens, social theory presents ethical responses through the methods of ideology 
critique, dialectical thought, and historicization. I unpack these three methods as 
responses to Roberts for how they offer more refined approaches than what he proposes. 
How I differentiate myself from Roberts and the critical religious studies scholars is my 
claim that social contradiction operates as a background operation motivating these 
methods. In reference to Marx, I relate his materialist account of contradiction as a 
dimension of social life not emphasized as such in religious studies. This close reading of 
both Roberts and his interlocutors produces a framework for reimagining subjectivity for 
critical theory with an emphasis on contradiction. It also serves to introduce a set of 
questions which motivate this dissertation, questions about category formation and 
representation in the study of religion.  
In the second part of this chapter, I begin to develop my category of Utopian 
desire that I argue reimagines how critical religious studies can credibly consider the 
existential dimension of social life that Roberts defends is occluded by social scientific 
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methods. Through the work of philosopher Constance Furey and literary theorist Fredric 
Jameson, I introduce how the term “utopia,” once used but then discarded by Jonathan Z. 
Smith, can be reimagined for critical religious studies. While Furey invests in “Utopian 
history” as a way of holding the sedimented and undetermined together, I am more 
interested in her gesture toward the desires of the scholar and how they may be refracted 
through a practice of Utopian history. “Desire” labels the affective and libidinal 
dimensions of knowledge production, criticism, and uncertainty. A sympathetic 
perspective on the historicized subject within the contradictory social sphere is 
recognizable as a desiring subject, a subject who desires. This chapter contributes to my 
argument in that it establishes that contemporary religious studies struggles for ways to 
represent political economy and subjective experience simultaneously and offers that the 
figure of Utopia can be a means to examine this problem as it inheres in critical 
discourses.  
I. Incongruity Remapped: Roberts through Social Theory 
In his recent monograph, Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism 
after Secularism, Philosopher of Religion Tyler Roberts identifies a waning of concern 
for the subject within contemporary discourses on religious studies and identifies a lack 
of humanism within social constructionist approaches to religious studies. Roberts 
introduces readers to these recent debates that frame religion as a contested category and 
spotlight how scholarship has toyed with, understood, or resisted the slippage of religious 
person and religion scholar. He identifies several scholars such as Jonathan Z. Smith, 
Russell McCutcheon, Willi Braun, and Steve Wasserstrom for their work in separating 
academic thinking from religious thinking about religion. Roberts counters that in rooting 
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out whatever cannot be grasped by social or scientific theory, these and other scholars 
have become overly-concerned with circumscribing their terms and their objects, and in 
doing so, have lost touch with the “incongruous” aspects of life that religion and religious 
studies encounters.  
The terms and figures that Roberts introduces deserve attention for the lineages 
and problematics they represent in the field of religious studies. Field-reflexive critiques 
of the classifications and categories of religion have been a growing subset of the field of 
religious studies and have occupied the main journals of the field, as well as sprouted 
new journals and scholarly organizations that attend to these concerns directly.22 Critical 
perspectives within religious studies have focused on the formation of the field within 
mostly Christian and Western contexts, using forms of historiography to track the field’s 
investments.23 Criticisms of the History of Religions scholar Mircea Eliade are perhaps 
the most widely known and referenced, with concerns ranging from his textualist 
approach, his use of description and morphology, or the political dimensions of his life 
and theory.24 Critical scholars replace treatments of religion as a distinct, autonomous, or 
special aspect of human life excited by religious behaviors with studies that see religion 
                                                
22 The AAR and its journal, Journal of the American Association of Religion (JAAR), have hosted many of 
these conversations, even as recently as 2014. These conversations, in part, occur in the text and footnotes 
below. North American Association for the Study of Religion (NAASR) and the journal Methods and 
Theories in the Study of Religion, along with blogs like Practicum and Culture on the Edge are new 
publication routes for the voices that may see their positions as held marginally by the establishment. 
Another analysis might consider this mainstream/marginal location within the broad religious studies 
discourse across times and places.  
23 Russell T. McCutcheon stands out here with Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse of Sui Generis 
Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Other works referenced 
below include those by Daniel Dubuisson, Tomoko Masuzawa, Steven Wasserstrom, and Samuel Preus. 
See also Ivan Strenski's Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century History: Cassier, Eliade, Levi-
Strauss, and Malinowski (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987).  
24 Robert A. Segal, “In Defense of Reductionism,” JAAR, 51, no. 1 (1983): 97-124; see, also, Jonathan .Z. 
Smith, “A Twice Told Tale,” in Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004): 362-74. Hans H. Penner "Is Phenomenology a Method in the Study of Religion?" 
Bucknell Review 18, no. 1 (1970):29-54. Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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as one cultural product among others, or as ordinary.25 Lively debates and refinements 
have helped the field understand problems which inhere both in established theories and 
methods and in the terms and concepts it uses.26 The goal has been a more precise 
approach to the diverse and contradictory contents of the field.  
However, to Roberts, these criticisms have corroded a vital dimension of what 
funds religious reflection, practiced by scholars and adherents alike. In a careful, close 
reading of Jonathan Z. Smith, Roberts concludes that scholarship becomes overly rigid 
and didactic when it always looks to situate or locate religion. As Roberts reminds his 
readers, Smith critiqued Eliade for the way Eliade promoted religion as primarily a place-
making enterprise. Through such concepts as the Axis Mundi and the myth of an eternal 
return, Eliade summarized religion as the activity of orienting a person in space and time. 
In “The Wobbling Pivot,” a paper delivered in 1971 and published in 1978, J. Z. Smith 
takes up Eliade’s work and redescribes his sacred/profane distinction as a concern with 
fixing the fluid or unsettled (i.e. wobbly) human experiences within time and space. In 
Eliade’s religious or sacred category, religion is treated as a mode of human activity to 
make or fund a point or location within a chaotic field of experience or, to think as Eliade 
does, within a cosmos. Smith uses Eliade to show that place and world-making are 
important questions for religious studies but are not the only activity of religion.27 Smith 
refashions the question of religion through late antique sources and sees religious texts as 
not just trying to fit or place themselves in relation to others, and thus, creating worlds, or 
having a “locative” purpose or effect.  
                                                
25 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 23. 
26 Many of these reference Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to 
the Religious Traditions of Mankind (New York: Macmillan, 1963).  
27 J.Z. Smith, “The Wobbling Pivot,” in The Map is Not Territory, 101.  
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 After identifying “Center” as a guiding image for Eliade, Smith proposes a new 
pair—locative/utopian—to describe the placing and displacing aspects of religion. Smith 
has reworked this pair over the span of his career; his earliest mention shows Smith’s 
caution with category formation: 
In my own writings I have toyed with the distinction centrifugal and 
centripetal, central and peripheral, considered adopting Bergson’s classic 
distinction between the closed/static society and the open/dynamic one, or 
Eric Voegelin’s contrast between a ‘compact’ and ‘differentiated’ 
experience of the cosmos. With some hesitation I have settled for the 
present on the dichotomy between a locative vision of the world (which 
emphasizes place) and a utopian vision of the world (using the term in its 
strict sense: the value of being in no place). Whatever terminology is 
employed, we must be careful to preserve a sufficient sense of the 
experiential character of this dichotomy and resist imposing even an 
implicit evolutionary scheme of development ‘from the closed world to 
the infinite universe’ (to borrow the title of Alexander Koyre’s well-
known work.)28  
 
As Smith discusses, utopian means “no place,” and he shortly thereafter abandoned the 
term for incongruity and then, for difference. Smith uses “utopian” again in his collection 
of essays entitled, Map is not Territory, where “utopian” is a type of restless seeker 
religious orientation that contrasts “locative” types of religious behaviors that center or 
attach people to places. But in employing these two terms, Smith calls out how both 
religion and religious studies are projects of orientation AND disorientation, that the 
scholar, too, can adopt these positions.  
In interpreting Smith, Roberts focuses on two of Smith’s terms: “locative” and 
“incongruity,” setting them up as binaries for contrast. Roberts subsumes “utopian” as 
another aspect of locating, but of “relocating” just in another place, not the more radical 
                                                
28 Ibid.  
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dislocating of “incongruity”.29 Roberts sees that the utopian, as a method of engaging 
hegemonic power, could be mapped as method of revolution; however, this revolutionary 
force is tamed for the work of collecting the group identity: “From this perspective, 
utopian, rebellious, and revolutionary forms of religion are in crucial respects ultimately 
locative, for they still seek to secure a stable place in the world for believers, even if this 
means that they or another group will be dislocated before they can relocate 
themselves.”30 Thus, it is the less addressed, more animated notion of incongruity, not 
utopian or locative, that is the more radical force, and for Roberts, the more common and 
recognizably religious aspect of what constitutes religious studies.  
Smith’s work has given rise to many other projects within what I have named 
“critical religious studies.” This makes him important for a discussion of how the modern 
category of religion reflects the social formations of multiple eras. His method in 
historical analysis addresses how religion and history are topics made available through 
texts and only approached obliquely. Tuning to the myths and symbols in texts of late 
antiquity, Smith reflects on the historian’s task and acknowledges its distinctly modern, 
post-Enlightenment orientation. It is this reflexivity that brings into view insights such as 
how “universality” is a category for modern elites31 or how the “primitive” is predicated 
on a binary contrast to the “civilized.”32 J.Z. Smith’s work shows how historians inherit 
and then revise or create the categories that they use.  
 Roberts reads J.Z. Smith against himself and sees locative patterns forming 
around Smith and other historicists and instead wants to refocus on encounters with the 
                                                
29 Tyler T. Roberts, “All Work and No Play: Chaos, Incongruity and Difference in the Study of Religion,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 77, no. 1 (2009), 99. 
30 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 72-73. 
31 J Z. Smith, “Map Is Not Territory,” in Map Is Not Territory, 293. 
32 Smith, “I Am a Parrot (Red),” in Map Is Not Territory, 273. 
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incongruous, unformed, or surprising. Moving away from texts and elite forms has been a 
necessary correction, according to Roberts. However, in reading for particularity of place 
and situation through demands to historicize, scholars fall into a pattern of constant 
positioning and reassertion of academic legitimacy. In this move, these critical scholars 
of religion expose themselves to their own critique of being overly “locative” of religion, 
“locating both their religious subjects and themselves too securely and [so that they] are 
not nuanced enough in their explorations of the power of religion.”33  
It is this constant resituating that troubles Roberts: the disinterested inquiry of 
social scientific and historicist methods miss the humanistic perspective of self and 
scholarship that is about encounter. Objectifying distance has been brought on by the 
“dead ends of critical consciousness that has emptied concepts such as ‘responsibility,’ 
‘ethics,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘subjectivity’ of critical and emancipatory force.”34 For Roberts, 
the humanities house the tools to live with incongruity and develop “processes of 
reflection and representation,” responding so as “to reflect on what the ideas and 
practices we study might mean for us, in our worlds.”35 He sees that a humanities 
approach would reinvigorate both the inquiry into religion and the place of the scholar in 
that inquiry, to acknowledge the contingency of all human pursuits. 
Roberts accuses critical studies of having its own “locative” bias: as it accuses 
Eliade of making religion about place, critical studies makes everything about its 
historical location. Roberts pushes back against historicist methodology by saying that it 
produces a kind of “undeadness” and “evacuates our acts and our subjectivities and so 
                                                
33 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 12. 
34 Ibid., 19. 
35 Ibid., 16.  
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turns them into artifacts of social formation.”36 Social constructionist approaches, 
according to Roberts, rob the self of its affirming gestures and contact with its “finitude” 
and “power” and put in their place a critical attitude towards the various social formations 
of which the self is a part. He reclaims the humanities, theology and psychoanalysis for 
interpreting social relations and institutions, and in doing so, situates the self in fields of 
interpellation and desire. Thus, the social is present but is strained through terms such as 
meaning, becoming, life, and desire. He seeks a way into constructive and affirmative 
approaches to religious studies theory and scholarship so as to recuperate “questions of 
justice, meaning, and purpose” that are foreclosed by explanatory and historicist 
methods.37  
In sum, Roberts argues humans are made into “artifacts” when seen as processes 
of social formation, and that the critical mind is trained to be suspicious and guarded, 
without affirmation. Ultimately the human is discouraged from seeing herself as 
purposeful, for herself or for others. Social constructionism does not allow enough 
nuance into the explorations of the “power of religion”, and in marking out and 
occupying a distanced, secularist perspective, these scholars fail to reflect the more 
realistic portrait of humans as experimenters. Exceptions to this are scholars such as 
anthropologists Robert Orsi and Michael Jackson and historians Amy Hollywood and 
Romand Coles who cut against the grain of traditional scholarship to explore finitude, 
power, and self-dispossession. In turning to the philosophers and psychoanalytic 
interpretations, Roberts maps out how power can be removed as an object of suspicion 
                                                
36 Ibid., 178. 
37 Ibid., 19. 
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and repossessed by religious studies for an account of human responsibility, 
answerability, and encounter. 
I agree with Roberts that there are “locative” patterns at work in some strains of 
critical studies. I also agree that the consequence of these and other patterns is to refuse to 
engage “responsibility, ethics, freedom and subjectivity” as terms because of their 
unexamined appeals to liberal humanism. I appreciate the turn to the humanities for the 
ways that they have held up the incongruous and framed uncertainty as productive of 
relations and of cultural goods. I want to argue, however, that Roberts’s concerns can be 
remedied by critical social theory and are arguably more thoroughly confronted by the 
tools and terms within the wheelhouse of critical religious studies itself. Critical religious 
studies has “critical and emancipatory force” within its genealogy and practices that can 
be leveraged for social critique. This dissertation explores how the incongruity that 
Roberts seeks to recuperate for religious studies can be reintroduced through critical 
religious studies as “Utopian”—the lost word of Smith’s project. As this chapter 
introduces, “Utopia” is not simply a “no place” or an “escape” from order but a wrestling 
with order that is ongoing, dialectical, and critical, accounting for the embodied, 
tempermental aspects that Roberts sees as constitutive of humanistic inquiry. Whereas 
Roberts gives up on the social-theoretical models and regroups in humanities and 
theology, I see mediation through the figure of Utopia and its cognate, Utopian desire. In 
order to develop this concept of Utopian desire, I first want to survey recent critical, 
social and historical methods of religious studies to see how they can resist the “locative” 
characterization given by Roberts and also add to the political economic dimension 
untouched by Roberts. 
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Ideology Critique: Objects of Suspicion or Ethical Position 
I agree with Roberts that social constructionism, with its frame of the social, can 
turn the subjects of religion into objects through its attention to the function of religion to 
construct objects. Social constructionism has its roots in the critiques of liberalism 
wrought by Hegel and Marx and found anchor in the developing field of religious studies 
through the foundational works of Durkheim, Weber, and Berger.38 By the lights of social 
constructionist interpretations of the field of religious studies, “Religion” is a concept that 
was created to name a type of social behavior, observable in collective behaviors. The 
method foregrounds the discretion of the analyst to frame social behavior as religious and 
to distinguish it from other social behaviors, and though it may be associated with what is 
extreme, exceptional, or socially taboo, as Durkheim remarks, religion registers at the 
level of ordinary human behaviors, institutions, and beliefs.39 This human-centered 
feature means that religion is, in one sense, ordinary human activity.  
In order to elaborate on religion as a set of social phenomena—as opposed to 
supernatural or psychological ones—social constructionists emphasize how the subject is 
always within a social field and report on how social groups shape themselves and are 
shaped through discourses. Language and materiality combine, taking shapes in 
                                                
38 While none of these three influential sociologists of religion are strictly social constructionists, they focus 
the discussion of the procedures of legitimization at the level of social life which goes on to shape the roles 
of its actors who deeply identify with these social roles. Religion bares the brunt of this work for these 
academics. It is the sociologists who can detect the “reality maintenance” that is performed, often by 
religion, to sustain the “precarious reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality.” Berger 
makes clear that it is both religion and theology both that obscure the constructed aspects of society. Peter 
L Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1967), 32. 
39 Whereas Berger focuses on the cohesive function of religion that Durkheim’s theory sets out, 
Durkheim’s own definition of religion straddles this tension of exceptional and ordinary and sets out how 
the sacred is something held in a collective that can be viewed from without, “A religion is a unified system 
of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and 
practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.” 
Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Free 
Press, 1965 (Orig. pub. 1912), 62. 
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prohibitions, permissions, and institutions on multiple scales. Social constructionist 
approaches to religious studies investigate these discursive operations generally and 
particularly how whatever is “religious” functions to permit, restrict, or constrict behavior 
and potentials within social space.40 In this frame, knowledge is seen as a product of 
social groups that often behave to sustain themselves in a field of competing interests. 
Religious studies should therefore do more than describe “religious” social groups: it is 
tasked with asking how knowledges that challenge and sustain, i.e. construct, these social 
groups interact with other knowledges.41  
  Ideology critique structures much of this discourse of social constructionism by 
analyzing the flows of authorization, the legitimacy of certain representations and the 
obscuring—intentionally or not—of others. 42 It is easy to mistake what is meant when 
critical religious studies scholars view religion as ideology. Despite efforts to nuance the 
word and to open it to its more general meaning of a system of ideas, its negative use—as 
was used by its 19th century originators—prevails. Ideology as a term was developed to 
describe the circulation of ideas at the expense of occluding other vital information. The 
way that language and behaviors disguise class interest was a main concern of Marx, 
along with the way ideologies disconnect from the conditions of production. Marx 
identified that religious ideas did this very effectively in the way that they assert a reality 
beyond material reality.43 They also salved a wounded heart in a cruel world. As Marx 
                                                
40 McCutcheon’s social constructionist definition of religion: religion is a construction of humans for 
“legitimating, contesting, and monitoring social cohesion and identity.” Critics Not Caretakers, 14. 
41 Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon, eds., A Guide to the Study of Religion (New York: Continuum, 
2000).  Religion is a term used by scholars to analyze a class of objects to explain their causes and 
functions, or how they are attractive to individuals and societies. Also useful for showing how concepts are 
related to other concepts. Religion is the study of authoritative discourse. It is ordinary in that it is like other 
cultural objects. Braun and McCutcheon, “Introduction,” in A Guide to the Study of Religion, 9. 
42 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 29. 
43 Gary Lease, “Ideology,” in Braun and McCutcheon, ed., A Guide to the Study of Religion, 441 
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described it, the deception was the institutional practices that enabled conceit to persist 
undetected. Twentieth century scholarship has extended this analysis of religion and other 
ideologies, tracking how ideology is sustained as structures of normativity that gain 
legitimacy and adherence through aesthetic forms or institutions. Terms like hegemony or 
habitus, while adding to the function and character of ideology can, as Marxist literary 
theorist Terry Eagleton avers, be used in such a way that waters down the power 
dynamics and struggle of Marx’s initial critique.44 All three terms, however, sustain focus 
on the social aspects of behavior that otherwise would devolve into stories of unique 
individuals acting as free, unencumbered agents. Ideology critique for religious studies is 
a marker of how all discourse excludes and argues that religious discourse excludes in 
particular way.  
Russell McCutcheon lays out this role of ideology critique in Manufacturing 
Religion, noting that this is not the “harsher Marxist use of the term that denotes false 
consciousness or deluded thinking.” He rejects these for the way they presume a “true 
consciousness.”45 Instead, McCutcheon proposes a generic alternative: “ideology denotes 
a process for authoring particular representations whose trace, history or context is 
obscured (whether intentionally or not).”46 Turning to Eagleton, McCutcheon identifies 
how ideology performs as a political tool through unifying, orienting, rationalizing, 
legitimating, universalizing, and naturalizing social processes. Through figures such as 
Durkheim and Freud, McCutcheon sees that religion functions to obscure social 
                                                
44 For Eagleton, Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and social field tend to make conflicts disappear. See, 
Terry Eagleton, “Ideologies and its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism,” Slavoj Žižek, ed., Mapping 
Ideology (New York: Verso, 2012): 179-225. 
45 As M.G. Hamner has remarked, “Marx would not attest to a true consciousness but he did presume a true 
depiction of the sets of forces and relations of production, a depiction that was obscured by bourgeois 
proprieties.” Private conversation, August, 2, 2016.  
46 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 29. 
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operations, to reassert hegemony and to bolster dominant power structures. This is a well-
established interpretation of religion that has been critiqued for its reductionism.47 
McCutcheon detours around this criticism by claiming that reductionism is the work of 
functionalist theories, and he is joined by other contemporary scholars in continuing this 
path.48 Critical methods within religious studies argue that the ideological operations of 
religion are especially adept at creating the illusion of closure and building absolute 
claims. Religion shores up other systems, and thus, deserves the attention of critics.49 
 For the purposes of my research, I use the term “critical religious studies 
scholarship” to denote these methods that view religion as social phenomena and that 
question the theories and methods in the field that may treat religion as interactive with 
the social field but as a response to a unique experience. Roberts defends this “unique 
experience” perspective as he articulates a framework for “response and responsiveness” 
to difference. 50 He situates his method as an enterprise of the academy that takes up 
concern with an attention to change: 
The humanities, as I understand them, are the site in the academy where 
we try not only to understand the immense diversity of ways that human 
beings have in the past and continue in the present to reflect on and 
represent themselves to themselves and others, but also to respond to these 
                                                
47 Introductory texts to theory and method explain how this reductionism is what has produced alternative 
theories and have also shown how Marx and Freud are more nuanced than a generic definition shows them 
to be. See Daniel L. Pals Eight Theories of Religion, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
and Bradley Herling, A Beginner’s Guide to the Study of Religion, 2nd ed. (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015). Broadly, this is the move of poststructuralism—to show how ideology critique cannot be 
sustained as its own mechanism because of the faults of the subject. 
48 William Arnal writes about the values of functionalism in his chapter "Definition" In Guide to the Study 
of Religion, Braun and McCutcheon, ed.: 21-35.. See also Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis 
of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Routledge, 1978). 
49 Lease, “Ideology” See, also, Derek R. Peterson and Darren Walhof, The Invention of Religion: 
Rethinking Belief in Politics and History, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press), 2001. 
50 “To ‘encounter’ religion, as I understand it, is to undertake a ‘disciplined suspension’ (to use Robert 
Orsi’s phrase) of one’s own locative impulses and thus allow the differences between the scholars’ own 
world and the world of the religious other to emerge in as much detail as possible. But the humanistic study 
of religion and the humanities more generally, I argue, need to think difference and encounter within the 
larger framework of response and responsiveness. Roberts, Encountering Religion, 16.  
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processes of reflection and representation and to the processes of self and 
social formation, to which they not only are bound but also effect and 
enable. To respond, in this sense, is to reflect on what the ideas and 
practices we study might mean for us, in our worlds.51  
 
For Roberts, it is the humanities, not social sciences, that offer the more precise method 
of handling religious texts and people. The humanities accept theological material but not 
its assumptions, reading religious texts through a position of humility and 
indeterminacy—a kind of ethical stance. The ethical position, for Roberts, is to see how 
“certain kinds of self-dispossession” incite the more responsible positions: there is too 
much certainty or self-assuring happening within the critical position, and the effort to 
establish authority blinds the scholar from the way religion destabilizes its subjects, and 
even its scholars. 
 I like the space that Roberts holds for the humanities within the academy, 
especially the way that it points to the subjective position of the scholar relative to the 
subjectivities of its “objects” for reflection. I want to emphasize, however, that critical 
perspectives have an advantage to other kinds of ethic's claims when they challenge the 
productions of hegemony. The normative stance within critical religious studies 
scholarship persists in McCutcheon and others as they call attention to where powers are 
unequally distributed.52 Societies are not set up to serve everyone’s interests equally. By 
pointing to how social structures are legitimated and maintained, critical scholars bring to 
light what is not as prominent in popular discourses and may be missing from other 
methods of studying religion.53 As Marx assured his readers of Theses on Feuerbach, the 
                                                
51 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 16-17. 
52 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, Bruce Lincoln, Emerging from the Chrysalis: Studies in Women's 
Rituals of Initiation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 112 quoted in Craig Martin, A Critical 
Introduction to the Study of Religion, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 57-8. 
53 Martin, Critical Introduction, xiv.  
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point of philosophy is not only to interpret the world, but to change it.54 Marx’s legacy 
within critical theory is a turn in the road from the more isolated social science of 
Durkheim.55 Social theory with this critical approach has a normative dimension. It has 
within it the motivation to both study and produce change.56  
 These histories are absent or obscured within Roberts’s analysis. Roberts’s 
concerns about the ethical dimensions of critical religious studies telescope out first with 
the concern that there is a lack of ethics in the critical perspective when it refuses to judge 
certain social formations due to its necessary detachment as a public, scholarly service 
and then zooms in to the places where McCutcheon appears to freely judge religious 
others when he describes his scholarly peers as “data.”57 Roberts overall is concerned that 
the ethics of critical religious studies are unevenly applied, “failing to explain why some 
kinds of socially stabilizing activities are preferable to others, they offer instead the all-
to-easy language of ‘transgression’ and ‘critique.’”58 McCutcheon defends his privilege 
by noting that scholarly autonomy has its own ideologies or systems of thought and thus, 
its own exclusions, ones that its own practitioners may not be aware of. Scholarly 
discourse, as McCutcheon sees it, does not actively work to disguise its trace or disavow 
its privilege whereas religious discourse does.59 When challenged about the success of 
scholarly discourse to police itself for its disavowed or disguised exclusions, 
                                                
54 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis XI (Marx/Engels Internet Archive). 
Accessed at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm. 
55 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986). 
56 Benhabib sees in critical theory two modes. First, a politics of the present in process, with its goal of 
fulfillment of a universalization of what came out of the bourgeois revolutions—”justice, equality, civil 
rights, democracy, and publicity”. Second, transfiguration towards “the formation of a community of needs 
and solidarity, and qualitatively transformed relations to inner and outer nature.” The transformations of 
“inner” and “outer” “nature” —this is the dimension of utopia. Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, 13. 
57 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 49-70. Roberts has a close reading of the concerns of the placement of 
the scholar in the academy.  
58 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 78. 
59 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, 66. 
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McCutcheon admits that this would be akin to pulling the rug out from under one’s own 
feet and that a critique of the institutional setting of his own work “falls outside the 
parameters of this book.”60 Arguing against McCutcheon’s privilege is part of the drive 
of Roberts who sees such positioning as overly defensive and guarded.  
 If one is to follow McCutcheon’s insistence on the “radically contextualized 
nature of all human thought and practice,“ then McCutcheon plays with an ever-growing 
list of criteria to assure one’s scholarship is properly accountable and situated. However, 
he excludes biography of particular subjects. This kind of bait-and-switch of McCutcheon 
relative to specific standards of disclosure and distance is confusing if one reads him as 
laying out rules for religion scholarship. McCutcheon sustains this argument through 
reifying "religion" and "scholarship," setting them in opposition, then reassigning 
descriptive scholarship to the “religious” side. Sui approaches to religion fund more 
idealist than materialist positions, he argues, and ideology critique, what he calls 
“materialist and naturalist critiques,” taken up against religion and sui generis 
approaches, “not only contextualize such idealism but, in the very act of contextualizing 
it, simultaneously deauthorize and challenge it.”61 However, what becomes apparent with 
McCutcheon is that religion is exclusive to groups. The object of study, then, is not 
religion, but people—who are treated as objects, not subjects. This objectification extends 
beyond religious people to scholars themselves, who are seen to be directed by interests 
and rewards, with appeals to authorities. McCutcheon has promoted this argument with 
his attention to scholars—as a group—in such categories as “caretakers” and “critics. 
This turn to analyze the scholar as a religious “data” may have rhetorical purpose for 
                                                
60 Ibid., 99. 
61 Ibid., 29.  
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McCutcheon but without a more sympathetic account of the scholar-as-subject, it 
alienates scholars from each other and from their shared conditions of existence, 
imagining them more different than the same. It is also what leads Roberts to misread the 
benefits of social constructionism, its inherent ideology critique, and its ethical force. 
Roberts criticizes McCutcheon and other scholars for bypassing the “messy 
questions of advocacy and social formation” that are central to good inquiry in the study 
of religion. 62 I would say more precisely that McCutcheon loses his argument when he 
characterizes scholarship as religion's opposite. I would argue that religiousness and 
scholarship are more precisely overlapping fields of social formations with degrees of 
attention to constructedness that are always incomplete. I maintain that social critique has 
this more nuanced history and the resources for taking positions that have political effects 
as constitutive of their purpose and are invested in social transformation, not merely 
disinterested inquiry. The failures of critical religious studies discourse highlighted by 
Roberts are perhaps failures of rhetoric but not of method, by my view, and not fatal. 
They instead should be treated as productive critique, helping to focus on the ways 
critical religious studies can better account for subjectivity and perspective in their social 
analysis.  
Dialectical Methods 
 As remarked above, Roberts watches ethical, responsive selves treated as objects 
void of lived perspective in social constructionist projects. The social constructionist 
would respond by arguing that the analytical view is just that—one view among others 
and a view the scholar must inhabit and explain. Roberts sees the critical scholar as 
                                                
62 Roberts includes Ivan Strenski, Gary Lease, Bruce Lincoln, Donald Wiebe, and Burton Mack for this 
analysis. Roberts, Encountering Religion, 78-9. 
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excepting himself (as these are male scholars he references) from this treatment by virtue 
of his scholarly location, creating an us-vs.-them dynamic that is skewed against those 
who disagree with the critical religious studies approach. This section continues with 
Roberts’s disagreement with social constructionism and how its social view of religion 
obscures processes of encounter and transformation. I argue that this is because he is not 
reading for the dialectics at work in the theory of social construction. 
 Roberts believes that social constructionism stabilizes itself through proposing a 
neutral stance on social processes, avoiding normative claims. However, this privileging 
of social constructionism is itself a normative claim. Others agree. Benjamin Fong 
describes how critical discourses, in resisting one standard, just institute another: what 
was “religion, experience and authenticity” becomes “discourse, discipline and 
power/knowledge.” New monoliths, such as “Western Civilization,” emerge, instituting a 
new universal that explains the conditions of a situation just as the liberal humanist one 
did and the reductionist one did before that.63 By protesting so much against the “reality” 
of certain stable formations by calling them “nothing but constructions,” critical theorists 
like McCutcheon lose sight of the complexity of the reality they claim to be able to 
explain.64 Fong challenges social constructionists by pointing out their inconsistency 
when they argue that reality is too complex to be viewed completely but then claim that 
they have a leg up on analyzing this reality. He suggests that instead of advancing an 
argument through these oppositional constructions, social constructionist approaches 
would gain more traction by beginning with the shared social field of the scholar and 
reader and drawing out its successes and failures at sustaining a consistent reality.  
                                                
63 Benjamin Y. Fong, “On Critics and What’s Real: Russell McCutcheon on Religious Experience,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 82, no. 3 (2014): 1127-48. 
64 Fong, "On Critics and What's Real," 1145. 
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 Fong’s recommendation to preserve social construction by drawing the circle to 
include scholar and other would go some distance in taking the edge from critical 
religious studies while preserving its message. This would be consistent with a genealogy 
of social theory building on Marxist praxis and immanent critique, proposing self-
reflexivity about the subject’s class position in relation to the forces of production. But 
this lineage also contains a facet of science that has come under scrutiny by 
poststructuralists, namely the positivism of social science methods and its accompanying 
objectivity. Where critical religious studies appeals to scientific or rational inquiry for its 
authority, it depends on a western hegemony that it claims it can see through.65 In order 
to do what Fong recommends without falling towards the positivistic side of social theory 
and to counter this normative, hegemonic tendency, I propose that critical religious 
studies re-engage a more dialectical methodology that reflects the dialectal production of 
the subject within the social. An attention to dialectics would both situate the subject 
within a livelier, more deliberative or even “messy” context, as Roberts and Fong 
suggest, with the recognition and force of the human, creative aspect of the social.  
 Dialectical approaches preserve subjective perspectives, accounting for a self as 
one that is constituted socially but in process. In The Sacred Canopy, Peter Berger 
emphasizes how life, society, and scholarship all function dialectically and so should be 
perceived as such. Berger’s social theory thus no longer analyzes society as hypostatic 
but rather as creatively dynamic, correcting Durkheim’s legacy. He reminds his readers 
that, “the sociological understanding ought always to be humanizing, that is, ought to 
refer the imposing configurations of social structure back to the living human beings who 
                                                
65 For an undoing of western rationality from a non-religious studies perspective, see Bruno LaTour We 
Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
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have created them.”66 Berger also dismantles a rigid subjectivity by arguing that 
“socialization… is always partial” and that internalization is always incomplete, with a 
non-social self-consciousness in uneasy relation to the social consciousness.67  
 Berger’s processual subject-in-formation corrects the misreading of Marxist 
ideology critique that ascribes ideology only to persons and not to systems. It also re-
presents social theory’s subjectivity as malleable and troubled—a view of social theory 
not considered in Roberts’s survey. Through the term “social formation,” subjects are 
situated within a society that functions to obscure or promote some ideas and transfers 
this function to competing subjective, social formations. 68 When subjectivities are 
framed as social formations, scholars can distinguish between the bluntness of some 
ideological formations and the subtlety of others, allowing some social formations to 
counter other hegemonic social formations, yet acknowledging that they are all formed 
through political economy. Social formations, as partial or in process, point to the 
overlapping and contested experiences, where a single human body can be marked by 
multiple social formations.  
 Roberts does not dig deep into the references used by critical religious studies 
scholars for these more dynamic perspectives on subjectivity. He instead invokes 
humanism for this account. By pointing to more nuanced descriptions of subject 
formation and describing them as social processes, I aim to answer one of Roberts's 
criticisms of social theory—that critical perspectives drain life from their objects of 
study. I do not believe that this is the case, and I want to preserve these elements of social 
                                                
66 Berger, Sacred Canopy, 8. 
67 Ibid., 83-4. 
68 Burton Mack, “Social Formation,” in Braun and McCutcheon, ed., Guide to the Study of Religion: 283-
96. 
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theory as I build my case for a critical religious studies theory and method that is 
ethically-tuned and responsive to others. What is clearer from this correction is that 
Roberts takes issue with an overriding arc of social theory—its habit or pattern towards 
social science objectivity and positivism that is primarily engaged with social, not 
personal, processes. It would seem that this is a general pitfall of Enlightenment reason: 
reification for the purposes of abstraction. However, that does not mean that social 
formations are static.69 Roberts might respond: if social theory attends to selves, it calls 
them subjects and only does so for more abstracted, less human ends, and this kind of 
thought pattern does not have to be the only game in town. 
 I agree that there is abstraction and consolidation and objectification in the theory 
and methods in social theory. But instead of abandoning it, I want to point out how this is 
more precisely just a moment of a dialectic. Thought is in motion, a dialectical procedure 
of integration and proposal. I want to reframe Roberts's rejection of social methods and 
say: if critical methods appear as “locative,” it is only because they have not brought 
attention to the movement of thought itself in the presentation of their work. Critical 
methods do not necessarily lead to deadening analysis or less responsibility per se. I 
would say (and am performing through this dissertation) that it produces new ethical 
responses and expands experience, as Roberts wants religious studies scholarship to do, 
                                                
69 As McCutcheon argues, “[s]ocial formations, then, are active processes that never arrive and are never 
completed. In one sense, the process implied by social formation simply suggests the active constitution 
and reconstitution of a social group. But in another sense, a social formation denotes the continually 
changing results of these active processes and the context in which these processes take place—in this case 
social formations are more things than processes [sic]. What is crucial is to recognize that both senses are 
necessarily related; despite the ever-present danger of mistaking our active concepts for real things, the 
utility of ‘social formation’ is precisely its ability to avoid the traps of reification, all of which comes from 
its status as a gerund. In other words, social formation is not a thing or an it.” McCutcheon italicizes “more 
things than processes” to emphasize something but it ends up being against what he is saying in the whole 
paragraph—about process. What a delightfully juicy error! Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics not Caretakers, 
27. 
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and a recognition and integration of the dialectics of thought in scholarship helps with 
this.  
Peter Berger and J.Z. Smith both demonstrate this reflexive work as a method for 
religious studies. Like the social process he describes, Berger calls attention to how 
theorizing is a dialectical process: “Depending on the starting point, one may then be able 
to show how a particular theoretical constellation results from a certain practical 
infrastructure, or conversely how a particular social structure is the result of certain 
movement in the realm of ideas.” The method of scholarship then matches the contents, 
which have, to Berger, an “intrinsic dialecticity” as socio-historical phenomena.70 The 
ever-incomplete aspect of human life, lived in social exchange, continues as production. 
It is a restless and expressive process.71 Scholarship is one instance of other productions. 
J. Z. Smith lists religion as a practice of producing knowledge through making 
connections. As mentioned above, this is religion as ordinary, not unique or exceptional. 
But it is also dialectical process: 
All of this is to say that the usual portrait of the primitive (the non-human 
‘them’ of our cultural map)—whether in the nineteenth century negative 
form or our more recent positive evaluation—has prevented us from 
realizing what is human and humane in the worlds of other men. We have 
not been attendant to the ordinary, recognizable features of religion as 
negotiation and application but have rather perceived it to be an 
extraordinary, exotic category of experience which escapes everyday 
modes of thought. But human life—or, perhaps more pointedly, humane 
life—is not a series of burning bushes. The categories of holism, of 
congruity, suggest a static perfection to primitive life which I, for one, find 
inhumane.72 
 
In this quotation, Smith contrasts the religion of “burning bushes” to the religion of 
“negotiation and application.” In reacting to this as “locative,” Roberts is dwelling on the 
                                                
70 Berger, Sacred Canopy, 155. 
71 Ibid., 5. 
72 J.Z. Smith, "Map is Not Territory," in Map Is Not Territory, 308. 
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products of social theory and not their production, nor the way that scholars inscribe 
themselves as subjects in negotiation. This issue of dialectics—of the reinscription of the 
scholar as a producer in a field of other producers where concepts and categories are 
constructions for use in an economy of knowledge production that turns with its own 
contradictions and resolutions—is a difficult counternarrative to sustain while making 
arguments and is a delicate task to insert dexterously into one’s work, both in structure 
and in content. 
 A quick example of this challenge of presenting scholarly objects as moments of a 
dialectical process comes from a review of Tomoko Masuzawa by Robert Orsi. Orsi 
follows Roberts’s concern that a too critical position leaves religion as reduced to other 
terms. In reviewing Masuzawa’s book Inventing Religions, Orsi calls Masuzawa’s work 
an “anti-history” for its way of wringing out earlier moments of the religious studies 
tradition and finding only Christian hegemony at work.73 Like Roberts, Orsi wants 
historiography to show the fissures and lines and struggles of its process. This struggle is, 
however, lost for Orsi because he is looking at the “struggle” at a different register: he 
wants to see history from the perspective of the personal decision tree—the wins and 
losses—that troubled early scholars.  
 But Masuzawa’s project shows more that the decisions of scholars are often not 
their own, or more precisely, they are decisions made under conditions that are degrees of 
difference from our own. Masuzawa focuses her archival research less on the particular 
circumstances surrounding individual nineteenth-century scholars, and more on the 
specific rules of discourse that constituted and sustained the “reason” so valued by these 
                                                
73 Robert Orsi, “On the ‘So Called History’ of the Study of Religion,” Method and Theory in the Study of 
Religion 20, no 2 (2008): 134-8. doi: 10.1163/157006808X283552 
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scholars. Through this, she is able to show how those rules (and Enlightenment 
discourses generally) are framed and anchored by diffuse Christian presumptions.74 
Those nineteenth-century scholars simply could not ignore or rebut these rules of 
discourse, then, without ignoring or rebutting reason itself. It is not only the past but now 
the present that is under consideration: if there is a sense that religious studies is still too 
Christian, to what degree is the familiar yet increasingly insufficient nineteenth century 
“reason” responsible? The praxis for Orsi—and for Roberts—is between something 
domestic or familiar and something strange or unsettled. For Masuzawa, the strange is 
what was supposed to be familiar or resolved. The conflict is present within the scholar—
she doesn’t have to encounter others or religiousness to find it. 
 Dialectical methods appeal to a variety of theorists within religious studies, 
crossing the boundaries of social science and humanist approaches. Employing and 
demonstrating the dialectics at work in one’s theory would help critical religious studies 
from the positivistic tendencies of social science and keep discourses on social 
formations focused on their dynamic and creative aspects. What critical religious studies 
adds to a general dialectical method is the self-consciousness about thought itself within 
the scholarship of religion, an attunement to the social formations of scholars themselves 
as knowledge producers. Roberts attempts a theory of a self-conscious scholar via his 
own method of encounter and response. However, he fails to account for the social or 
political dimensions that circumscribe or limit the terms or range of thought available. 
                                                
74 Masuzawa charts the historic process of how European Christian hegemony did not simply impose itself 
on its colonial others but constructed its identity through the material management of these outposts of 
commercial and cultural imperialism. The diversity that Europeans encountered produced both 
administrative and epistemic challenges: how to order the variety of behaviors and communities 
encountered. Religion became a conceptual tool for this epistemic challenge, charting differences under an 
umbrella of a universal phenomena variously expressed. Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), xiii. 
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Instead, he theologizes them, or more precisely, "quasi-theologizes" them by turning the 
limitations of one’s own experience into a disorientation that he reveres.  
 I agree with Roberts and Orsi that texts, practices, or human/living others 
disorient and surprise expectations. I share with Roberts an interest in theorizing 
encounters and regard it as project of scholarship. Where we diverge is in how one talks 
about the conditions that create these encounters. Dialectical methods permit the insight 
of processes and incompletion, as social formations lived as subjectivities and as social 
formations that are distinctive to times and places. It is not a choice between a personal 
decision and a subject as an effect of social processes but more that certain material and 
discursive conditions give rise to what is lived and experienced as personal decision. 
Dialectical methods can bring the scholar into the frame of this analysis, keeping 
attention on how scholars are ordinary humans who both create their conditions and are 
created by them.  
 To sum up the previous two sections, Roberts characterizes social constructionism 
as disinterested and presenting subjects as static objects. However, ideology critique has 
ethical norms both at the level of analysis and at the subjective level, and both are in 
process and (thus) changing. To examine the human creative social life—what I have 
been labeling subjectivity—I will further trace Roberts’s notion of incongruity so as to 
show how he attaches it to humanism. Debates about whether or not “religious 
experience” can be included as data for analysis is an irritant to Roberts who wants to 
acknowledge it as a type of more general human encounter. I will show that “experience” 
and “incongruity” are better framed as contradiction. Contradiction is a more precise 
word than incongruity when describing the subjective experience. Marxian contradiction 
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communicates both how the subject is cast by the play of forces in social life and how she 
experiences these forces—as conflict calling for resolution. When Marxian contradiction 
is introduced to the historical analytics of critical religious studies, the existential, lived 
experiences of subjects comes into view with a social frame.  
Incongruity Remapped as Contradiction 
“Incongruity” stands in Roberts’s work as the experience of the subject in the 
midst of undecidable or excessive arrangement. Roberts traces the term in J.Z. Smith’s 
work, following how Smith presented it as the religious strategy for “grappl[ing] with 
that which seems out of place.”75 As mentioned above, this was developed alongside of a 
“locative” strategy of orientation. Roberts claims that Smith inadequately develops 
incongruity as its own strategy, one where “chaos, disorder, lack of fit” are a part of a 
religious disposition that is “neither overcome nor (only) a spur to a new ordering or 
reordering, a disposition that in some significant sense bears or inhabits chaos.”76 Using 
his positive examples, Roberts calls out how people, texts, and the singularity of self 
deliver incongruity as a particularly lively place or mode. Meeting the incongruous is a 
challenge for both the subject-scholar and for the field of religious studies. It is also the 
condition of responsiveness as such, “that which stands out and cannot be incorporated 
into or subsumed under any kind of unified self, historical tradition, or social formation.77 
Incongruity cannot be resolved but can and should be responded to by “thinking 
respectfully and responsibly.”78 It may take shape in philosophy as an aporia or in 
experience as liminality. The injunction to reduce it, to see it only as the property of 
                                                
75 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 25. 
76 Ibid., 29, 30. 
77 Ibid., 198. 
78 Ibid., 150. 
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another text, society, or person, or consolidated as ‘the other’, is to close off its 
situational givenness.  
Roberts sees that critical, social methods close off incongruity, both as an object 
of study and as a legitimate method. If the scholar is willing to be remade in the process 
of engaging another’s worldview that is under critique, then perhaps there is room for the 
study of social formations and subjectivities: this is critique under the lights of the 
incongruous.79 Still, Roberts does not want the political to hamper this open inquiry, this 
vulnerable subject or tender moment, instead conceding that it will need to be considered 
in due course.  
 Critical religious studies closes off incongruity when it patrols institutions and 
departments, claiming that theology tarnishes religious studies as a credible study within 
the university.80 In seeking to separate social scientific methodologies from more 
humanistic or theological ones, some have seen critical religious studies dismissing the 
historical lineage that has mutually produced both.81 Other institutional contexts may 
                                                
79 Roberts quotes Saba Mahmood here: “Critique, I believe, is most powerful when it leaves open the 
possibility that we might also be remade in the process of engaging another’s worldview, that we might 
come to learn things that we did not already know before we understood the engagement. This requires that 
we occasionally turn the critical gaze upon ourselves, to leave open the possibility that we may be made 
through an encounter with the other.” He cites Mahmood further for saying that there is space for theory 
that is not political but that politics will enter in. I think he is misreading her for what is meant by politics. 
The social constructionists and I have a much broader definition of politics, one that is definitely a part of 
her anthropological work. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 37 quoted  in Roberts, Encountering Religion, 117. 
80 McCutcheon says this repeatedly. Donald Wiebe is most known for it. “To repeat, in these essays I 
attempt to recover for the university a study of religion governed by principles of scientific investigation 
and I decry the current governance of such study by religious goals. I am aware that in this attempt I might 
well be accused of following a political agenda. But if so, the agenda does not activate concerns foreign to 
the university’s aims and intentions. It is a “political” act in that it is an attempt to re-establish or re-found 
the discipline as it first emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and in terms of which it first 
received legitimation as a university discipline.”” Donald Wiebe, The Politics of Religious Studies: The 
Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), xvi. See, 
especially, Wiebe’s essay, “The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion,” in The Politics of 
Religious Studies: 141-62. 
81 Linell E. Cady and Delwin Brown, ed. Religious Studies, Theology and the University: Conflicting Maps, 
Changing Terrain (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).  
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house theology but this accommodation may just reinforce the denominational affiliation. 
The object of study is still sniffed closely to check for sympathetic reasoning.82  
In focusing on incongruity and encounter, Roberts elevates it as an essential 
human experience and associates it with religiousness. As mentioned in my introduction, 
religion scholarship traffics in the problematic of identity and difference, of what is fixed 
and what slips away. Roberts wrestles with this and decides that the doing of scholarship 
is its risk of undoing, of the undecidability of encounter. As I have argued thus far, there 
are resources for this kind of complex account of human life within social theory. Where 
I see the most need for a close examination of alterity as it registers in religion 
scholarship is in the case of “religious experience.” As I will argue, if there can be some 
way of accounting for something like “religious experience” within critical religious 
studies, then there will be ways for analyzing a subjective perspective that satisfies the 
social constructionists and the existential dimension of incongruity that Roberts wants 
centered in religious studies.  
Religious Experience, or a Claim Made within the Phantasmagoria 
 
The topic of religious experience has been another boundary line, policing 
incongruity, according to Roberts, and is at the heart of Roberts’s concept of encounter. 
Scholars such as Robert Segal have argued that projects that describe other’s experience 
and label it as “religious” are always acts of interpretation and explanation because no 
one else’s experience is ever directly accessible.83 Critical religious studies calls on 
                                                
82 This argument is fought constantly over Robert Orsi’s work.  
83 Segal defends reductionism only as the less-bad option than what would be feigned understanding by the 
non-believer of the believer. It is a compelling presentation of a familiar quandry. " Take the conventional 
statement that a nonbeliever can appreciate religion in a believer's own terms. As what can he appreciate it? 
is the fundamental question. As a response to the divine? But what can the divine mean to him when he 
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religious studies generally to own its redescriptive task: without immediate access to the 
same experience, the scholar will always be in a position to redescribe, to translate, or to 
propose in other language, that which is properly another’s.84 Also, choosing which 
redescriptive terms has consequences: relying on insider or “emic” categories may not 
add any insight or may reinscribe assumptions. Critics say it is better to choose 
redescriptive terms consciously, using theoretically driven etic categories, organizing and 
analyzing and not relying on self-evidential or the emic terms of those whom the scholar 
studies.85 Third, religious experience discourse, beginning with Rudolph Otto and 
William James, emerges from the context of a humanist liberal paradigm and assumes a 
self-possessed individual, missing the social altogether.  
More stridently, McCutcheon identifies “experience” as the way humans signal 
the end of signification and he treats this limit not as a condition of human finitude (and 
thus, a potential for alterity as such), but as a rhetorical device. By this account, 
“religious experience” is the signpost for upcoming claims about particularity and 
universality. Whether ancient or modern, any discourse on experience moves shared 
reality into a different register, defending the author’s interpretation as inviolable. In this 
                                                                                                                                            
does not accept its reality? Unless he reduces it to some- thing else, can it mean anything to him? If he does 
reduce it to something else, can he be appreciating what a believer says it means? Would not a believer say 
that the meaning of the divine is above all that it is real? Would not a believer say that to appreciate its 
meaning is to accept it? How, then, can a nonbeliever profess to be appreciating its reality for a believer 
without accepting it himself?" Robert Segal "In Defense of Reductionism," 110. 
84 This claim of redescription is embedded within both J.Z. Smith and Russell McCutcheon. For example, 
in Smith’s, “A Twice Told Tale,” he argues that “too much work by scholars of religion takes the form of a 
paraphrase, our style of ritual repetition, which is a particularly weak mode of translation, insufficiently 
different from its subject matter for purposes of thought.” 370.  Smith supports religious studies reflecting 
on how, broadly as a science, could emphasize its project of bringing the unknown into relationship with 
the known. ”The field of religious studies has been more persistent than many of its academic neighbors in 
continuing to maintain one strand of nineteenth-century neo-Kantian thought, which argued that the 
distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences was a matter of explanation as opposed to 
interpretation.” J.Z. Smith, “A Twice Told Tale,” 372. 
85 McCutcheon, Critics not Caretakers, 22. 
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register, religious experience is hot with normativity. The scholar, however, cools this 
engine with her explanatory tools. 
 Thus, when religious experience is invoked, it is more than a defense of an 
individual set of sensations, one experience among others. According to McCutcheon it 
marks an occlusion of history by an appeal to nature, a claim to authority that refuses any 
challenge.86 The scholar cannot unlock all of human life and culture with one 
hermeneutical key, but the scholar can and should point out whatever she sees as off-
limits, unique, or natural and to ask how it got that way and what sustains it, taking 
nothing for granted. Critical scholars should approach “religious experience” discourses 
ready to interpret them for their implicit “shoulds.”  
Is there such a thing as experience at all for McCutcheon or is it only ever an 
argument for authority? The short answer is “yes”—McCutcheon separates experience 
from the claims to experience: experience itself, and not just its position as authority, are 
approachable when treated as sociopolitical events. Experience is a “contestable by-
product of a stratified, diverse community, a by-product always in need of 
contextualization when studied.”87 He continues on the same page to elaborate the 
dimensions of experience: “Experience is the localized depository of complex and often 
virtually transparent messages communicated through, and made possible by, social life.” 
These “virtually transparent messages” are teachers and, in McCutcheon’s example of a 
John Mellencamp lyric, those teachers could teach the fear of Jesus.88 Combined with 
other sections from McCutcheon and other voices from social theory, these notes on 
                                                
86 Ibid., 9.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
  53 
  
experience begin to show how critical religious studies could expand its inquiry into the 
more affective dimensions of the subject that I believe Roberts is searching for. 
 This extended foray into McCutcheon’s work shows that incongruity is not, in 
fact, lost in critical religious studies scholarship. It is, instead, understood as a social 
effect. Restated, there is something recognized as and called “religious experience,” but it 
should be first examined for who it appeals to and why. There is still a subject in critical 
religious studies, having the ups and downs of life, getting lost and found. But this is 
measured through its social, political and economic extensions. The interiority that 
Roberts appeals to is—and here I agree with McCutcheon—a mystification of social, 
political and economic events that are no less traumatic for this reason, no less profound 
or disorienting when understood as socially constructed. Instead of retreating into a 
humanist camp of “self” whose disruptions are counted through psychoanalytic self-
estrangement or the secularized theological terms of deconstructive thought, there are 
means within critical theory still to appreciate the dynamic account of human life that 
permits an objective account of social forces constructing subjects. Critical theory makes 
room for the psychoanalytic and post-structuralist positions, too. Disagreeing with several 
strains of critical religious studies does not mean leaving it behind. Its value is that it 
actually has a chance at addressing and accounting for the massive material structures 
that produce the experiences of incongruity that register on the level of a “self” in 
Roberts’s system. 
 Marxist literary critic Raymond Williams introduces us to the subjective 
encounter of the experiential, as a counter to Roberts’s structural account of subjective 
experience. Thus, Williams helps to tease out undecidability and incongruity within a 
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frame of social formation. This further demonstrates that social construction can be home 
for “experience”—but casts it as social process. It is true that the social-in-process is 
difficult to witness and thus, analysis of a social form such as a religious institution or a 
common scriptural interpretation tends to treat it as fixed. As Williams observes, analysis 
tends towards the past because of sedimentation where the material conflicts and uneven 
disruption of resources can be more easily examined.89 The present recedes under the 
conditions of social production, requiring special effort. One is searching 
not only the temporal present, the realization of this and this instant, but 
the specificity of present being, the inalienably physical, within which we 
may indeed discern and acknowledge institutions, formation, position, but 
not always as fixed products, defining products. And then if the social is 
the fixed and explicit—the known relationships, institutions, formation, 
positions—all that is present and moving, all that escapes or seems to 
escape from the fixed and explicit and the known, is grasped and defined 
as person: this, here, now, alive, active, ‘subjective.’90  
 
The subject is experienced as this point of production, of its construction. If Roberts 
resists social constructionism, the work of Williams explains: because of “all the knowns, 
complexities, the experienced tensions, shifts, and uncertainties, the intricate forms of 
unevenness and confusion, are against the terms of the reduction and soon, by extension, 
against social analysis itself.”91 Roberts is in one sense correct—that first-person, 
incongruous human life will not be reduced.  
 Rejecting social analysis and diving towards humanistic analysis, however, is not 
the way through. Williams cautions that general concepts such as “human imagination” 
or “human psyche” are foils for complex conditions and displace specific social 
                                                
89 “In most description and analysis, culture and society are expressed in an habitual past tense. The 
strongest barrier to the recognitions of human cultural activity is this immediate and regular conversion of 
experience into finished products.” Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 128. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 129-30. 
  55 
  
conditions.92 Modern psychological or aesthetic descriptions, as well as appeals to 
“experience, immediate feeling, and then, subjectivity and personality” are derivations of 
what is more precisely instances of a social process. 93 Without sliding towards these 
other modern discourses, Williams sticks to the social register and proposes that there are 
“structures of feeling” that are prompted and conditions by relations that tremble and 
pulse, carving up social reality into what could be felt as personal or important.94 While 
the spark of interpersonal responsibility that Roberts wants for religious studies could be 
threaded through these structures (what has come to be known as “Affect theory” or 
“Affect studies”), I instead am interested in the habits of thought that in, rejecting social 
analysis, push for psychology or aesthetics—to the exclusion of social analysis. I aim to 
critique this move, wanting to stay with social analysis. Can there be a social account of 
incongruity? Where and how are these discourses folded into each other, such that 
scholars can speak across these lines? 
 One such way is to show how incongruity can be cast in social terms. In social 
theory, there is language for life lived with incongruity, even in McCutcheon. There is a 
density to human experience: “the busy and unruly flood of material and information that 
comprises the phantasmagoria of historic existence.”95 But can the “encounters” 
(Roberts’s term) with the “phantasmagoria” (McCutcheon’s term) become the object of 
                                                
92 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 130. 
93 “The undeniable power of two great modern ideological systems—the ‘aesthetic’ and the 
‘psychological’—is, ironically, systematically derived from these senses of instance and process, where 
experience, immediate feeling, and then subjectivity and personality are newly generalized and assembled. 
Against these ‘personal’ forms, the ideological systems of fixed social generality , of categorical products, 
of absolute formations, are relatively powerless, within their specific dimension.” Williams, Marxism and 
Literature, 129. 
94 Ibid., 132. In Williams’s words: “We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and 
tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but 
thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating 
continuity.”  
95 Russell T. McCutcheon, The Discipline of Religion: Structure, Meaning, Rhetoric, (New York: 
Routledge, 2003). 
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study? If, as Roberts says, these encounters and experiences of incongruity are an 
important aspect to religious content, my turn to critical religious studies is to use their 
tools for interpreting incongruity at the site of so-called "experience." It  does this, 
acknowledging the reifying process of locative work but then re-animates this through the 
dialectic.  
 I am concerned to show that scholars can theorize subjective encounters with or 
experiences of what McCutcheon terms the ‘phantasmagoria’ without relinquishing the 
social constructionism of social theory. It requires a dialectical method that grasps such 
experiences as social events. It also, however, implies keeping track of a multiplicity of 
forces and shifts in order to hold them up for analysis. Incongruity is a call for humility 
and submission to this impossible task. Social constructionism responds with 
Nietzschian-like affirmation of the human capacity for theorizing and ordering. Social 
theory has other routes. Where social theory best responds to Roberts is where it shows 
the heterogeneity of thought, its active procedures of composition, along with the 
elisions. It also has within it ways of talking about the material risks of incongruity, the 
affective gratifications of thought achieved and then again, the material consequences of 
those gratifications. Leaving social theory for the humanities is not necessary to get to the 
fullness of incongruity. 
Phantasmagoria as Contradiction 
 
 I suggest that “contradiction” is better than incongruity to mark discontinuity. 
This term captures both the subjective perspective of disjuncture and political economy. 
In using the dialectics of Marx and Hegel, a scholar comes to focus on the movement and 
patterns within the density of the world-human nexus. This is not to explain away the 
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incongruous, as Roberts fears. Instead, it is to attend to the patterning behavior and 
generalizing work of human thought—a remarkably consistent aspect across expressions 
of humans within various social configurations.96 Viewing the human-world intersection 
as a series of incongruous events, failed expectations, or overwhelming stimuli means we 
view the conditions of existence as merely random, lacking any explanation or analysis, 
and it thus negates human agency in generating our own conditions. While the world is, 
indeed, dense with trajectories and effects that are too innumerable to calculate, humans 
consistently look for patterns so as to order their lives and create stability for their 
thriving. Marx’s work particularly accounts for both the moment of the incongruous and 
the moment of patterning—both of which are necessary for an anthropological 
perspective on religious activity. 
 Marx’s use of contradiction describes the conditions of existence more precisely 
than what Roberts offers or what is available at first glance with the critical theorists of 
religion. Instead of the incongruous or the dense phantasmagoria, Marx sets out to 
examine the foundations of thought and existence from a dialectical movement quite 
different from that of the Hegelian idea. Marx is persuaded by Hegel’s invitation to see 
how the outside, opposite, or other of an idea is part of its identity, and thus, necessary to 
include when tracking ideas and their movement into politics and philosophy. But Marx 
names material conditions and political economy as the engine behind these movements. 
Contradictions are not merely objects of thought desperate for resolution or “aufhebung”: 
history moves by the gears of human creativity transforming unmarked landscapes into 
                                                
96 Smith makes this claim to mark humans as those who think, primitive or modern, in their reliance on 
myths or maps “That is to say, the incongruity of myth is not an error, it is the very source of its power.” 
Map is Not Territory, 299. Claude Levi-Strauss saw organizing mental operations as not just modern but 
something much more encompassing and defining, a position popularized in The Savage Mind, trans. 
George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). 
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habital space and usable goods.97 The “resolutions” are through this fusion of human 
effort and raw material. However, under capitalism, the contradictions of thought that 
Hegel encounters are made of muscle, sweat and hunger. Marx never lets his readers 
forget this. 
 Drawing on Marx’s analysis of changes in the modes of production, contradiction 
emerges where there are ruptures within or between the conditions for existence and the 
descriptions or terms of those conditions. Contradictions exist between modes of 
production as different means of producing material goods and the social, economic, and 
political structures that support and reinforce different means of producing and sustaining 
human life. In the mode of production called capitalism, the smooth trajectory of 
producing goods for one’s survival or pleasure is disrupted when the good becomes a 
commodity and threatens the producer’s power to become existentially and economically 
worthless in a marketplace beyond her reach. The worker is estranged from her own 
productive capacity, unable to recoup her generative capacity for her own use.98 Marx 
identifies this shift as a contradiction for a very specific reason: when the mismatch of the 
forces of production are labeled a contradiction, political economy can be seen to infuse 
thought itself. Where what is at first, with Hegel, the oppositions of thought systems are 
in conflict at the level of ideas, with Marx, conflicts at the level of ideas are modeled on 
                                                
97"Property is a consequence of production bounded by land or family relations, then bounded by exchange; 
the first where there is exchange of man and nature, the second where there the exchange of labor; physical 
and mental activity together, second sense is where they are separated the relation to nature produces the 
form of society and the form of society shapes the relation of man to nature." Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, "The German Ideology" The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1978), 158-59. I have appreciated Anthony Giddens's discussion of Marxist contradiction in 
Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979). 
98 “This contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse, which, as we saw, has 
occurred several times in past history, without, however, endangering the basis, necessarily on each 
occasion burst out in a revolution, taking on at the same time various subsidiary forms, such as all-
embracing collisions, collisions of various classes, contradiction of consciousness, battle of ideas, etc., 
political conflict, etc.” Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," 161.  
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conflicts sustained within the ways goods and services are unevenly distributed between 
their producers and consumers, leaving some with more and others with less.99  
 Contradiction, then, is both the unpleasant experience of cognitive dissonance of 
incompatible premises and the disjoint of social organization that both sustains and 
undermines society itself. With Marx in mind, there is no neat separation nor an elegant 
parallelism of these two layers—no crude base/superstructural cause-effect mechanism— 
but that they are only separable with the tools of analysis. Likewise, other common forms 
or concepts developed to extend Marxian analysis emerge when looking at Marx through 
his account of contradiction, especially those relevant to examination of religion and 
society as developed by critical religious studies theorists. Ideology and history begin to 
take shape through an understanding of Marx’s use of contradiction. Combined with an 
appreciation of dialectics, contradiction shows itself as formulation of incongruity tuned 
to materialism and political economy.  
  For Marx, every aspect of that production and path is possible through the 
stratification of society and the assigned significance to persons, objects, and 
temporalities. Thus, a good shorthand for the breadth of these contradictions that support 
both uneven material distribution and ideological difference is to see them as social 
contradictions. An example of a contradiction under capitalism is how the individual 
human is paid individually, separated out for her effort and paid for it. Her wage is set up 
as her means to survival, to procuring her means. She is independent. And yet, she is also 
                                                
99 This last point, about the relation of idea and materiality is most succinctly stated in "The German 
Ideology," “But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc., comes into contradiction with the 
existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with 
existing forces of production; this, moreover, can also occur in a particular national sphere of relations 
through the appearance of the contradiction, not within the national orbit, but between this national 
consciousness and the practice of other nations, i.e., between the national and the general consciousness of 
a nation (as we see it now in Germany).” Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," 159.  
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completely dependent because of the divisions of labor and the complex systems that are 
involved in food production and shelter. Her dependency on the complex system then, 
further reinforces the necessity that she alone is responsible for earning enough to secure 
her survival.100  
 Contradictions stall out thought and then activate it again, just as incongruity 
does. However, calling encounters with otherness “contradiction” instead of 
“incongruity” lends a set of vocabulary to the situation that shows how imbricated 
humans are with the economic and political events around them. In contradiction, the 
encounters and responses are crossed with all manner of relations that are too easily taken 
for granted. If this means that humans and others are too easily “located” on a grid for 
Roberts, it is only because the infinite number of social relations are too complex to even 
think or write. As J.Z. Smith says, the map can never be the territory. The lived social 
relations are too vast. Analysis steps in to give shorthand to the substance that are too 
dense to serviceably share.  
Historicization developed, in part, to manage the proliferation, to begin to track 
the contradictions as they played out in social formations of subjects and groups. 
Historicization locates. But it does so with the acknowledgment that these are relations 
always in history, meaning always in process, always in between other moments that 
played out in slightly other ways. In the next section, I show that historicization can be 
produced in ways that lets the contradictions come to the fore. With experiences of 
incongruity and encounter remapped as points of contradiction within history, the 
immanent, fully social quality of subjective incongruity can be better perceived and can 
engage ethically, as Roberts demands. What is needed to bridge the humanist and critical 
                                                
100 Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, 35. 
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discourses is a subject aware of both its interests in theorizing and its limitations in doing 
so. A critical scholarly subject will need to be able to account for her own social 
formation within others as well as adequately describe the surplus—that 
phantasmagoria—as something thoroughly historical that also escapes the grasp of the 
theorizing human mind. If it can do this, it will be able to respond to the anxieties of the 
loss of the surprising or normative aspects of religious studies. Or, to put it in terms of 
Fong and Roberts, critical religious studies will need to show how messiness and 
incongruity are historical social formations that cannot be reduced by them alone. I 
propose that it is what lies at that point of the JZ Smith’s “incongruous”—in both its 
categorical and existential senses – that one can begin to articulate what may be 
missing—or one could say “desired”—in contemporary religious studies. 
Historicizing "Religion" 
  Having considering the subject or the excess of experience/life as site of conflict 
for critical methods, I want to consider how it is that these scholars have endeavored to 
emphasize the constructed or artificial category of "religion" within modern scholarship. 
By means of historicization and genealogies, critical scholars have retraced the 
development of the field. Tracing its own investments and commitments, scholars have 
sought a means to bring awareness to the process of scholarship itself, turning the lamp 
on themselves. This method differs from an ideology critique strictly in that it talks about 
the usefulness of these productions—of how categories are crucial to knowledge 
production. This reflects an implicit normative claim that critical knowledge holds value, 
at minimum to perpetuate scholarship itself, and at most, to affect some degree of 
positive change. What historicization offers as a method is first, self-reflexivity about the 
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procedures of scholarship, and second, a further means to lift off the naturalizing 
language that sustains religion as the equivalent of "experience" itself. Historicizing 
"religion" is another crucial method by which critical scholars have been blamed by 
Roberts for excising the humanities from religious studies. I propose, however, that 
critique can undo its own certainties, and that, as an artifact, can be examined as an 
aesthetic production.  
 The category of religion is variously seen as “manufactured” (McCutcheon), 
“constructed” (Dubuisson), and “invented,” (Masuzawa) by those of critical religious 
studies. The crafting of religion as an artefact is noteworthy. In asking questions about 
history of the category, one asks about the relation of ideas to materiality, with the 
emphasis in critical religious studies to center on the materialist foundations of 
knowledge and the institutions that legitimate, circulate, and reproduce knowledge and 
their structures. By these accounts, the category also requires an ideological critique in 
order to unmask its “modern,” “western,” or “Christian”—and even "Protestant"—
agendas. The value of such work is that it reveals the dynamics of interest, economics 
and politics within the field, especially those built on Christian universalism, 
Enlightenment reason, predatory capitalism, ethnographic method, and secularization. It 
also shows the problematics of representation and thus, advances scholarship beyond the 
power dynamics of modern scientific knowledge regimes. From these critiques, religion 
emerges as a concept developed in situations of global contact and connects to concrete, 
local concerns such as colonial systems of education, resource extraction, global trade, 
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nation-state development, governance, law, and military actions.101 Analyzing the history 
of “religion”—its formulations and applications in literature recognized by our field of 
study—is a method and a theory that contribute to what I have been calling critical 
religious studies.  
 These scholars do not begin with essence or with the claim that there is a sin qua 
non that makes something “religious.” They do not query the origins of either 
religiousness or even origins of the category of “religiousness” in order to seek its true 
nature. Such historical methods are the target, not the practice, of the critical scholars. 
Instead, the critical religious studies approach is to ask about how disparate elements 
were collected and organized into what is now is recognized, misrecognized, or both—as 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith brought forward as he began an insight into the category of 
“religion.” 102 Historians of the category recount the contexts and biographies of 
prominent scholars and pull at the intellectual movements that pressed out some terms 
ahead of others.103 “Religion” as a category of analysis has emerged through historical 
procedures and may be as a term, an artifice of the scholar’s workshop, but it can not be 
erased. Indeed, critical religious studies depends on “religion” to assert itself as distinct 
from the “political,” and so becomes a point of clarification for critical religious theory 
                                                
101 Scholars with remarkable texts on this topic include Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Post-
Colonial Theory, India and "The Mystic East" (New York: Routledge, 1999); and, David Chidester Empire 
of Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
102 Wilfred Cantwell Smith proposed in his The Meaning and End of Religion that, due to the pedigrees of 
its terms to define religions, the field would be helped to replace “religion” with” traditions” and “faith.” 
This would, according to W.C. Smith, unhook the field from the etymologically-troubled “religion” along 
with other constructions that do not accurately correspond to the local descriptions. Smith, The Meaning 
and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind (New York: Macmillan, 
1963).  
103 Texts that recount the historical conditions around the production of knowledge in the field of religious 
studies are such ones as: James Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to 
Freud, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Steven M. Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion: 
Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999); Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions; Ivan Strenski, Thinking About Religion: An Historical 
Introduction to Theories of Religion, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006).  
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that sees religion as a sub-category of politics that functions socially in remarkable 
ways.104 Using the category “religion” as an occasion to analyze history and society is 
fruitful for interpreting the historical conditions of religious thought, the historical 
conditions of religious studies as a discipline, and also, more substantially, the historical 
conditions that promote different kinds of thinking and sees thinking and categories as 
differentiated across times and place—thus self-reflective of a historical mode of modern 
thought.  
With these histories in mind, some propose alternative terms to religion, such as 
“cosmographic formation” or a dispersion of religion into more specific cultural terms so 
as to unhook the field from its history of colonialism, Christian imperialism, and 
capitalist investments.105 From this urgency to discard the category "religion" in favor of 
a more deeply-treated history, these voices within critical religious studies call out the 
constructedness of categories, the violence committed in the use of category formation, 
and the options available for scholarship in the midst of these problematic histories.  
Roberts wants scholars of the field to proceed with caution and ask about the 
“locative” effects of critical approaches. I can appreciate Roberts’s concern about too 
thoroughly placing, labeling, and suspecting scholars for their hegemonic formations, 
however, as I have argued, there are methods to use that would keep the uncertainty of 
any analytic project within view. Without placing Roberts next to each of these projects, I 
                                                
104 My thinking here has been influenced by Kevin Schilbrack. Schilbrack avers that while the category of 
religion may be constructed, its phenomena are not. While it may distort what it seeks to name, has been 
used to essentialize diverse ways of living, and is too much about Protestant tradition and history, 
“religion” is still a useful category. He describes his position as a “critical realist view” that sees “religion” 
as a label for a set of behaviors that are, in crucial respects, independent of the scholar. Kevin Schilbrack, 
"Religions, Are There Any?" Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 78, No. 4 (2010): 1112–1138. 
doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfq086. 
105 Daniel Dubuisson The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, trans. 
William Sayers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of 
Religious Studies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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step back to consider if histories generally are too conclusive, too occupied with 
contextualization and situation. Are there examples of historical critical scholarship 
which undo the confidence game that Roberts accuses social constructionist methods of 
playing? How could such a history involve the subjective, experiential register of 
uncertainty for both the scholar and religious person alike? 
As mentioned above, a theory of social formation would make this possible if 
widely and rigorously applied or if in part self-reflectively engaged by the author and 
reader alike. To some degree, all scholars are ever within a stream of history that they 
seek to examine, like embedded journalists in a conflict being waged in their name. But 
this only further implies that one could extend this project ad infinitum. Without some 
nuance of history and method, social formation turns to reification, losing out on the 
existential conditions of contradiction that play up and dominate much of what 
constitutes subjectivity.  
History, as a theory and a method, offers up several options for troubling the too-
certain means that Roberts implies. Genealogical methods and psychoanalysis have 
broadly introduced into the field of religious studies a less locatable history. These 
methods reproduce the friction of objective and subjective perspectives in history for 
their readers. Roberts uses psychoanalytic frames for his own investigations to consider 
how uncertainty is at play or involved in much of what counts as human thought. 
However, this does not help at all for considering social formations, political 
arrangements, and economic forces as constitutive of the subject. Genealogical methods 
can preserve religion as a distinctive occasion of analysis. Through the situational work 
of genealogy, the focus turns to the effects of analytic frames. Through genealogy, the 
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scholar shifts from asking about how to let in or accommodate the strange or incongruous 
to investigating the problematics of difference and otherness generally.  
 As anthropologist and genealogist Talal Asad observes, general “religion” 
fractures when compared to particular religions, even proximate Christian ones like 
medieval Christianity and Islam. In his explicit uses of Foucault, Asad marks how the 
term “religion” has been applied across different material relations and other times in 
which subjects were formed by different logics than those of modern colonial conditions. 
While Asad has drawn criticism for his textualist methods that lean away from the more 
tentative, particular, and immanent work of sorting reminiscent of field ethnography, 
Asad tackles the power/knowledge grids that fund and instigate such projects.106 His 
starting premise does not turn inquiry simply into a witch-hunt of colonial offenses, as 
simply ideology critique might produce, but inspires scholars to analyze what is taken for 
granted, especially the operative systems, and to see through to their constructed nature. 
Asad applies this to his investigations of secularism and revises the linear narrative of 
progressive secularization. Where some see the decline of religiousness and the rise of 
Enlightenment values, Asad sees the shift toward the universalized nation-state, 
developed across terrains where scholars mixed with merchants and bureaucrats. Asad 
tends to say that different practices and sensibilities and habits are roped under "religion" 
at different times and places, which doesn’t (for him) negate the term so much as 
mandate a historical investigation of its "grammar."107 In his genealogy of the secular, 
                                                
106 As Benson Saler argues, “[w]e do not begin, in short, with ‘concrete sets of historical relations and 
processes,” but with perspectives and mediating categories—and, if we are lucky, our perspectives are 
flexible and adaptive enough to warrant describing them as a ‘modest view.’” Benson Saler, 
Conceptualizing Religion: Immanent Anthropologies, Transcendent Native, and Unbounded Categories 
(New York: Berghann Books, 1999), 101.  
107 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 189. 
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Asad demonstrates that ‘religion’ is not to be held as secular’s opposite but that secular 
can be seen to co-constitute religion—and religion with diverse interests and contents.108  
A second example comes from Masuzawa’s history of the field of religious 
studies traces how Europeans, in seeking unity for the diversity of colonial and economic 
contexts, “invented” the category of “world religions.”109 This is the book that Orsi called 
an “anti-history” in his review but, as I argued earlier, is an account of the rules and 
principles of discourse and epistemology in the nineteenth century. Masuzawa shows 
how universalism was first Christian universalism, translated through a universal 
religious impulse, and provided a means for explaining diversity that still secured 
Christian preeminence.110 This history which most notably plays itself out in the 
sympathetic attitude these nineteenth-century comparativists extends into present-day 
discourses of world religions and pluralism—a history that Masuzawa and the other 
                                                
108 See also Saba Mahmood “Can Secularism be Otherwise?” Michael Warner, et al., ed., Varieties of 
Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013): 282-99. The arguments of 
secularization as a distinctive procedure were set out in Asad’s influential Formations of the Secular. For 
an example of the potentials of his anthropology of secularization, see Judith Butler and Mahmood in a 
discussion about the Danish Mohammed cartoons controversy in 2009 Symposium, "Is Critique Secular? A 
Symposium at UC Berkeley," Public Culture 20, no. 3, (2008): 447-452. doi: 10.1215/08992363-2008-004.  
109 Masuzawa treats the comparative religionists from the mid nineteenth century as an occasion to not only 
investigate this constitutive function of research and identity but also to reflect on the field at present. For 
example, in her reading of the turn of the century British scholar Henry Louis Jordan, Masuzawa weaves in 
the resistance to what strikes the contemporary reader as political incorrectness in order to dissolve the 
barrier into thinking that "we" would not commit those errors of ego-dependence as those "colonizing 
scholars" would. "Such value laden panoramic survey of ‘old,’ ‘inferior,’ and ‘false’ religions, with its 
evangelizing and missionizing agenda so unequivicolly pronounced, would likely not only embarrass 
contemporary scholars but also offend the pluralist doctrine of today’s world religions discourse more 
generally. It has become a prevailing ethic and custom to edit out from both academic and public 
discourses on religion any sign of hierarchical valuation, any overt expression of self-serving and self-
elevating motives lurking behind the work of comparison—that is, motives other than those in the interest 
of science or of the ecumenical harmony of the world. At the same time, scholars today are aware that in 
former times a large number of biased treatises dismissive of religions other than the author’s own were 
written in the name of ‘fair surveys’ and ‘comparative religion’ as we learn from the ever-resourceful Louis 
Henry Jordan, the explicitly partisan, apologetically motivated comparativism has long thrived side by side 
with, and often in collusion with, the new science of ‘comparative religion’ or ‘history of religion.’" The 
Invention of World Religions, 103. Thus, in Masuzawa, the "invention" is something both done and 
ongoing that contemporary scholars must recognize as having happened, still happening, and in some ways, 
impossible to wrest from. 
110 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 95-97. 
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critical religious studies scholars see as problematic. While Orsi criticized this text as 
anti-historical, I see in it how genealogical methods set up the terms of strangeness and 
“religious others.” Orsi and Roberts want these others to trouble or unsettle the locative 
scholar. I see, instead, that they reimagine the positions of "scholar" and "other" straight 
out of the gate. Instead of the “play of ordinary and extraordinary” where the religion 
scholar and religious person share the unstable ground of wanting to explain but are 
unable to do so consistently or with utter confidence,111 history as genealogy remarks on 
how the extraordinary is teased apart from ordinariness as a procedure of history and 
done so to various effects. 
Historicized Desire: Origin as a Case of Ambivalence 
 
In heeding the call to historicize, Masuzawa adds new dimensions to 
historiography in critical religious studies when she takes up psychoanalysis as a critical 
discourse available for social theory. The search for the/an origin of religion has been a 
target for religious studies across the twentieth century, but while religious studies may 
have outgrown its quest for the origins of religiousness, it still tells narratives of origins 
such as creation myths and in etymologies. Masuzawa reads these parallel narratives 
against the contemporaneous and imbricated discourse of psychoanalysis and finds 
religious studies saturated with a desire for origins. Psychoanalytic allusions to a return of 
the repressed permits Masuzawa to thread history with unconscious activity. Ambiguity 
comes center stage. Unlike Roberts, however, she does not attempt a direct address of the 
uncertainty of incongruity. Instead she watches as scholars use origin to modulate their 
relationship to what cannot be determined. Where origin either can refer to a plenum or a 
                                                
111 Roberts, Encountering Religion, 12.  
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nothingness, it settles as an “object of intense desire” because of its “hyper-cathected” 
status, compensating for what is fundamentally unknown and unknowable.  
It is understandable—one might say that it is structurally inevitable—that 
origin, qua that which is at once everything and nothing, should be an 
object of intense desire. At the same time, it follows with equal certainty 
and necessity that such an hyper-cathected object should be subject to 
strenuous prohibition. For, that which is most acutely and singularly 
desired is also that which must be most stringently and energetically 
denied. In short, the fundamental contradiction endemic to the concept 
(qua everything and nothing), as well as this logical double-bind of desire 
and prohibition that defines and determines its function, together make an 
impossible object-idea out of ‘origin.’ This constitutional difficulty, it 
appears, haunts every deliberation on the problem of origin, openly or 
surreptitiously.”112  
 
The “impossibility” of understanding origin, according to Masuzawa, seems at first an 
overstatement. I see, however, this impossibility as a manner of speaking towards the 
affective and libidinal conditions that surround contradiction. Origin questions stimulate 
the anxiety—and thrill—of limit conditions, which Masuzawa signals with 
psychoanalytic terms. She identifies the limit-issue of any inquiry into origin and calls 
out that limit conditions fold over onto the limits of representational logic. From a 
modern worldview, origin questions are speculative and are ultimately unanswerable. Yet 
humans ask them anyway. Origins also propose the strange thought that answers to the 
present are actually in the past. Again, another contradiction. With her example of origin, 
Masuzawa introduces how objects of study attract attention because of the way words 
and concepts cover over obstacles and gaps in thinking and in experience.  
 Masuzawa’s example of origin shows how modern knowledge production steps 
into new problems as it seeks to solve other ones. In this case, the nineteenth-century 
modern scientific approach and emerging knowledge-field of biology and evolution 
                                                
112 Tomoko Masuzawa, “Origin,” Guide to the Study of Religion, ed. Braun and McCutcheon, 209-24. 
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piqued interest beyond classification to explanation. This then led to a shift, through such 
scholars as Eliade, to turn the tables of inquiry to remind scholars of the limits of 
knowledge, generating a new, impeachable category labeled the “sacred.” Through 
Masuzawa, religious studies scholarship shows how new territories and connections are 
generated, layering new foundations on old structures of thought while applying new 
technologies to erect more elaborate and nuanced perspective. Throughout, origin is not 
wiped away or replaced but put on hold. Through Masuzawa’s account, the history of the 
field is creased and glued, held together by the relationship of its objects, theories and 
methods. Her project refers back to its procedures of historical method as it tells a 
history, , denying while it speaks of denial, making contradictions as it undoes and 
remaps other contradictions. 
As a contributor to critical religious studies, Masuzawa historicizes origin and 
also elaborates on the location of contradiction, not mere incongruity, within the field. In 
her dialectical approach, she does not fall into the locativism that Roberts charges, 
pulling out from within her discussion how scholarship trembles with ambivalence even 
as it asserts. Her discursive analysis of the discipline’s archive leaves within it the 
hesitations and decisions of its contributors. Where a more social-scientific reading 
would treat a search for origins as an ideological claim about false unity for the purpose 
of authority or simply as bad metaphysics, Masuzawa reads tension between renunciation 
and gratification. But this is not only a psychological study: her investigations play out 
across the backgrounds of colonial outposts and institutional relations. Thus, in moving 
between political economy, cultural theory, and psychoanalysis, Masuzawa unfolds the 
conditions for intellectual inquiry for Euro-Americans in late modernity. Her method 
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produces an analysis of the material conditions of thought, and thus, situates the study of 
religion as not only constructing objects for study but as an effect of specific conditions, 
in this case, late modernity’s anxieties of verification and authenticity in industrial 
capitalism. 
Masuzawa positions desire as a major term for critical religious studies. How does 
this square with other scholars? Subjective interests have been the primary term for 
thinking about desire within critical religious studies. Craig Martin, in his introduction to 
the critical study of religion, makes the clear distinction that socially-given identities 
precipitate interests, and that, distinct from desires which are short-term, interests are 
desires extended in time and space where those with more social capital are in positions 
to satisfy more of their social interests. As he explains, “By ‘desire’ we simply refer to 
the desires (in the colloquial sense) that subjects have—or, more precisely, are socialized 
to have—and which they express both explicitly (through what they say) and implicitly 
(through their behavior).” 113 Thus, desire is something that happens through socialization 
and that one represses or maximizes to serve interests over time. One may desire to 
comply with the social code in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the society, but one 
desires this because it is in one’s interest—increase in social capital—to do so. Or it may 
be in one’s interests to resist dominant norms to gain social capital in non-dominant 
groups (one can think here of the increased acceptance of tattoos in society.) From here, 
Martin moves to show that the subject needs to be viewed as one who is rewarded 
                                                
113 Martin, Critical Introduction, 60. Italics in original. 
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through the social and that scholars should be suspicious of these reward structures, but 
also of who is rewarded.114 
I agree with Martin that desires and interests can and should be analyzed for the 
ways that each legitimate subject positions differentially and that these are scripted 
through procedures of authorization that support hegemony. He pulls back to show that, 
following Lincoln, the desires that one has are those put in place by the social and that 
these should be seen as externally, socially directed—and that these make subjects desire 
what is desired for them by others with more capital.115 Martin’s distinction of interests 
as long-term and desires as short-term helpfully addresses the lived, historical condition 
of decision-making. What discourages me from this interpretation of the subject under 
social conditions is that first, interest-fulfillment is a complex, intensive process that 
occupies considerable material, temporal, social, and affective resources and produces 
substantial effects. These procedures, because of their complex operations and 
considerable role in social life, are given little space in critical religious studies literature. 
Second, as Martin says, these operations disproportionately constrain those of lower 
social status.116 Critical religious studies theory would benefit from more attention to 
unpacking the range of authorizing procedures, as Martin advocates, but needs also to 
theorize desires as attachments that may or may not follow the logics of authorization.  
                                                
114 "When confronted with a question about who is or isn’t authentic, the best strategy is to not address the 
question directly at all, but to look behind the question and ask 'Who wants to know, and why do you need 
to know it?' When we are asking who 'is' and 'isn’t' part of a tradition, we are wrongly searching for an 
essence we will not find. What we need to look at is not authenticity ('are you authentic?') but function 
(“how does this work?”). What kind of identification happens when we use certain words? What are their 
effects of this identification for us and our relationships? Who wants to know? And why?" Martin, Critical 
Introduction, 159. 
115 Ibid., 56-57. 
116 “The reason this ability serves a subject’s interests is because when the social arrangements are not well 
suited to work toward the satisfaction of an individual’s desires, she can change the social arrangements so 
that they will. Consequently, domination takes place when subjects in particular positions have a 
disproportionate ability to alter those arrangements, compared with subjects in other social positions.” 
Martin, Critical Introduction , 65. Italics in original. 
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Scholarship in critical religious studies thus proposes this subjective level of 
social analysis but rarely follows through with its prescriptions. By distinguishing one’s 
research as distinctly critical or analytic and not religious, or by insisting on the scientific 
or category-directed work of the scholar as distinct from religious others, scholars excuse 
themselves from being objects of their own analytic tools. It is not impossible to imagine 
such a critical study, but it is something that takes time—and interest?117 The gaze is 
consistently turned outwards, or more precisely, constructs an outside through the motion 
of separation of articulating the differences. Thus, scholarship is seen to have legitimate 
legitimating practices while other forms are less legitimate, illegitimate, irrational, or just 
controlling.118 As J.Z. Smith’s approach demonstrates, critical religious studies 
scholarship does not need to set itself up as divisive in order to be incisive.  
Attention to the social field need not dismiss the subject’s perspective within it, as 
this chapter has argued. But neither does it depend on a concept of a liberal individual. 
Desire, as I propose, bypasses the actor-agent dimensions implied by interests. It also 
supports subject positions which are less able to maximize their interests. It could do the 
theoretical work that is demanded of critical religious studies and support research into 
                                                
117 “Interest” would be the internally consistent metric. At the end of his response to Paul J. Griffiths and 
June O’Connor in his 1998 JAAR article, McCutcheon points to the self-critical perspective he would 
employ. It would seem he has other interests to pursue, which includes scolding those who he feels scolded 
by. “One final point: Am I free of the very structural constraints I see operating in the work of others? 
Certainly not! Contextualist critiques are self- referential-how could it be any other other [sic] way? But 
since one can only accomplish so much in a book or an essay, not to mention this rather brief rejoinder, I 
leave it to others to contextualize my few contributions to the public discourse on the study of religion-but, 
please, no paternalistic spanking, humoring patting, or speculations on the health of my digestive system.” 
Russell T. McCutcheon, “Talking Past Each Other: Public Intellectuals Revisited: Rejoinder to Paul J. 
Griffiths and June O’Connor,” Journal of the American Association for Religion, 66, no. 4 (1998): 915.  
118 This kind of attitude comes forward in the situating of religion as within Enlightenment discourses of 
rationality and irrationality, where religious studies begins and sustains itself through sorting into one or the 
other. McCutcheon sets up this binary but does nothing to trouble it except perhaps to reinstate a new 
binary and claim the privilege of the public and dissent as the legitimate—and legitimating sphere—above 
privacy and experience. Russell T. McCutcheon, “Introduction to Part II: The Autonomy of Religious 
Experience,” The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, ed. Russell T. McCutcheon (London: 
Cassell Publishing, 1999), 67-73.  
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particular conditions—an approach advised but hard to follow through on.119 Desire can 
be cast as a social construction, not as a private matter, and when defined through 
political economy, can become a figure for which to further explore what motivates both 
religion and scholarship in religion.  
II. Desires as Subjective Social Formations, the Case for Utopia 
 
This chapter has honed in on how to grasp and study the subjective perspective 
within the layers of human thought and action, seeking a way to demonstrate that the 
incongruity that Roberts sees as vital to an ethical life and responsible scholarship should 
be viewed as created out of social life and the interactions of creative, productive forces 
that are difficult to track, always interrupted by other productive forces. Psychoanalysis is 
one way to figure these interruptions. Seeing it as a discourse rising out of the late 
nineteenth century as a response to bourgeois European subject formation, 
psychoanalysis becomes a means of redescription, alongside social theory, for the 
ruptures or discontinuities of reason that have been coded as religious. Blending it with 
historical analysis can be appropriate when considering subjective experience within the 
range of modernity and capitalism—both contexts for the construction of religious 
studies. I will consider more about the uses of psychoanalytic terms in chapters two and 
three as they relate to material culture and subject formation. In chapter four, I will 
extend Masuzawa’s query into the place of origin studies in religion and ask if the hunt 
                                                
119 McCutcheon avows that while he appreciates Talal Asad’s direction set forth in Genealogies of Religion 
(1993) that studying how religion authorizes in distinct times and places as distinct traditions; keeping the 
scholar's tool from carving out a universal “religion” is hard to do. See McCutcheon, Manufacturing 
Religion, 134, for this blanket warning and McCutcheon, The Discipline of Religion, 240, for specific 
examples where the modern thing of religion comes to be collected as one effect. 
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into the past as the plenum or obscured source has a correlate in another distinctly 
modern formation: Utopia. 
As mentioned above, J.Z. Smith describes utopia as simply a “no place” to oppose 
the locative impulse. He later modifies this formulation and shortly abandons the term for 
incongruity and then, for difference.120 But in employing these two terms, Smith calls out 
how both religion and religious studies are projects of orientation AND disorientation. 
J.Z. Smith’s work shows how historians inherit and then revise or create the categories 
that they use. This attention to categories has had an important role in critical religious 
studies and also bears on how Utopia can become a conceptual tool for thinking about 
religious studies as a modern category. This somewhat crude formulation for interpreting 
religious phenomena is not striking for how it uses Utopia as much as it is for how Smith 
sees interpretation, redescription, and categorization as necessary yet delicate tasks of 
religious studies. As mentioned above, I am distinctly interested in the contingences of 
categories, about how they are chosen and deployed. I depart starkly from Smith’s “strict 
sense” of Utopia as “no place,” and instead, situate it within modernity as a term related 
to a specific genre of literature that then has been expanded and taken shape over the 
centuries since coined by Thomas More in 1516.  
I take two ideas from Smith’s use of utopian here: first is the insistence of the 
contingency for all categories, a theme that is more thoroughly unpacked in the final 
essay of the volume by the same name, “Map is not Territory.” This is a guiding theme 
for my own research and connects me to many important concerns raised through critical 
                                                
120 Smith's essay, “When the Chips Are Down” in Relating Religion is Smith's own account of his 
transition, and while he says that he has not abandoned utopia, he makes no mention of it in the other 
essays in the collection whereas difference reappears frequently as a category, with essays titled 
"Differential Equations" and "What a Difference a Difference Makes."  
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religious studies. Second is his caution about the literalness of the word utopia and how 
this troubles the creation of the category itself on closer inspection. My dissertation takes 
seriously this choice of “Utopia” as a category for religion and embraces Smith’s caution 
that it holds multiple meanings and thus, needs careful definition.121 I will go on to argue 
that Utopia is best understood as a uniquely western modern formation similar to yet 
different from the modern formation of religion. Both can be seen as human social 
categories responding to the political economic conditions known as modernity. This 
dissertation argues that Utopian desire not only describes modern forms of religiousness 
but also can be used to redescribe—to analyze and leaven understanding of—the 
motivations within the modern academic inquiry of religion. 
Literary critic Fredric Jameson capitalizes “Utopia” to signal this relationship to 
modernity. I follow this convention. Utopia, as a literary genre, has several formal 
elements that make it distinct: its image of the ideal commonwealth, of a harmonious 
society, often removed or separated from a contrasting society that supplies characters to 
visit and explore this enclave both similar and different itself. For Jameson, these literary 
products signal a moment in cultural history coming to terms with the political and 
economic conditions of exploration and the transitions within England and European 
social life marked by transitions of trade, social organization, political institutions—all 
signals of the shift to a capitalist mode of production.122 These productive contradictions 
are figured as the juxtaposition of the Utopian society and the contrasting society of the 
                                                
121 I depart starkly from Smith’s “strict sense” of utopia as “no place,” and instead, see its specificity in 
situating it within modernity, as a term related to a specific genre of literature that then has been expanded 
and taken shape over the centuries since coined by Thomas More. Fredric Jameson capitalizes “Utopia” to 
signal this relationship to modernity. As discussed in my introduction, I follow this convention of 
capitalizing Utopia to mark my argument. 
122 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions, 
(New York: Verso, 2005), 1, 18. 
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text and then repeated by the contradiction within the name itself—Utopia as that which 
is both the no-place (U-topia) and the good place (Eu-topia). Utopia is well-known to 
trigger ambivalence as it paints a picture of a society that is enjoyed by its residents but 
under suspicion by its visitors.  
 Constance Furey turns to the form of Utopia to investigate potentials for 
practicing history with a critical frame, sensitive to the kind of locativism that Roberts 
sees with some methods. Furey responds in her essay to Roberts, Orsi and Nancy 
Levene—religionists seeking alternative historiography that responds to and includes 
excess. In an effort to loosen historicism from its authoritarian posture, she follows the 
turn from philosophies of history to situated histories of context, noting the influence of 
Foucault and Joan Scott and an implied motivating logic that “telling a different story 
about the past will somehow expand our options today” (mirroring a move in culture to 
re-narrate the past i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Committee).123 Mindful of Derrida’s 
insight that the past haunts the present and compels the retelling as a part of mourning, 
Furey seeks a way into a transformative retelling, critical of the present, sensitive to the 
strange, and productive of new conditions. For this, Furey turns to Thomas More’s 
Utopia and Fredric Jameson’s dual commitments to utopia and historical materialism to 
“illuminate the theoretical dilemmas involved in critiquing history.”124 
 What she constructs in this evocative essay is a method of doing “Utopian 
history.” More’s Utopia is a satire, mixing the familiar and fantastical with no clear 
signal as to which is which. This “dialectic of fact and fiction produces a distinctive kind 
of realism that establishes a place for ideas that stand apart from society without claiming 
                                                
123 Constance Furey, “Utopian History,” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 80, no 1 (2012), 385.  
124 Ibid.  
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transcendence.” While Utopias are fiction, she sees that history, too, is made: “it is not an 
object to discover but a learning process, the ongoing work of self-critique.”125. Furey 
argues that when scholars regard history as a creative task like writing utopian fiction, we 
can lift out how the unusual mixes with prevailing norms and this in turn stimulates the 
immanent possibilities within present. She avows that using utopia might at first seem 
“perverse,” with its association with stasis and an imperialism of an old philosophy of 
history, where progress and teleology shunt difference. However, she holds out that the 
fusion of criticism and construction, literalness and fantasy is a model for how history is 
written and “lays bare what we have invested in history and does so in a way that is 
formally analogous to history itself.”126 
 Furey roots her appreciation for the critical force of the Utopian literary form and 
the unchartered potentials of history in Fredric Jameson’s work. Her essay weaves his 
complex thinking expertly for her purposes of sketching a potent concept. By combining 
her summary with additional explication, I want to begin to show how Jameson’s method 
of interpreting cultural forms can lend nuance and texture to the aims of critical religious 
studies and advance a dialectical engagement with the problematic of social and 
subjective theories for religious studies.  
 The Utopian satire delivers the contradictions of History for readers as hyperbole: 
in More’s Utopia, gold is worthless, monogamy is rare, and the rational treatments for 
thieves were proposed by a fool. While not all Utopian narratives are so blatantly 
satirical, the genre is recognized for its way of re-presenting the status quo via its 
distorted or reformulated other. In working out the details for a sustainable social 
                                                
125 Ibid., 391. 
126 Ibid., 390. 
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structure built on revised conventions, the Utopian genre hypostasizes a different status 
quo, freezing the world and ending History’s contradictions. Furey sees in More’s work a 
resistance to conclusions. In its structure, Utopia makes it impossible to take its 
alternative society as a blueprint. The juxtapositions are too tightly woven. 
Just as Utopias are restricted in what kinds of fantasies they can present due to the 
ability of the reader to recognize society as still functional, as still inhabitable, writing 
and revisiting history—historiography—runs up against what has happened, the archive 
as it has been preserved. However, in its retelling by scholars, Furey suggests that history 
be considered for the way it limits and defines what can be said, but also is opened up 
again for its counternarratives for the present. When historians write about the past, they 
would do well to consider at least two dimensions of the Utopian form: first, how they 
are performing an immanent critique of the present, and second, how in juxtaposing the 
present with the past, the familiar and the strange, one is also involved with a resolution 
of the contradictions of capitalism. Furey turns to Jameson for this guidance on what it 
means to include Utopia in doing historical work: that there should be a  
"‘renewal of Utopian thinking, of creative speculation as to the place of 
the subject at the other end of historical time, in a social order that has put 
behind it class organization, commodity production and the market, 
alienated labor, and the implacable determinism of a historical logical [sic] 
beyond the control of humanity.'”127 
 
Utopian history is twofold: it is immanent critique but also “creative speculation.” What 
Utopia produces then, at its best, is what history, too should offer: an endurance for 
                                                
127 Fredric Jameson, Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988), 110, quoted in Furey, “Utopian History,” 390. This quotation appears in the essay "Imaginary 
and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject" and 
corresponds to page 393 as it appears in Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading 
Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).  
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indeterminancy, with an endless dialectical movement of “immanent critique infused 
with hope.”128 
 As I have shown, Furey’s “utopian history” is a lively concept that gives an 
introduction to the wealth and possibilities within Utopia and Fredric Jameson’s thinking. 
Jameson’s work spans six decades and is worth more attention within religious studies as 
it provides a way of theorizing religious tropes as part of culture from within a cultural 
studies/material culture method. It contributes by demonstrating ideology critique as a 
immanent, self-critical practice that does not deny the appeal and constructive force of 
culture on its critics. Jameson’s method of historicizing not only narratives or characters 
but also the form that culture takes turns interpretation towards the constitution of 
thought, again inviting the critic into her own historical moment, creating a type of 
“metacriticism” for thinking the tools of scholarship as well as their objects, as critical 
religious studies does. Furey’s essay invites further query into Jameson’s formal method 
and specifically, the figure of Utopia within modern literature.  
 As Furey demonstrates, Utopia is a fascinating and relevant form that invites 
reflection on the production of modern, Anglo-European knowledge and terms of 
verification. This dissertation extends this conversation with Jameson for religious 
studies and contributes in several ways. Utopia and religion have thus been conceived of 
as versions of one or the other. My project proposes that instead of reading Utopias as 
religious or religions as Utopian, I offer how their mutual engagement with concepts such 
as human nature, idealization, transcendence and society can be remapped as navigating 
the limits of representation. I am especially interested in Jameson's focus on aesthetic 
forms that reflect moments of modernity. The Utopian literary form has a particular role 
                                                
128 Furey, “Utopian History,” 397. 
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for Jameson in that it figures the contradictions within capitalism. Where Furey treats 
Utopia as a model for specifically historical projects, I want to say that Utopia is also a 
frame for the scholarly category of religion. Developed within modern Anglo-European 
intellectual history, both the Utopian literary form and the scholarly object “religion” are 
responses to political, economic and social histories of global exploration, colonization, 
and industrialization. In some ways, this dissertation performs Furey's account of the 
scholar in its “willingness to take the energy of [my] desire for novelty and put it to work 
in utopian history.”129 Perhaps literally here as I write a utopian history of my own.  
From here, one can begin to see how the strange or incongruous that Roberts and 
Orsi promote as necessary to religion overlap with seemingly secular forms such as 
Utopia. As a representation of good but impossible social arrangements, Utopia has been 
variously embraced and rejected over the last 500 years. Roberts’s search for an analysis 
of religious phenomena that keeps theory open to the life of the particular can be 
transposed onto the secular image of Utopia that resists easy location.130 The 
particularity, however, is not in the unknowable about another as ethnographic subject 
specifically or social formation generally, but in the Utopian literary text that attempts but 
never completes the account of a total society. The contradictions of the social world may 
at first seem resolved in the Utopian social order that removes various anxieties from 
consideration but these are never absolutely managed in the questions that linger for both 
Utopia’s visitors and its readers.  
                                                
129 Ibid. 
130 "In other words, 'knowledge' in the humanities is always disturbed by the reverberations of the 
particular, which can never be fully subsumed by the concept or the explanation." My project, as I have 
been arguing, sees this relation of a generalizable particularity as another kind of logical inconsistency that 
religious studies coalesces around, problematizing this in its theories.  In my project, I take this  
generalizable perspective of particularity and look at how Utopia can help scholars notice these kinds of 
contradictions and to question how they might relate to material relations. Roberts, Encountering Religion,, 
115.  
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The lingering questions, such as the contradiction of the peaceful yet troubling 
society, the ambivalence—these are signals of what I will develop as part of the desire for 
Utopia—a subjectively experienced, thoroughly social encounter with contradiction, 
referenced through a historical deposit that can be explored but never absolutely 
captured. The incongruous that is central to Roberts’s reanimated, responsive religious 
studies is first, not exclusive to only the religious imaginary but I agree with Roberts that 
it is an important aspect of religious theory and method. As I have drawn out, incongruity 
can be actively engaged by critical religious studies through appeals to social theory 
where it provides access to various states of social formations, ones more proximate to 
subjectivity than what some forms of social contradiction provide. Where ideology 
critique is leavened with dialectical method and cognizance of the temporalities of 
society-in-process, it functions both to raise both suspicion about formations and to incite 
curiosity about their constitution. The creative, productive aspects of social forms re-
engage the humanism that excites Roberts without collapsing the affective into aesthetic 
or psychological terms. Masuzawa’s use of psychoanalysis as a historical discourse draws 
out how the conflicts of category formation are lived tensions that register as satisfactions 
and frustrations.  
While Masuzawa's work traces origin across the modern discourse of religious 
studies, my own asks about the desires for Utopia within the modern study of religion: in 
what ways does the figure of Utopia consolidate and redistribute the longing to resolve 
social contradictions? How does Utopia, signaling the ambivalent aspects of all fantasy, 
simultaneously resist and perform representation of social totality? This interest in 
Utopia—what I want to call a desire for Utopia—emerges from the contradictions of 
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political economy evident as cognitive uncertainty or frustration in the face of material 
uncertainty and frustration. Utopias—as representations of ideal social orders—attempt to 
resolve these frustrations but only do so in part, and always in a larger field of vision of 
comparison with surrounding still-contradictory social reality.  
Whereas Roberts wishes to propose that the religion scholar submit to the ongoing 
undoing of encounter, I propose that the modern study of religion needs to see its 
investments in a larger movement of Utopian desire. As I articulated in my introduction, 
modern religious studies has been marked by a problematic of representation—a conflict 
of how to form categories that are adequately descriptive and redescriptive of “religious” 
phenomena, thereby adequatly signaling alterity (or difference) that always resides both 
in the object of religion but also in the theory and methods of its scholars. My own 
contribution to this conversation is to speculate that these questions of representation, 
addressed through the study of religion, can also be articulated as desires for Utopia. By 
this, I mean that what structures inquiry and what funds the affective, libidinal 
investments of contemporary religious studies can be recognized as Utopian in the way 
that they are pulled by longings for collectivities and schematics of totality. A concept of 
Utopian desire speaks to the ambitions of these projects but also their ultimate failure. 
Total representation is impossible, and the practice of collectivity is fraught and often 
disappointing. Utopian desire sustains the ambivalence that both desire and Utopia signal.  
 Utopian desires are specific to social formations within capitalist modes of 
production and disruption that are encouraged by Enlightenment knowledge productions 
of reason and abstraction. I explore the figure of Utopia in the following chapters, tracing 
its history and home as a literary form. I argue that Utopian literature formalizes the 
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social contradictions of capitalism and intersects with other cultural forms that are more 
readily referenced as “religious.” As I tease out how Utopia is recognizable from its 
literary instances in modernity and how the literature is a cultural response to social 
conditions, I advance my thesis that the overlap of religious topics and Utopia is due 
more to the conditions and contexts of modern knowledge production broadly, since both 
Utopia and religious studies are engaged in a problematics of representation, albeit 
through different means. Thus, the concept of Utopian desire is my attempt to address the 
problematics of representation of the study of religion by different means. The next step 
in this process is to say more about Utopia.  
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Chapter Two 
Representing Utopia, Representing Desire: Utopia Theory and 
Method Reconsidered 
 
 Religion scholars are not the only ones laboring under the incommensurability of 
representing the subject's experience of her own existence and the society as a structuring 
force of that experience. This chapter turns to Utopia Studies as a peculiar site of this 
problematic as it repeats the dilemma of representing the two layers—self-and social—in 
its object of study: for what does Utopia signify except a society of untroubled selves, 
reconciled to the structures that have constructed them? Like Russian nesting dolls, a 
theory of Utopia represents the representation of an irresolvable contradiction, resolving 
in theory what has been "resolved" in aesthetic form. In this chapter, I show how theories 
of Utopia tip into this tautological dilemma. By rereading the theories of Utopia critically 
and comparing them to those of historians of the Utopian form, I show how they operate 
as a kind of Utopian form themselves, performing the very fantasy they endeavor to 
define. They are thus another iteration of the desire that Utopia represents—the end of 
social contradictions, where self is fulfilled in its social life. Utopia is most precisely 
understood as a form within modernity that represents not just a general "better way of 
living" but an interstitial aesthetic figure used to fantasize a bridge between our 
immersed, existentially-limned, individual selves in the social structure and theories 
about how best to represent that relation. Theories of Utopia are thus instances of Utopia, 
and intellectual projects confronted with tensions between representations of the self and 
social—like critical religious studies— can be recognized as Utopian attempts to form 
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such a bridge in themselves, even as they study the Utopian ideals of other social 
structures..  
 Rather than being a generic, timeless fantasy of a simply better world, Utopia as 
we know it has a strong relationship to the genre of fiction that reflects the conditions 
particular to the political-economic-social transitions and conflicts of the North Atlantic, 
Anglo-America-European setting—a distinction I regard as necessary to understand as a 
category for analysis. I capitalize Utopia to signal this association with Western 
modernity, and my analysis pivots on this distinction. Heretofore, theorists in the field of 
Utopian Studies have depended too heavily on bland universals or generalizations, using 
a lower-case "utopia" and defined variously as social dreaming, an anticipation of the 
future, or a desire for a better way of being. Theirs is a busy, maybe too busy project, 
attempting to bring coherence to the multiple contents and methods that proliferate 
around the enigmatic and appealing occasions of utopias, utopianism, or utopian ideas 
and projects. These generalizing theories of an ahistorical utopianism have encountered a 
surprising lack of critical resistance and they can be critiqued for the way they erase non-
Western particularity or avoid much extra theorizing about the structures of fantasy. 
Instead of immediately dismissing them, however, I want to use utopian theories as 
evidence of a modern, western Utopian form.  
I contend that utopian theories are a kind of Utopian form because they “resolve” 
the plurality of forms, contents and function with a single phrase or formula. This is not 
in anyway unusual for theory to do, and in fact, can be productive. However, in doing this 
with Utopia, this approach privileges ideas over their expressions in material reality. 
Utopia has the potential to stumble over its own shadow as it endeavors to represent 
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society for the sake of its own theoretical understanding of society. A theory of Utopia, 
therefore, develops as an abstraction of the abstraction—an abstract representation of an 
abstract totality. I find this recursive feature of Utopia crucial for understanding how it 
has been and can be used, as both a theoretical approach and a subsequent form, within 
political and social theory.  
 This chapter on how Utopia Studies directs attention to Utopia as an aesthetic 
figure—either through its faults or through its transitions in modern history—supports 
my larger project of seeking ways to discuss the impasse of self and social that confronts 
critical religious studies. It presents Utopia Studies as another instance of this dilemma 
and proposes that Utopia is a figure found within modern western theoretical projects. 
My argument is that Utopia is a consistent presence in the modern study of religion, 
found throughout the forms that—falsely but fruitfully— represent social life as a totality 
and resolve social contradictions through social collectivity. But because religious studies 
doesn't recognize these forms as Utopian, treating them as pragmatic theoretical 
applications instead of as instantiations of a valuable fantasy, we miss a crucial 
opportunity for self-reflection and growth. To put it in different words: only by 
understanding the nature of our favorite abstractions will we be best able to put those 
abstractions to work for us.  
Outline 
 Reading utopian theory generatively involves layers of critique and retrieval. 
While I would argue these are imbricated processes, for the purposes of explication, I 
present Part One as critique and Part two as retrieval. Part One takes up three widely-used 
theories and shows how their appeals to human desire and fantasy mechanisms belie 
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general habits of universalization endemic to Western theory. I argue, through familiar 
critical routes, that universal approaches such as those proposed by Lyman Tower 
Sargent and Ernst Bloch conflict too much with the critiques raised in Chapter One. 
However, instead of using critique to dismiss them, I reinterpret them as symptomatic 
residues of the "utopianism" they attempt to describe. I assert that these universal claims 
are not conclusions but evidence of their own Utopian fantasy, resolving through theory 
an anxiety about, or at least the perfusion of difference. I propose that the popularity and 
use of these theories of a generalized utopia emerge out of this tautological satisfaction 
that a Utopian theory provides: If humans desire societies where dissatisfactions are 
resolved and conditions of lack fulfilled, then a close second to this fundamental desire 
will be a representation of those resolutions and fulfillments, be it a fictional narrative, a 
proposed social order, or a theory—itself an abstraction. I show how recursivity of theory 
tightens when the definition of Utopia emphasizes desire, as in the case of Ruth Levitas's 
work. Desire, I contend, contains its own proposal and deferral of satisfaction. To use 
desire to define utopianism, in short, satisfies the more specific, western intellectual 
Utopian desire by ending the contradiction of multiple definitions, in that competing uses 
resolve into a neat yet endlessly deferring "desire." I see this conflict as, again, 
symptomatic of a larger, more pervasive dynamic of representation and the problematic 
of delivering an account of social totality as it constructs subjects and the subject's 
perspective from within and lived as existence. I analyze this problematic by tracking 
how the contradictions that inhere in these conceptual projects should be interpreted as 
occasions for analyzing Utopia for its contradictory effects. 
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 In Part Two, I perform a retrieval of Utopia's contradictions by tracking back 
through the historians and political and social theorists subsumed by the "utopian" 
theorists in Part One. I revisit the history of the Utopian literary form and its transposition 
into political and social theory. Here, Utopia capitalized signals its relationship to the 
island in More's titular text. By revisiting the transition of Utopia from literary form to 
abstraction for social change, I chart how Utopia becomes part of an emergent field of 
social theory, taking on parts of political theory's normative edge. As Utopia is taken up 
by social and political theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Utopia acquires 
the freight of abstraction and becomes mobilized by social theory to counter ideology and 
frame questions about the means of social change. I recover tensions about how social 
theory hypostasizes and loses the movements and particularity of the subjects it 
endeavors to describe and contend that the theorization of Utopia as "impulse," 
"dreaming," and "desire" signals how theory is invested with fantasies of closure and how 
claims of universality is a stand-in for the Utopian desire for collectivity.  
  By reading Utopian theory through its own history, I uncover how the Utopian 
theory is, in part, constructed from the fragments and failures of representation within 
modernity, folding within itself its own concerns with reification. For this reason and 
others, as I will show, Utopia should be treated as an aesthetic form or a figure. Such a 
project shows how theory as a genre performs a type of Utopian closure, creating 
shortcuts for the sake of explanation that, when put into use as abstractions, can become 
reified and lose the particularities of the social life that the abstractions were created to 
describe. The way out is by considering Utopia not as function but as form. Attending to 
the Utopian literary form switches attention from social abstraction and social or political 
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theory to commodity production and reception. As I will clarify in my last section, 
commodity production and reception more accurately portrays what constitutes Utopian 
desire than what is proposed through utopian theory.  
I. Utopian Theory: Universalization 
 Scholars have responded to the overdetermination of Utopia across different 
cultural sites with a variety of methods. The most common are the historical, aesthetic, 
and philosophical, but within each of these is a kernel of theory, attempting to isolate a 
Utopian essence, origin, or function. Considering the breadth of disciplines that publish 
in the Utopian Studies journal—"American studies, architecture, the arts, classics, 
cultural studies, economics, engineering, environmental studies, gender studies, history, 
languages and literatures, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology and urban 
planning"—it is not surprising that there is a need for some robust theory to sustain these 
multiple projects. (It is also interesting to note that authors from "religion" are not 
significantly represented enough to warrant a mention on their website).131 In order to 
manage the diversity of utopian forms, contents, times, places, and expressions, some 
scholars of Utopia give it a broad definition and collect a multitude of examples beneath 
it. Advancing a generalized understanding of human nature, these scholars go on to 
compare cultural objects for their Utopian qualities across eras and places, labeling 
Biblical, classical, and non-western cultural elements for their utopianism. 
 In this first half of this chapter, I critique the problematic tendency of these 
approaches to universalize, a natural impulse of anticipation or desire for a better way of 
living. First, I present two of these definitions on their own terms. Then, I track through 
                                                
131 See the website for Utopian Studies Journal at: http://utopian-studies.org/journal/, accessed January, 9, 
2017. 
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critiques of universality from the methods of critical religious studies, reading them as 
products of outmoded Enlightenment thought that generalize about human nature, 
subsume religious contents within them, and erase particularity and difference. This 
delineation of critique prepares the ground for my overall thesis: that "utopian theory" is 
a symptom of the Utopian desire it attempts to describe. I argue that these two utopian 
theories are evidence of their own claims: that modern Westernized scholars are 
preoccupied with "social dreaming" or express a "utopian impulse" when they turn to 
theorize society as a totality and fantasize a collectivity of "humanity." While Ruth 
Levitas's formulation of utopianism as a "desire for a better way of being" attempts to 
limit the universal prospect of utopianism with an assertion that those desires are socially 
constructed, her definition buries the social in a generalized desire that registers only at 
the level of the self, and casts Utopia as little more than private fantasies of self-
betterment. Though it is immensely common, even typical, to view Utopia as a universal 
form of human thought and practice, Sargent's three "faces" or varieties of Utopia—
literary narratives, intentional societies, and Utopian social theory—each occlude aspects 
of the real work that Utopia does in condensing the problematics of social representation.  
Utopia as Social Dreaming 
 Defining utopianism broadly as "social dreaming," scholar and bibliographer 
Lyman Tower Sargent scans archives and world history for examples of this tendency in 
practices, literature, and theory.132 Ancient myths of paradises and speculative fiction 
about future lands of plenty are bucketed together, along with intentional communities 
and theories of social improvement. The result is an exhaustive account of fiction, non-
                                                
132 Lyman Tower Sargent, Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 8. 
  92 
  
fiction, architecture and film alongside examples of historical projects—all enacting 
some dimension of “a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally 
located in time and space.”133 The efforts at instantiation through projects within history 
are utopian in that they are dependent on this fantasy, on the dream of the social. In 
bringing such diversity under the canopy of utopia, Sargent endeavors to resolve 
confusion about the words in wide use and to keep honest those who would like to say 
that they know utopia when they see it.134 In other words, Sargent implies through this 
cataloging process that the contradictions or diversity in the examples of utopia can be 
handled by sufficiently broad definition and an effort at categorization. This pays off in 
inclusivity, and makes sense of the popular use of the word: “utopias” are produced by 
“utopianism,” the habit of social dreaming that is a part of both western and non-western, 
ancient and modern worlds. It is an elaboration of hope and a part of changing society for 
the better and as such, a universal phenomenon not exclusive to Judeo-Greek-Christian 
lineages.135  
 Sargent privileges utopia as a universal habit and situates religious behavior and 
projects within a larger, global work of social dreaming.136 The “desire for a better life, 
                                                
133 Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,” Utopian Studies, 5, no. 1 (1994), 9. 
Goodwin and Taylor note how this contrast makes it a natural critique utopia is not just normal idealism 
because it breaks from the present social order and in doing so, critiques the social institutions. Most 
projects focus on the "eu" of utopia, the good life that, by definition, “does not currently exist” Barbara 
Goodwin and Keith Taylor, The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1983), 17. 
134 See Sargent’s discussion of Manuel and Manuel who said “they know one when they see one.” Fritzie P. 
Manuel and Frank E. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 336; Sargent, “The Three Faces,” 2. 
135 Sargent, Utopianism, 66-81. 
136 According to Sargent, utopian experiments, such as the Oneida Perfectionists, have been formed around 
religious texts, communities, and leaders but are read as religious utopias, not utopian religious movements. 
Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament scriptures, with their images of Zion and the Kingdom of God, 
are read as Proto-Utopian texts. Utopian political theories bring consciousness to ideology and a social 
imaginary that is seen to preserve the arms of power which consolidates in religious communities. Thus, 
Sargent has little in the way of theory for his interpretation of utopia and religion, leaving the associations 
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for order, unity and simplicity” has always been with humans and “the expression of 
utopianism is the most basic strata of the human experience.” Even those who oppose 
utopia hold out for a better situation by asserting that a utopian effort would make matters 
worse. Sargent naturalizes utopianism by identifying it with maximizing need fulfillment. 
This need fulfillment requires direction, however, and positive visions of society are 
necessary to direct behavior that would otherwise be directionless. This expansive 
reading of Utopia as ‘purposeful work to inspire’ has much in common with Joyce 
Hertzler's earlier survey of utopian literature. Writing in 1923, Hertzler identifies utopias 
as imaginary ideal societies that recede on the horizon and endlessly motivate human 
action on behalf of social transformation. As in Sargent's work, Biblical prophets and 
apocalyptic texts are considered to be outgrowths of human longing, and Hertzler's 
survey profiles prophets, Apocryphal literature and ancient writers like Homer, Virgil, 
Plato, and Cicero as examples of early utopianism. Thus, utopia is the tradition of 
representing ideal conditions that, through the representation of social possibility, 
becomes a means of transforming society. Hertzler highlights how these texts inspire 
change in human behavior through the way they emphasize human effort, even if in a 
horizon of divine activity.137  
 Among their contributions, surveys of utopian literatures like Hertzler's and other 
more recent collections provide snapshots of significant texts of the Western canon that 
encourage the reader to relate them contextually within history.138 However, these 
                                                                                                                                            
stand in their expressions and not in their thematic relations or history. This is an issue for Levitas (and me) 
that I discuss below..  
137 Joyce Hertzler, The History of Utopian Thought, (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 49.  
138 Johnson’s 1968 collection and Claeys and Sargent’s more recent Utopia Reader both restate that social 
dreaming precedes the genre that Sir Thomas More’s work, Utopia, inaugurates. Sir Thomas More, Utopia, 
ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1975, orig. pub. 1516); J.W. Johnson, ed., Utopian Literature: A 
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surveys take for granted and naturalize the world views and assumptions that shaped their 
production. They make little effort to question or even to qualify the trajectories of liberal 
humanism and secularization, where the "natural" human impulse is to fantasize 
alternatives and the modern scholar's responsibility is to collect as many diverse 
examples of this. Hertzler's is perhaps the most extreme example of this progressive 
narrative, placing ancient texts in the stream of Anglo-American Christendom, thus 
building a narrative of a modern man [sic] progressively developing and striving along 
this axis of effort and ability. Sargent, writing after World War II, is more wary of the 
effects of this motivation, cautioning that physiological needs can be misunderstood and 
their social routes to satisfaction can in turn produce “social pathology, grotesques of the 
imagination and of politics.”139 However, both the broad definition of social dreaming 
and the form of the survey work support the notion that there is a general human progress 
at work despite its temporary interruptions.  
 Sargent's definition that utopias are cases or instances of "social dreaming" and 
are figured as "non-existent societies located in time and space" affords a narrow account 
of Utopia, in that this definition circumscribes Utopias as fantasies that figure or 
articulate social relations with specific conditions. But Sargent’s framework overreaches 
by declaring these representations to be Utopia even when they are found outside of 
modernity. The assumption in these cases is that ex-modern utopianism depends on a 
generalized human nature which dreams in ways that modern scholars can recognize. 
This spreads the critical and specific work of Utopia into regions that may or may not be 
articulating a desire to reconcile social difference through a restructuring of social 
                                                                                                                                            
Selection (New York: Modern Library, 1968); Gregory Claeys and Lyman Tower Sargent, ed., The 
Utopian Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 
139 Sargent, “The Three Faces,” 28. 
  95 
  
totality, and likely attributes too much modern subjectivity to the authors and adherents 
of pre-modern utopian narratives. Also, in extending social dreaming to individuals, 
texts, or communities beyond modernity by way of a generalized human nature, Sargent 
purports to construct a collectivity of human natures that spans diverse times and places. 
This reflects what I identify as the modern desire for Utopia—the creation of a 
collectivity of different humanities, all in cooperation with the same goal and 
harmonizing difference. Sargent's definition and explication of utopia as "social 
dreaming" is, therefore, is itself a dream of a shared human activity that finds sameness 
across time and space.  
Utopia as Universal Impulse 
This claim of a universal human impulse that unites humanity is most strongly 
articulated in Ernst Bloch's philosophical argument for a "utopian impulse." Bloch has 
widely influenced scholarship on Utopia. Regarded as a lesser-known member of the 
Frankfurt School, Bloch's weave of Marxist thought— with and against Freud and 
Heidegger—generates an unorthodox materialism that turns towards the unknown future, 
allowing for both a perspective of universal claims and an historicized aesthetics. Bloch’s 
work impacts my analysis of Utopia at several junctures: first, in its universalization;  
second, in its role in Levitas's understanding of desire, and three, as it contributes to my 
own historicized aesthetics and category of Utopian desire developed in the following 
chapters.  
Bloch asserts a universal utopian impulse arisin gfrom the effects of temporality 
on consciousness, which situate every person in a moment that is filled with an unknown 
future— experienced in the moment primarily in terms of fear or hope. Within both of 
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these orientations is recognition of the exposure to what is not yet to come into being. 
This consciousness of anticipation is an “enormous experiment of mediated capability of 
being other in process,” where the human fills in possibility with hopes and fears and 
plans but ultimately is met with an incalculable uncertainty.140 Thus, the immediate 
horizon has a disruptive quality to it. This moment, when filled with the positive possible, 
is the impulse to hope, what Bloch refers to as a "utopian impulse," potential in ever 
anticipatory moment.  
The utopian impulse pulls embodied human sensations of hunger into a larger 
schema of temporal expectation. The future starts in the present, where wishes derive 
from hungers and cravings are centered in bodily survival. He tracks how anticipatory 
consciousness constructs desires for better selves, better worlds, and the fulfillment of 
time itself, culturally evidenced in both the personal wishes of fairy tales, travel 
narratives, films, theater; and the social wishes of architecture, political plans, utopian 
literatures, and even the industrial relations of the 8-hour work day. The fulfilled 
moment-wish is evident in moral programs, music, images of an afterlife and death and 
the kingdoms on earth brought forward through divine intervention. Bloch situates 
cultural creation itself as an ontological argument, as a response to temporality. His 
rigorous defense of anticipatory consciousness as a necessary and useful orientation to 
time has been used to ballast humanist arguments within utopian theory, including 
Levitas's claim that Utopia is mostly recognized as it functions to excite humans to strive 
and achieve better conditions for living—a "desire for a better way of being."  
 Bloch's work is rich with allusion to the development of religion as cultural 
expression of this fundamental utopian impulse, and his work has found reception in 
                                                
140 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 274. 
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theologies and histories of hope.141 However, what is notable here is that both Bloch's 
philosophical approach to Utopia and the more data-collective style of literatures and 
expressions of social dreaming share the argument that utopianism is a universal or 
fundamental human experience. It is a compelling argument in that it cooperates with a 
perception that biological human necessity generates fantasies that seek resolution. These 
surveys echo what has been said about the place of religion by Tyler Roberts: that utopia, 
like religion, is a way for thinking the gap between the social world and individual 
experience by using social dreaming for managing the limits and obstacles to 
satisfaction—materially, structurally, and emotionally.  
 Universal Utopianism and the Erasure of Non-Western Particularity 
While there is value in asserting Utopia as a fundamental human urge, this kind of 
perspective is a therapeutic expression based on acceptance of a modern bourgeois 
individual that obscures particularities when abstracted as a theory. The consolation of a 
shared, human utopian impulse misses the mark and runs the risk of treating the condition 
itself as a religious remnant, a “divine discontent.”142 Positioning utopia as either a 
primal, inescapable human impulse or reading back through history and places to name 
                                                
141 Jurgen Moltmann's work is perhaps the most well-known and relevant here. I wrote my master's thesis 
on Christian eschatology and have learned more about Moltmann from my Syracuse colleague Wendy 
DeBoer in her research in historical methods in religious studies. In correspondence, DeBoer notes that 
"Barth criticized Moltmann that he had simply "baptized" Bloch. But I think Bloch provided a way for 
Marxism to be incorporated into Christianity through the concept of hope and the logic of promise as Von 
Rad had emphasized in the Hebrew Bible. Bloch's future orientation and the prevailing interest in 
eschatology ushered in by the realization that humans in a nuclear age could destroy the world in one fell 
swoop." February 24, 2017. See Jurgen Moltmann Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of 
Christian Eschatology (New York: Harper Row, 1967). 
142 "The idea of utopia is a striking example of man's divine discontent: his refusal to admit that he has no 
say in his own destiny but must submit to the harsh, disagreeable facts of existence simply because they 
seem unconquerable." Johnson, Utopian Literature, xiii. 
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texts or behaviors as of a single utopian fabric denies or comes into conflict with 
historical particularities that critical religious studies have shown to matter.  
Among these denials is the erasure of non-western particularity. Using social 
dreaming or ideal social vision as the category for comparison, scholars can claim 
evidence in writings from China that yearned for a past era or Taoist concepts of 
harmony and equality that focus on social transformation through human effort. 143 Other 
non-western utopias are identified as products produced from the impacts of western 
modes of social reform, making local projects utopian in character. Japan and Latin 
America have examples of these texts.144 Also, forms such as the Asian and African 
cargo cults may fall in this line as expressions of plenty. Using them as examples of 
utopian social dreaming, these cases lose an analysis of how politics are in themselves 
wish-fulfilling fantasies. A further problem comes when an ahistorical humanism 
displaces experiences of those within colonialization. With the broad label a wish for 
better living, utopia is treated positively without necessarily examining the historical 
consequences of this aspiration and how it is played out, especially for those in the 
Americas. Such historians as John Mohawk and Miguel Lopez Lozano show how what 
Sargent broadly calls “social dreaming” are sites of conflict. Mohawk specifically details 
how Platonic philosophy of ideals combined with imperial Christendom to generate a 
rationale for subjugating American natives and ravaging the land in the ways they did—
and still do. Lopez-Lozano’s Utopian Dreams, Apocalyptic Nightmares: Globalization in 
Recent Mexican and Chicano Narrative gives testimony to how the colonizers used 
                                                
143 Confucian inspired writings were descriptions of a Golden Age with an ethical imperative to improve 
for a perfect future. Zhang Longxi, “The Utopian Vision: East and West,” Utopian Studies, 13, no. 1 
(2002), 18.  
144 Segal, Utopias: A Brief History from Ancient Writings to Virtual Communities,19-23. 
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Utopia as a means to externalize the difference they encountered.145 It also shows how 
writers have inverted the terms of western modernizers to reposition women, nature and 
culture as the ideal that was trampled in the name of a Utopian ideal. Their work 
highlights the negatives of Utopia and its violence to people and to the landscape for the 
purpose of reimagining social relations. 
 It is this kind of anachronism that critical scholars of religion have warned of in 
comparative treatments of religion. From this investigation of the “human nature” of 
“utopian” ambition, thought, and products, through the surveys of Sargent and Hertzler 
and the ontology of Bloch, I want to consider what I might call “the historical impulse to 
universalize Utopia.” This impulse is a modern intellectual habit formed out of an 
Enlightenment orientation to knowledge to generalize about human nature, coming to 
terms with the differences witnessed through global contact. This kind of historical 
treatment of utopian theory follows the work of the critical religious theorists presented 
in Chapter One who cautioned against universal claims as being Christian in their 
pedigree and assumptions. Collapsing all hopeful futures into utopia promotes the 
Christian, modern liberal valences of progress, making hope appear normative. These 
accounts do not adequately address the constitution of western scholarship and its history, 
shaped by western experiences of space and time that are formed through imaginaries of 
exploration and conquest. To a scholar of religion, they resemble the claims of universal 
religious impulse that is then shown to manifest variously across history. Utopia, by this 
design, looks like a perennial wisdom or an Eliadian universally-available Sacred, able to 
                                                
145 Miguel Lopez Lozano, Utopian Dreams, Apocalyptic Nightmares: Globalization in Recent Mexican and 
Chicano Narrative (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007); John Mohawk, Utopian Legacies: 
A History of Conquest and Oppression in the Western World (Sante Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 
2000). 
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express itself under various historical conditions. Like Eliade who identified a modern 
malaise taking away the enchantment of every day life and advocated for the value in 
promoting a transcendence for its role in orienting human activity, “utopia” is a new 
word for uniting diverse expressions. When posited as an enduring hopeful spirit, 
“utopia” looks like a Tillichian Ground of Being, providing a depth to reality that is then 
brought to the surface through its forms of planning and proposing alternatives to 
challenge the disappointing present. To use a word from Chapter One, instead of religion 
as the counter to incongruity, these scholars have found utopia. As I will show next, 
Levitas endeavors to avoid the associations of a general utopianism with fundamental 
human nature by instead associating it with desires for better ways of being. However, 
her analytic method of uniting the diversity and superseding particular cases of content, 
form, or function with a generalized desire displaces Utopia's contradictions to the level 
of her claim. Thus, the ways that Utopia signifies the modern representational dilemma of 
the self and social by figuring this resolution aesthetically as a harmonized collectivity is 
subsumed simply as desire for something comparatively better. This displacement does 
not negate her work but gives the occasion to analyze how utopian theory is, as I will 
argue, itself a Utopian form and leads me consider form as the primary mode of 
theorizing Utopia. 
Utopia as Desire for a Better Way of Living 
 Ruth Levitas, in her widely-cited work The Concept of Utopia, recognizes the 
fluid status of "utopia"—the lower-case version—in scholarly works and wants to take 
account to bring some conceptual clarity to address the means and methods of social 
transformation. Lower-case utopianism appears in a host of places but is rarely defined. 
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She notes that utopia, colloquially, is seen as intrinsically impractical but widely used to 
connote ideas about social change, thus rendering it an "ideological battleground" for 
promoting or dismissing specific social programs.146 This effort to collect, isolate and 
explain a constant among the variation leads her across nineteenth and twentieth century 
terrains of surveys of literature, historiography and Marxist theory. She sorts these 
projects for their general liberal humanist and Marxist orientations, noting how the 
humanist strands tend to emphasize utopian programs, whereas the Marxist ones weight 
towards a utopian function. Levitas's work centers on the Marxist commentators most of 
all and the function of utopia, who have, over time, reimagined the word and its 
potentials after Marx and Engels used it so pejoratively to dismiss the Utopian Socialists 
and their local social arrangements. Having carefully read Marx and Engels for this 
history, she moves on to recover the usefulness of dreaming for social change.147 
Levitas's chosen Marxist commentators for her task are ones who have emphasized 
utopia in their own writings. Organizing chapters around their works, she draws mainly 
on Karl Mannheim, Ernst Bloch, William Morris, and Herbert Marcuse. She backs away 
from the claims of Bloch and Marcuse that identify utopia as a part of a central human 
nature but assures her readers that there can be a common aspect to all utopias without 
"making claims about the universality of utopia or the existence of a fundamental utopian 
                                                
146 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 3. Levitas's 
book was reprinted in 2010 with a new preface, different pagination but no substantive changes.  
147 Levitas's chapter on Marx and Engels is a careful exegesis of their work to identify how they construct 
their understanding of utopia explicitly from the schemes of Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Henre de 
Saint-Simon and counter them with their own Scientific Socialism. However, Levitas preserves them for 
utopia in that they "touch on a central political and theoretical debate within Marxism and beyond, namely 
that concerning the role of ideological processes in social change." She goes on to say that "Conceptual 
clarity is of crucial importance in this debate; for what Marx and Engels were rejecting as utopian, and 
thereby adding so substantially to the pejorative connotations of the term, is manifestly not the same as that 
dreaming which Lenin commended, or that which later Marxists have sough to re-insert into Marxism in 
the name of utopia." I do not see that Levitas adds that much light to distinguishing between ideology and 
dreaming in her own analysis, except by way of her exposition of others. Levitas, Concept, 58. 
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propensity."148 Seeing herself as one who can pull together the diversity, she finds the 
functional definitions and uses of utopia more compelling but settles with a general 
enough definition to satisfy the range she surveys, naming the constant element as 
"desire—desire for a better way of being and living."149  
 Levitas's painstaking tracking of the ways scholars have utilized definitions of 
content, form, and function lead her away from any one of these definitions, having 
found each missing the other in some way. She holds out for an inclusive definition, to 
avoid having to rank contents, to allow how utopia has escaped from its literary form and 
ISseen in other expressions, and to consider how utopia may change in its function 
historically.150 If utopia is seen to be drained of its politics, then she assures her readers 
that utopia is only the desire, and hope is the proper name for what transforms wishful 
thinking into will-full action, as hope is the domain of possibility. Levitas offers the 
fullest statement in her conclusion: 
The essential element in utopia is not hope, but desire—the desire for a 
better way of being. It involves the imagining of a state of being in which 
the problems which actually confront us are removed or resolved, often, 
but not necessarily, through the imagining of a state of the world in which 
the scarcity gap is closed or the 'collective problem' solved. This definition 
goes beyond that of an alternative world, possible or otherwise.151 
 
She insists that a desire for a better way of being should not be narrowly construed in 
psychoanalytic terms as an erotic drive or a constantly manifesting impulse, nor as a 
universal, defining universal in the sense of it being a foregone conclusion of human 
existence. Such an "idea of an innate impulse to utopianizing is intimately bound up with 
essentialist definitions of human needs and human nature," which are for her problematic 
                                                
148 Levitas, Concept, 8.  
149 Ibid., 7.  
150 Levitas, Concept, 198, has a quick summary of these points.  
151 Ibid., 191. 
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for they way that they suggest a potentially single and ideal content.152 Wanting to 
preserve the plurality, she defends the "socially constructed" aspect of all utopian 
creations as opposed to their naturalness: it is not that it is natural or inherent to construct 
utopias, but they are dependent on what the society wants or needs because each society 
will construct from its own place and time its own needs. In such cases, if there is 
scarcity, it is only because the society has decided that such-and-such a thing is needed 
and thus may or may not be scarce. 153 She defends a kind of particularity that allows for 
cross-cultural expressions of utopia in such diverse instances as Plato's writings, Cargo 
Cults, The Land of Cockaygne with its rivers of milk, honey and wine and also in an 
(orientalized) Shangri-La. However, she also includes the "individual" pursuits of 
psychological states. She assures that a broad analytic definition, moving away from the 
function of it to compensate, critique, or catalyze for change as the Marxist interpreters 
favor means it does not have to attach to anything particularly but can apply to particular 
things.  
Contradictions in/of Utopian Theory of Desire 
 While Levitas's exegetical work with each theorist provides useful summaries of 
major contributions to the study of Utopia, I contend that her method of harmonizing the 
variety of utopia into a generic concept of desire is not a solution but a sign of the larger 
problematic of representation generally that appears as contradictions in her method and 
theory. Despite using explicitly modern commentators, Levitas attributes Utopia to non-
                                                
152 Ibid., 181. 
153 She cites Raymond Williams for her understanding of socially-constructed desire: 'We cannot abstract 
desire. It is always desire for something specific, in specifically impelling circumstance.” Raymond 
Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays, (New York: Verso, 1980), 200; Levitas, 
Concept, 182-83. 
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modern locales. As seen above, this assumes a kind of generalizable utopianism that, I 
have argued, creates a kind of anachronism that weakens its usefulness as a category. She 
gathers her term "desire" from the Marxist commentators who focus on the function of 
utopia, distancing herself from the "liberal humanists" who tend more to programs and 
their content. Levitas gives a short review of the historians of the utopian forms, noting 
that they primarily have used a general definition of utopia as the "the attempt to describe 
in fiction or construct in fact an ideal society."154  
  In the first of three contradictory elements of her thesis, Levitas eschews Bloch 
and Marcuse for their universalizing of a Utopian impulse via ontological or 
psychoanalytically-explained rifts in consciousness, and goes on to develop a universally-
applicable concept for any historical site that demonstrates the generic desire for better 
living.  
Analytic definitions not only do not imply the existence and necessity of 
boundaries, they suggest their irrelevance. The principle of addressing the 
utopian aspects of different cultural phenomena implies that there are no 
limits to the material that can be looked at from this point of view. A 
consequence of adopting an analytic definition is that the issue of 
boundaries ceases to be a theoretical problem.155 
 
This limitlessness and "boundary"-lessness seems ironic in the case of  “utopia,” first 
known as an island bounded by the sea, remote, and only accessible through retelling. As 
I will go on to argue, it is the boundaries that establish Utopia exist as a scholarly figure 
and interesting as a limited category for use in considering how ordinary utopian 
representations are themselves bounded and provisional, as are categories and concepts, 
despite Levitas's claim. I defend the claim that analyzing Utopia as desire is indeed an 
encounter with limitations and boundaries, but these are not confining or restrictive as 
                                                
154 Levitas, Concept, 158. 
155 Ibid., 198. 
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Levitas says but are useful for analyzing particular conditions. As I will go on to explain, 
Utopia is a distinctly Western, modern form, and its association with universality should 
be recast along two different lines that neither Levitas nor the others have considered: 
Utopia strides the universal and particular not as a human impulse nor a limitless concept 
to be applied in particular places but as its placement within an Enlightenment habit of 
analysis. If there is a universal aspect of Utopia, it is neither in its impulse nor in its 
concept of desire, but in how modern claims of universality represents both collectivity 
(plurality) and social totality (unity) at once—a shared humanity within an arc of human 
history.  
 A second contradiction is in the case of opposition or conflict or contrast of utopia 
that Levitas disguises with the more ameliorating or approximating terms of "desire" and 
"better way of being." Levitas seeks to distance it from its more critical function because 
she is concerned about prejudice seeping in and showing preference for some solutions or 
too narrowly construing what someone's scarcity gap may be. Her definition aims to 
recognize the neoliberal projects as well as qualitatively negative social arrangements, i.e. 
fascism, to be seen for their utopian aspects as they, for their proponents, are "better ways 
of being."156 She distances herself from these right-leaning views from personal, 
politically practical perspective, but reserves that they are utopian because they reflect 
aspirations. However, in qualifying utopia to include conservative, neoliberal, or the 
radically right politics, Levitas waters down the disjunction that Utopia signifies: 
There may perhaps be those who would exclude these on the grounds that 
they are not genuinely believed in by those who propagate the views—that 
the ideas of the New Right represent a cynical manipulation of politics. 
But one of the features of ideologies (including utopias) is that their 
proponents genuinely do believe that the social arrangements which are in 
                                                
156 Ibid., 183-186.  
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their interests are also in the interests of the rest of humanity. This is not to 
deny that utopian images may be used for manipulative purposes. Much 
advertising uses images of the good life (the idyllic island, the 
sophisticated life of leisure and consumption, the cosy [sic] nuclear 
family) to sell products. Advertisements work, though, because they key 
into utopian images which are already present among the audience, 
reflecting their desires, their lack. Even at this level, the utopias current in 
a society tell us much about the experience of living in it, because they tell 
us in a way that we cannot directly ascertain where the felt absences are in 
people's lives—the spaces, that is, the utopia offers to fill, whether in 
fantasy or reality.157 
 
There is indeed a utopianism in consumerism, of eliminating the "scarcity gap" of leisure 
and rest, but to assert that proponents of neoliberal policies "genuinely believe" that "their 
interests are also in the interests of the rest of humanity" ignores the Marxist project of 
ideology critique she has carefully followed. I too want to keep the possibility open of 
ideology and utopia as in cooperation, as related. However, I argue that Utopia, to speak 
back to the scarcity gap it desires to fill, must take two aspects of this gap that Levitas 
misses: the representational circuit of the Utopian "image" and the violence that claims to 
"better" imply. Many paths to "better" have been paved with bodies, and this is missing in 
her formulation of a general utopia. Thus, as I will argue, Utopia is not merely 
ameliorating or a proximate improvement but draws attention to the formation or 
constructedness of the scarcity that is funded by violence, viscerally experienced and 
highly mediated.  
 A third contradiction in Levitas's method in conceptualizing utopia is the silent 
insertion of a desiring, self-possessed individual within a stream of social constructions. 
Levitas insists on the "socially-constructed" conditions for the desire to arise or be 
enacted, that the "scarcity gap" is given by the specific conditions of specific social 
arrangements and insists on a broad enough definition beyond any particular form, 
                                                
157 Ibid., 189. 
  107 
  
content, or function so that the analysis of this desire can be tracked for historical 
changes. She is also careful to insist that utopia and ideology should not be separated, and 
resists any essential human need, seeing all needs as socially-constructed and that appeal 
to discrete, verifiable need would lead to an attachment to a particular content in utopia. 
Her approach is thus strongly reminiscent of social constructionism in Religious Studies: 
what makes all utopias sound like discussions of human nature is their tacit appearance of 
happiness, when in Levitas's eyes, they are just one more case of an occasion to register 
someone's values or interests: 
Indeed, without the criterion of human needs and human nature we have 
no objective measure for distinguishing the good society from the bad, 
except the degree of fit between needs and satisfactions; and this does not 
distinguish happiness in unfreedom, the happiness of the cheerful robot, 
from 'real' happiness. The appeal to needs is made, in fact, to provide 
precisely such a (pseudo)-objective criterion, rather than make explicit the 
values involved in particular constructions of individuals and societies, 
and present this as what it is—a matter of moral choice.158 
 
As Levitas goes on to present the socially-constructed desiring subject, she 
simultaneously assures her readers that these are "moral choices" directing particular 
utopias and later, that agents with hope are the ones transforming the nascent utopian 
wishes into action: "The dream becomes vision only when hope is invested in an agency 
capable of transformation."159  
 This slippage of dependent subject and liberal agent is most relevant to my own 
project of proposing how Utopia figures these two aspects of representation. Levitas is 
aware of this problematic and registers it in her discussions of Bloch and Thompson, who 
she says keep these two pieces—constructed subject and experience—in dialectical 
relation. I will turn to her use of these figures for her own ends in Part Two. For my 
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purposes here, it is enough to say that her conclusion does not sustain their dialectical 
relation. Levitas's deployment of the term of "desire" unites the social and the individual 
too easily. In her use of desire, Levitas substitutes a word signifying a personal 
experience of contradiction—desire—for a representational contradiction—Utopia. In 
emphasizing the "desire for a better way of being," Levitas lets this "way of being" settle 
back on the individual who seeks his or her own fulfillment or expresses a "moral 
choice." This shifts emphasis away from "being together" as the source of concern. It puts 
the weight on an individual confronting society instead of a subject confronted by 
society. Needs are likely to be "contradictory for and between individuals," she asserts, 
but this contradictory condition does not trouble the coherence and confidence of her own 
project—that of eliminating the contradictions which plague Utopia. Her method is 
overall motivated by her own desire to rescue utopianism from obsolescence, arguing for 
continuity between the Marxist and neo-liberal utopias by bracketing utopia from action 
and assuring that its social relevance lies not in its ability to generate desires or represent 
desires but in the longings themselves—that the presence of longing is enough to secure 
utopia's status.160 This motive —has no interest in Utopia’s inherent conflicts with early 
modern political authority and late modern subjectivities characterized for their rifts of 
consciousness and the stakes of wage-labor capitalism. It is easy to understand her 
                                                
160 Levitas suggests here what she says more explicitly in 2013 in Utopia as Method: utopia has been 
eclipsed in thought and to return to utopia in sociology is to preserve the motivational power that socialist 
utopias held in the 19th and 20th centuries. In her discussion of Bauman's claim that utopia has lost its 
persuasive power, Levitas remarks: "what is needed then is a new utopia to take the place of socialism, 
which is directed at both capitalist and socialist realities." It is an anxiety about what can be used to 
motivate the left to continue to pursue its "function of transformation" In her conclusion, she again names 
the loss: "There is no sense of who is going to effect change, or how, although such change is seen as 
imminently necessary, if unfortunately not necessarily imminent. But ever since the abandonment of the 
assumption that the proletariat would be the agents of revolution, the problem of agency as been acute." 
Levitas, Concept, 169, 196. See Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan), 2013.  
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solemnity, writing in the late 1980s, wondering what to make of postmodernity and its 
political apathy and social decadence. However, instead of applying a blanket of desire to 
rescue agency, I will argue that periodizing Utopia for its ability to figure—narrate, 
image, and represent—modern contradictions will do more for holding open the conflicts 
of representing experiential and constructed registers that Levitas and I both notice as an 
aspect of critical scholarship and its inheritance of Marxist methods. 
 Simply stated, Levitas uses a the concept of a gap to cover a gap, insists on a 
better ‘way of being’ that really is only a different moral code, and hides social 
construction behind a self-possessed desire. Instead of focusing my critique on these 
inconsistencies, I argue for seeing them as an occasion to examine how utopian theory as 
method performs its content by resolving formally the subject's existential perspective 
and the social totality used to account for that perspective. To restate my claim 
succinctly: If Utopia offers the fantasy of fulfillment and resolution of problems created 
through social intercourse, Utopian theory is a fantasy that resolves the contradiction of 
impersonal social and historical forces and the all-too-personal affective crush of those 
forces. Sargent, Bloch and Levitas all rest on the fantasy element of utopia to direct their 
definitions. Sargent and Levitas appropriate those theorists of desire—Bloch, Marcuse, 
and E.P. Thompson—for the work of fantasy, imagination, and desire without laboring 
with the archive of psychoanalysis. I contend that this insertion of desire performs a 
Utopian desire—to resolve the incommensurability, the incongruity that the legacy of 
social theory has left. By labeling Utopia as desire in this way, the existential dimension 
of the play of differential social formations is reintroduced to social theory. Although 
Utopia is indeed a desire, it is a desire played out on the level of form, be it theory, 
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fiction, or other aesthetic products. Thus, a more appropriate method examines is its 
formal properties—its history, its features, and its circuits of production, distribution, 
reception, and reformation. The following analysis will show how the gaps constitute the 
form and attend to the contradictions themselves while admitting that all attempts, in 
fiction or theory, are fantasies. These are useful fantasies—and pleasurable—but 
fantasies, nonetheless.  
Treating Utopia as a universal, ahistorical human activity erases the differences of 
others who scholars seek to know more about. Bloch's work in connecting art and culture 
across historical time and place has been criticized for being overly expansive, and 
ignoring crucial differences between his wide-ranging evidence for the ever-present 
utopian impulse.161 Others have seen his universalism of utopia in all these corners of 
human cultural life as ultimately useless for utopian theory, for “when everything 
becomes an expression of utopian desire, to what degree does the category of utopia loses 
its usefulness?”162 This is just as much in the case of Levitas's desire. As much as Levitas 
endeavors to call out social construction, she too is driven by the impulse to universalize, 
albeit more covertly. She codifies the tension that Utopia signifies with another word rife 
with ambiguity—desire—but at the level of the body. Her analysis of the term “desire” 
depends on Bloch's ontology and E.P. Thompson's description of Morris's work as an 
"education of desire". Levitas's review of the historical methods of charting utopia argues 
that, in focusing on form, the historians do not adequately account for what produces 
                                                
161 Wayne Hudson, The Reform of Utopia (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), ch. 3 
162 Phillip E. Wegner, Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 18.  
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utopia.163 It will be shown below that the abstraction on which Levitas bases her 
argument on comes about through a historical process—i.e., the literary form of Utopia 
evolving into a social-theory abstraction—which elucidates how Levitas and others arrive 
at their conclusion that Utopia is structured as desire.  
 Thus Utopia retains more value for analysis when historicized within Euro-
American fields of intellectual, political, and economic contexts. To this end, I will show 
how Utopia as a figure of an alternative political and social order distinguished itself 
from other texts and figures that represent fulfillment, satisfaction or harmony around the 
time of Thomas More's writing, and briefly describe how Utopia came to be associated 
with political change and used as an abstraction or shorthand for "the good society." This 
history demonstrates the seemingly mutually exclusive choices utopian theorists have 
made to either occlude the personal experience level in favor of social constructionist 
accounts; or excise political economy from experiential, descriptive methods. Levitas’s 
lens of desire via Bloch and Thompson focuses the first horn of this dilemma, and I 
harmonize it with the first by historicizing it via psychoanalytic and Marxist discourse, in 
                                                
163 Levitas treats Davis, the Manuels, Kumar, and Sargent in her review of utopian studies at the time of her 
writing in 1990, noting where these historical approaches have given nod to what motivates utopia as a 
project of human effort of the imagination or otherwise. Levitas point to the Manuels' reliance on a 
Jungian-style collective unconscious account that leads them to examine the childhood experiences of the 
authors they include. Concept, 159.  See 159, 164, 167. . J. C. Davis excludes Arcadia and Cockaygne from 
being properly utopian because they idealize nature, not human effort. See Concept, 164.  [For his 
summary of these two forms that give a distinct perspective on the role of "human appetites", see , Utopia 
and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516-1700 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981) 20-26.] Levitas rejects the Kumar's proposal that utopia hinges on its form in literature and 
calls Kumar's credit to More as the genre's founder is "patently absurd" that one person could be 
responsible for "such a novel and far-reaching conception of the possibilities of human and social 
transformation" but gives him credit for saying that utopia is about a hope for a transformed future. 167. As 
for Sargent, at this time of her writing in 1990, he too is too interested in the form of utopia in his definition 
that it be thought of as "a non-existence society described in considerable detail." I share Levitas's interest 
in seeking what motivates the appearance or distinctiveness of utopia but share with the historical approach 
an interest in the circumstances of its circulation and less in what I see in Levitas as a quest for the essence 
of utopia.   
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the process establishing a more productive role for the figure of Utopia in Religious 
Studies.  
II. Retelling Utopian Theory through History 
 The utopian theories described above are not simply about generic, timeless 
fantasies of better worlds, but seek to explain the genre of Utopian literature and the 
conditions of its occurrence and popularity as a literary form. These conditions of 
production and sites of popularity are thoroughly European and American, reflecting the 
transitions of intellectual, political and economic modes, beginning with the Renaissance 
humanism, oceanic exploration and the rise of nation-states through the revolutionary and 
Enlightenment periods and colonialism into industrialization and the philosophical 
projects from Hegel and Marx. I am not proposing to undertake a project of relating these 
events to their textual counterparts. Instead, I want to demonstrate in Part Two that the 
abstraction that is valuable to the theorists is more properly treated as an historical object, 
seen as part of process of reception and manipulation of forms over time. I regard the 
definitions that the theorists above have crafted to be formulations that function as a kind 
of Utopian form in themselves—resolving the frustrations generated by their socio-
intellectual conflicts with a narrative fantasy based on a constructed, cross-cultural 
collectivity of desirers and dreamers.  
 The historicization of these theories proceeds by introducing crucial moments in 
the formation of Utopia as a figure within modernity. As shown in Chapter One, the 
history of an idea can show not only who it serves and for what purposes but how it was 
constructed. The advantage of this for the concept of Utopia is two-fold: one, it clarifies 
both Utopia and fantasy/desire as they appear in the discourses above, and two, it 
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establishes those discourses in their socio-political contexts—an aspect that Levitas 
claims to value in her assurance of the social-constructedness of desires but ends up 
complicating more than clarifying. My approach is thus genealogical—I confront the 
formations of discursive regimes, and mark the possibilities and limitations of different 
times and places and how subjectivities are differentially formed. My central theme is 
that critical studies—in religion or other fields—need not turn all subjectivity into an 
object but can instead turn to dialectical methods which respect the affective and libidinal 
dimensions of social life as well as such categories as ideology, social formation, 
legitimation, and hegemony typical of critical discourse. I implement this theme in a 
novel analysis of Utopian desire, via representational forms constructed as responses to 
the surges of political economy within modernity, where these two seemingly 
incommensurable perspectives often come together. Part Two of this chapter supports 
this argument by offering key transitions in the development of the Utopian form and into 
an abstraction for use by social theorists to reflect on and theorize social change. By 
showing a few of these transitions, I show that the concept of utopianism as it is widely 
understood arises from a historical process which situates it, along with Utopia, as a 
distinctly Western modern product.  
 To direct this argument, I unfold several key moments in the formation of Utopia 
through historians and literary, political and social theorists. Through the work of the 
historians and literary theorists, I show how Utopia is an aesthetic product distinct to 
Anglo-European early modernity that was one of several responses to the social 
contradictions of its time, giving shape to the intellectual currents of humanism, the 
challenges to church authority, the formations of nation-states, and opportunities of 
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oceanic travel. Then, I discuss how political theorists have described Utopia's role in 
directing political programs and how Utopia came to represent itself as an abstraction of 
the mechanisms of social life. I turn again in the next chapter to desire and aspects of its 
history that were glossed by Levitas through a review of several social theorists Levitas 
uses for her definition,.  
Utopia as an Early Modern Literary Form 
Utopia at the Renaissance 
 Historians Frank and Fritzie Manuel state in their “study for the continuities in 
Western utopian thought,” that they “are acutely aware of the temporal and geographic 
fractures and demarcations that separate one Utopian constellation from another.”164 For 
them, the continuities are found in the historical conditions, not in anything universal 
because, for the Manuels, anything universal—theological claims of cosmic dimensions, 
reaching across times and human psyches— would turn utopia into more of a religious 
than a properly historical phenomena.165 While this abandonment of the universal as 
religious signals their own prejudices (and ignorance about the field of religious studies), 
it is also a legitimate concern with the form of Utopia. Although they admit that there are 
occasions of Utopia showing up in non-western settings where there are "paradises on 
earth," their extensive survey shows that Utopias are primarily a leftover of Platonic-
Christian ideals that emphasize human capacity and combine in various manners images 
of an eternal or transcendent world. Where Utopias are secular, they are so in an attempt 
to isolate practical behaviors for effective, satisfying social relations. 
                                                
164 Manuel and Manuel, Utopian Thought, 14. 
165 Ibid., 5. 
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 Contra Hertzler or Sargent, ancient worlds and politics and are not Utopia for the 
Manuels but the “vital prehistory” of utopia as a “hybrid plant” of Hellenic philosophy 
and Humanist Christianity.166 Utopia's history begins with the combined conditions of 
oceanic exploration and conquest, northern humanism with Erasmus and Rabelais, the 
English Civil War, Italian Renaissance architecture, German Anabaptism and mysticism, 
and seventeenth-century science. With the French Revolution, they see a major 
adjustment to Utopian narratives that take up time as a factor, making for a parallel form 
that might be called “euchronia.” New modes of production in the nineteenth century 
produce new relations to work and love. Concomitant with this historical development of 
the Utopian form, there is exploration of new scientific space, both within the micro 
levels of biology and the macro of astronomy. As with other modern forms, Utopian 
literature appeals to the Hellenistic virtues of perfection, transcendence and pastoral 
harmony that are matched in the Renaissance with Judeo-Christian allusions to heavenly 
and divinely-directed cities. These texts, along with an emergent interest in the human 
capacities for manipulating political life, meet to form Utopia.  
Narrowing to the moment of early northern European history, the Utopian literary 
form can be seen to take shape alongside other literatures. The historian of early modern 
literature J.C. Davis follows the texts of early modern writers to discern their allegiance 
to a Utopian form and discovers that the writers of both major and minor texts between 
1516-1650 do not adhere self-consciously to a model of Utopian text but devise their 
own. Writers of ideal societies from this era occupied diverse social roles as lawyers, 
diplomats, academics, country squires, administrators, merchants, soldiers and “political 
                                                
166 Ibid., 5, 17. 
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intriguers.”167 Commitment to a set of historical texts do not link these early modern 
Utopian writers as much a shared “subjection to a common mode of social idealization 
and its consequences.”168 Thus, while Utopias do not form themselves from reference to a 
set of established texts, neither are they the umbrella construct for all of idealizations of 
society. Marking the genre of Utopian literature at this time are their references to 
particular idealizations that overlap conventions, such as travel and dialogue—that 
facilitate this agenda. Davis’s synchronic historical mapping shows religion taking shape 
within history, instead of serving as an archaic and unchanging deposit to be drawn on by 
early and late moderns alike as the Manuels imply. 
Early Modern Types 
Davis identifies Utopia alongside four other ideal societies. Each distinguishes 
itself for what it says about the human, its relation to nature, institutions, and its approach 
to legal, educational, and bureaucratic devices. The types are, for Davis, heuristic devices 
for sorting a common problem of the early modern period—the problem of collectivity 
and the coordination of satisfactions of individuals within a community. The Utopia, 
Arcadia, Cockaygne, Millennium, and Perfect Moral Commonwealth were less attempts 
to solve the problem of unlimited desires and limited satisfactions than they were 
articulations of the problem.169 Davis lists non-Western and non-modern texts and 
                                                
167 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, 7. 
168 Ibid., 4. 
169 This is my gloss on Davis's distinctions: The arcadia, named after Virgil’s pastoral poem, is the most 
commonly recognized across cultures and speaks of a time of happiness and fulfillment where needs were 
less and thus, easily met. Also called the Golden Age, it commonly reflects an original condition of human 
life and thus, reflects to contemporary readers inherent virtues. Such examples include Hesiod and Ovid of 
Greek tradition, Aboriginal Australian Dreamtime, the Garden of Eden, the Chinese Taoist Age of Perfect 
Virtue and the Christian Kingdom of Prester John. The second type, the Land of Cockaygne, is less widely 
reproduced. This is the fantasy of extravagance and excess, named after the medieval poem of a poor man’s 
heaven where cooked larks fly straight into one’s mouth and rivers run with wine. It is not exclusive to 
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narratives that speak back to these distinctive forms but preserves Utopia for the case of 
early modern Europe. I see in these forms how they differentially emphasize human 
effort in achieving satisfaction. All five forms work to resolve the problem of “limited 
satisfactions and unlimited human desires” but Utopia solves it not through a divine 
intervention or a fundamental balance of social relations or an excess of satisfactions, but 
by means of limiting satisfactions.170 As he summarizes:  
The utopian’s concern is rather to control the social problems that the 
collective problem can lead to—crime, instability, poverty, rioting, war, 
exploitation and vice. None of these evaporate in utopias. They are 
controlled and where possible, eliminated, and the utopian is concerned to 
show how.171 
 
Davis does not permit Utopia to be used as a blanket statement for all kinds of social 
dreaming. Utopia does not produce myths of a golden age of paradise. Instead, the 
broader term, "idealization," produces multiple forms for various social uses. Restraining 
the use of Utopia for a type of text and not a universal impulse would be a misuse of the 
term for Davis, who wants to restrict Utopia not to its lineage back to More but to the 
                                                                                                                                            
medieval Europe. The Big Rock Candy Mountains sung of in American folk songs can be read as a 
contemporary example. The richest allusions to utopia come from Davis’s third category of the Christian 
Millennium—the 1000 years that, depending on one’s counting, comes before or after the return of Christ 
to earth as promised in the Revelation of John in the Christian New Testament. Rising in popularity 
through the rough and violent ruptures of both the German and English Reformations, millennialism 
captures the intrigue of the past and future, the familiar and the unknown. Instead of simpler human needs, 
the complexity of present humanity is pulled together and resolved into a new society brought about by 
divine intervention. Whereas the Land of Cockagyne or Arcadia recede in popularity after the sixteenth 
century, millennialism can be seen to expand, and the explicitly Christian label grows to include other 
European movements such as modern Jewish messianism, Jewish and Christian apocalypticism, Christian 
dispensationalism, and a secularized spiritual age of Hegel, Marx, and National Socialism. The appeal of 
millennialism is to point the present as a special time preceding or already in the midst of upheaval. It is 
form common through the modern era as social change brought on by colonial contact, migration, and 
technological innovation created new social climates. The fourth of Davis’s categories of ideal society is 
the perfect moral commonwealth—a pagan inspiration that leans on the image of ancient city as a construct 
of rationality and order. Whereas the millennium takes the disorder of the present and reorders it through 
drastic reconstruction, the moral commonwealth hedges on the thread of reason within the Renaissance 
worldview of humanity as reconstructed through the Greco-Roman tradition. The commonwealth of the 
medieval period was secured by a just landlord-tenant relation that preserved duty loyalty, charity and 
virtue.  
170 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, 37. 
171 Ibid. 
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concerns of More’s era: disorder in an emerging capitalist society with and nation-state 
formation in relation to an expanding globe.172 In separating out utopia from other ideal 
societies, Davis allows for its rigidity, its closed qualities, and its totality of change to 
exist without the seemingly apolitical world of the pastoral or the gustatory indulgences 
of a Cockaygne. So for Davis, "Utopia" is not genre or universal impulse but a specific 
kind of text that emerged within modernity. 
 Adding to Davis’s list of ideals, Krishan Kumar constructs a sixth category—the 
ideal city.173 Here is the pagan influence again but in the image of the Greek city-state 
that becomes an inspiration for More. The ideal city preserves geometric balance and 
lends architectural structure to its social forms. The social hierarchy of the ideal city 
comes to reflect a divine hierarchy of the cosmos. Utopia does not simply recombine the 
elements of Hellenism and Christianity but has its own inventiveness.174 This Hellenistic 
influence carries a preference for balance and order into the Utopian project.175 Order 
may be variously sourced or located, either in transcendent realms, such as in 
Augustine’s City of God or the transcendental realm of Plato’s Republic, but Utopia itself 
is focused on instantiating order by humans on earth.  
                                                
172 Davis reflects on the co-construction of modernity with utopia, where the nation-state comes to 
dominate as the mode for managing borders and space, change and time: "Into this world of chaos, 
confusion, irregularity and incipient disorder the utopian injects images of a total and rational social order, 
of uniformity instead of diversity, of impersonal, neutrally functioning bureaucracy and of the 
comprehensive, the total state. He provides the imagery for the process which, I have suggested, has 
dominated social evolution for the last four centuries and shows no signs of losing its dominance now." 
Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, 9. From the perspective of literary criticism, Phillip Wegner writes 
extensively on the relation of utopia as a form to the development of the European nation-state. He sees the 
utopia in its contents and forms, as articulating the shift in powers from monarchy to a hegemonic 
bourgeois. See Wegner, Imaginary Communities and my discussion of nation-state formation that follows. 
173 Krishan Kumar, Utopianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), ch. 1.  
174 Kumar, Utopianism, 19. 
175 Donnelly uses Levitas to explain the classical utopia where “the expression of the desire for a better way 
of being in the classical utopia is centered, first and foremost, on redefining order.” Dorothy F. Donnelly, 
Patterns of Order and Utopia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 13. 
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As other historians have noted, this link of order to an ideal and its possible 
proximity undergoes revisions soon after More in the work of Francis Bacon's The New 
Atlantis (1624) where order is no longer the static but dynamic and progressive. 176 The 
ideal in Bacon, then, is not what is unchanging form but is in process. The Utopian form 
in this era reveals an interest in city-state organization and its attempts to balance the 
competing authorities of King and Church, evidenced in Tommas Campanella's City of 
the Sun, where a theocratic monarchy provides the structure for the ideal city. Order for 
these early modernist Utopias revises but never quite sheds its spiritual valence.177 It is 
more than their visions of Platonic city-state ideal forms that unite these early Utopias—
each is structured as a travel narrative with a place reached by an ocean vessel, an 
isolated land that requires a reporter for relaying, through dialogue with a local authority, 
the wonders that are found far away. This formal feature of distant travel and narrator 
reflect More's text and becomes a central feature of this nascent genre, one that Kumar 
argues is delineated within modernity for the way that texts reference and repeat features 
like dialogue, travel, and quotidian details relayed through a mediating narrator.  
 As noted above, Davis recognizes that Utopia distinguished itself for addressing 
the problem of collectivity and the coordination of satisfactions of individuals within a 
community by the tools of politics, law, resource production and resource distribution. 
One mechanism for coordinating satisfactions in More's text is an egalitarian model and 
                                                
176 This break by Bacon is described by Davis and Donnelly alike. Robert Applebaum argues that 
seventeenth-century utopia is a disposition towards “earthly paradise, the millenarian future, the ancient 
Age of Gold, the happy constitutional democracy, the world turned upside down, the primitive church, the 
ideally munificent court of the ideal monarch.” Robert Appelbaum, Literature and Utopian Politics in 
Seventeenth-Century England, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–2, 5. 
177 “Even in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when human reason had, in different places and in various 
area of speculation, strongly reasserted its independence of the concept of religious order, the underlying 
assumption remained, for many thinkers, that the order of the universe is, finally, divinely ordained. ” 
Donnelly, Patterns of Order and Utopia, 10. 
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the elimination of money. Belonging and shared resources were not novel to Thomas 
More, who had many examples of collective activity in the monasteries of his time. But 
instead of leaving the collective behavior to the cloister, More’s Utopia situated it in the 
broader society, applying the forms of shared resources and activity to the realm of 
families and secular life. Literary theorist Phillip Wegner argues that More's narrative 
shift from cloister to public square produces a person-society relationship that we now 
recognize as endemic to the modern nation-state.178 In More’s Utopia, the former castes 
and classes are wiped away in favor of a subject in more regular relation to the social 
totality via a flattened hierarchy, which Wegner sees as parallel to the subsequent 
emergence of the European bourgeoisie.179 The hold of the church and the feudal lords 
are replaced by the monarchs which, in turn, become the republics of Europe. Emerging 
from More is a foretaste of the modern individual who is identified with political entities 
through adherence to practices and allegiances to principles, instead of through fealty to a 
God or King.  
This identity of the bourgeois subject as one wedded to others through European 
nation-state affiliation shaped subsequent renderings of Utopia. As the years passed and 
the European nation-state was naturalized as the premier social totality, the power of the 
once-novel bourgeoisie grew. The growing hegemony of the bourgeoisie within the new 
nation-state led to what Wegner calls 'operations of neutralization' to resist the inevitable 
counter-hegemonic attacks from emergent classes, ethnicities, merchant groups, and 
                                                
178 Wegner, Imaginary Communities, 55-59. 
179 “The spatialized national subject formed in the Utopian narrative thus serves as one of the original forms 
of the collective subject of class—for it is by way of national identity that the bourgeoisie comes to 
‘identify’ itself.” Wegner, Imagined Communities, 60.  
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religious bodies.180 These operations within Utopia are recognizable as the uniformity of 
taste through clothing, restricted interests, or schedules, which came to be regarded in the 
twentieth-century as potential threats to the unique expressions of the individual human 
spirit, whereas once it may have been simply a means of tempering vice that threatens 
that same spirit. As the new nation states emerged, the Utopian narratives that were 
produced from within them sought through their narratives a resolution to their 
burgeoning internal sub-communities. Thus, one can see later Utopian narratives carry 
through them a strong message of cohesion and willing collective belonging as a 
response to both the reality of nation-state formations and its fragility. If there is a 
resistance to the Utopian collectivity—as is so easily seen in dystopian narratives, but 
also signaled by the iterations of Utopias and their reformulations of social life—then it is 
the queasy unease with the violence that founds and supports the nation-state. If Utopia is 
laced with the quality of the nation-state, as Wegner argues, then this direct connection 
with state power exacerbates the anxiety of moderns all the more as they contemplate the 
bloody beginnings of most states. More’s founder, Utopus, for example, merely arrives 
and sets up his ideal society.  
Wegner's analysis contributes in several ways to my own argument about the 
importance of placing Utopia and tying it to European history: not only does More's 
text—and subsequent Utopias in their presentation of ideal social organization—draw on 
the material conditions of their time but they also displace these conditions into text and 
represent them in ways that more than simply inspire desire. Utopias hold and represent 
social contradictions at the level of form, delivering the striations of social life as 
harmonized fantasy. I argue that Utopia's contradictions should be held front and center 
                                                
180 Wegner, Imagined Communities, 61. 
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so as to deliver the shock of their proposal simultaneously as that of their wishes. If there 
is a wish for harmony, it should also be registered under the lights of the violence of the 
nation-state. If there is a wish for collectivity, it should be scrutinized alongside the 
subjectivating forces of liberal legal apparatuses and the isolations of bourgeois 
individualism and its alienations.  
Excluding pre-modern and non-European forms, Kumar insists, “Utopia may be 
nowhere, but historically and conceptually, it cannot be just anywhere.”181 More's text is 
a touchstone for considering the relationship of the literary form and its social setting, of 
how the conditions that surround the text give rise to the text. While Levitas would like to 
consider the contingent conditions of Utopia, she does not recognize either the 
distinctiveness of More's text or how it reflects the material conditions of an early 
modernity. This brief survey underscores that diversity of forms such as Arcadias, 
Millennials, and Cockaygnes should not be presumed as all examples of social dreaming 
or desires for better ways of living, but rather shown as distinct ways of solving a 
problematic of living collective life, and that Utopia is a version of that, which resolves 
this as a fantasy of political and economic arrangements. These arrangements, however, 
were distinct to the moment that we now call "modernity"—a complex historical and 
social shift that effected deformations of European Christianity into power heterodoxies 
of humanism and politically-charged millennialism.182 Utopia consolidates and re-
presents the violent reforming of social life into nation-states, simultaneously disavowing 
                                                
181 Kumar, Utopianism, 3. 
182 Kumar references religion’s response to similar contexts that stimulated utopia, such as Millennialism, 
which gained prominence in the late medieval period to explain the conflict between a “righteous remnant” 
and local authorities and mirroring the conflict of John’s apocalypse that precedes Jesus’ return to earth. 
Kumar assures his readers, however, that the passion for a divinely-sent savior may have been prevalent in 
medieval Europe but it is not exclusive to western modernity as utopia is. Monasticism also spans the pre-
modern and modern and has lent utopia the types of social regulation that are commonly seen in the form. 
Utopianism, 19.  
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the constitutive violence of that same nation-state, and displacing it into discussions of an 
"imperial other." The social differences were being newly marked as modernity 
developed, taken further away from the hierarchies of the faithful and the heathen as 
constructed by Christian orthodoxy and moved into national identities. Contacts with 
difference—what will be in modernity variously known as heathens and then 
primitives—will be coded differently as Enlightenment paradigms of human nature take 
shape and give rise to new areas of study, new disciplines. I turn now to consider how the 
aesthetic form of Utopia concentrates this process, especially around the development of 
the abstraction of "society" as used by European political theory and adopted by social 
theorists.  
Literary Form for Political Theory 
Utopia, in signifying radical social change that is desirable but also impossible, 
coincides historically with political theory with the optimism and failure of modernity's 
two grandest proposals: liberalism and Marxism. The historical node of the French 
Revolution marks a change in the meaning of Utopia from a more classical mode in the 
Renaissance to its late modern associations with radical change. In this section, I rely on 
political theorists for their interpretation of their field and its relationship to the Utopian 
form. As they recount the history of Utopia for political thought, they note how Utopia 
shifts in signification as it is used by philosophers to both interpret their moment and 
direct its course. As producers of their time, these philosophers take up "society" as an 
abstraction to describe and predict their conditions. As I show, this philosophical labor 
situates Utopia in a matrix of constructs signaling both the mood of change and its 
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mechanisms—a history that will come to give Utopia its association with lack, longing, 
and satisfaction at the level of immanent social life. 
Political philosopher Judith Shklar explains how the early modern period drew on 
a contemplative practice of philosophy that situates Utopia as a part of a classical mode 
of political engagement. She points to the image of the “virtuous pagan” that was held up 
to reproach the Christians of this era. Thomas More is a main voice in this era, and his 
Utopia focuses on rationality as the securer of public goods, where laws produce social 
harmony, not consolidated religiousness. This should be seen in contrast to the 
apocalyptic tone of such revolutionary visionaries as Thomas Münzer in Germany, whose 
religious fervor consolidated people, not laws. Shklar suggests that perhaps the 
contemporary ambivalence to Utopia in the late twentieth century is due to a harboring of 
nostalgia for the pensive mode towards alterity and alternatives from the classical era, 
instead of the revolutionary urgency from the revolts of the French and the Americans 
that have turned the intellectual mood of Utopia into a call to action.183 Utopia is seen 
within Shklar as a vital aspect of modern political theory that reflects the models 
throughout the modern era for maximizing human virtues, the role of government in 
facilitating this, and what methods and means are best for promoting this. Shklar’s work 
holds out for the imaginative mode to not be dismissed as rhetoric, but to be considered 
alongside the normative mode of political theory.184 Thus, in Shklar, we see that what 
                                                
183 Judith Shklar, “The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia,” Daedalus, 94, no. 2 
(1965), 370. 
184 Later in her career, Shklar points to Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls as doing battle over the normative 
models, where Habermas’s critical theory is to counter the normative but both work with a practical, as-is 
social form. Critical theory rejects normative political theory because it does not talk of fraternity or 
solidarity or any new person. “They do not offer a total critique of the actual, nor do they strive to 
‘transcend,’ that is, to rise above and to transform the consumer society and the welfare state. They do not 
shake up the present enough by forcing us to envision a wholly new world order.” "What is the Use of 
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constitutes Utopia is rooted historically in the early modern period and, particularly, its 
reading practices. The distinctive mental operations that can be recognized as "Utopian" 
depend on contemplation and rumination that does not foreclose alterity or possibility. 
Shklar also notes also, however, that there was a shift between the classical and 
modern moments that turned Utopia into a call for action. Tracking this change, political 
theorists Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor examine Utopia's relation to political theory 
through space and time. The influence of liberalism and Marxism on Utopia turn it from 
its spatial representations of a place outside of here to a time outside of now. Prior to the 
Enlightenment, there was a surge of non-Christian utopias that narrate travel to distant 
places. Utopias here emphasize a distant people and their exquisite cooperation, making 
use of the exotic enticements discovered through imperialism and colonialism to enact 
another level of experimentation: fantasy projections of alternative political orders, 
pulling at the similarities and differences of the European traveler and the distant Utopian 
resident, emphasizing the day-to-day lifestyles as they are influenced by the varying 
principles of these other places.185 However, with the influence of the Enlightenment's 
focus on progress and perfectibility within an earthly realm, heaven comes to earth, so to 
speak: the ideal is brought within reach through human progress. Encounters with 
primitive groups through travel were now plotted along a timeline, with influential 
thinkers such as Rousseau interpreting these groups as reflecting the essential morality of 
humans.186 The French Revolution furthered the positioning of alternative social orders 
                                                                                                                                            
Utopia?" in Heterotopia: Postmodern Utopia and the Body Politic, ed. Tobin Siebers, (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), 55.  
 Her work connects to Seyla Benhabib on the matter of the need to move from normative, theoretical 
positions to actions and efforts of fraternity.  
185 A good list of these is found in Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 42. 
186 The laws of nature could seen to be inscribed in these small communities. The free love societies of 
Sade, Fourier and such earlier thinkers as Dom Deschamps’s La Verite ou le Vrai Système (1770), reflect 
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within a future time instead of a distant-yet-parallel space. Revolution, according to 
Goodwin and Taylor, made progress more immediate with an emphasis on temporal 
eruption. The revolutionaries were headed into a place in the near future, not a distant 
future nor a distant place.187 The future of Utopias from this point on is literally the future 
of Utopias: no longer is Utopia a physical space, but spaced in time.  
The shift from spatial to temporal utopias is heightened in the work of Marx and 
his reactions to utopian socialists. Marx focuses on Henre de Saint Simon (1760-1825), 
Robert Owen (1771-1868), and Charles Fourier (1772-1837) who each responded to the 
social and economic upheaval of industrialization and how traditional social values were 
being lost or were dissolving at the beginning of the nineteenth century.188 These 
solutions attracted enthusiasm because of their ability to integrate previous norms under 
new conditions. Traditional families were reimagined with more permissive family 
structures that were larger and happier, transferring familial love to the larger group of 
                                                                                                                                            
Rousseau's position that modern society could be improved by studying these distant groups, emphasizing a 
“natural” human that could be realized once again through repositioning the human in principled ways. 
Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 44. 
187 Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 44–45. 
188 The discussions of Marx and Engels on the "utopian socialists" to set out the distinction of "scientific 
socialism" are canon for Marxism, where on close reading, is not so much with the visionary figures 
themselves as much as with those clinging to the programs and do not advance the awareness of class and 
its antagonism.  The central text for this is "Manifest of the Communist Party" in Tucker's edited The Marx-
Engels Reader, with the relevant text on 498-9. For a longer discussion of Marx and Engels connection to 
the Fourierists, the Owenites, and the Saint-Simonists, see Levitas's excellent review Marx and Engels's 
correspondence and published works on these projects. Concept, 47-58.  For a review of the lives and ideas 
of Saint-Simon, Owen, and Fourier, see Chapter One, "The Utopian Socialists" in Vincent Geoghegan, 
Utopianism and Marxism, (New York: Methuen, 1987), 8-21. Chapter Two, "Marx, Engels and 
Utopianism" is similar to Levitas's account, but his book more thoroughly connects with the party politics 
of this history. Martin Buber's Paths in Utopia also manages a similar historical legacy of practical 
socialism as the three men referenced above, but with more of an argument than analysis of the Marxist 
arguments.  Goodwin and Taylor see the three iconic utopian socialists referenced by  Marx and Engels and 
historicized them  three in line with Icarianism, a kind of Christian sect founded with the ideas of Étienne 
Cabet and the German artisan movement inspired by Wilhelm Weitling as reactions to the revolutionary 
fervor of Europe from the late eighteenth century. See Chapter Six, "Movements for Utopia-1" for these in 
summary and Chapter Seven, "Movements for Utopia-2" for the Marx-Engels response and account of the 
political milieu of Europe in the nineteenth century.  Goodwin's earlier monograph focuses on this era.  
Barbara Goodwin, Social Science and Utopia: Nineteenth Century Models of Social Harmony (Hassocks, 
UK: Harvester Press, 1978). 
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society. The lack of harmony among communities impacted by industrial work was offset 
by programs that buffered these changes. Utopian socialists regarded politics as function 
of administration, not government, promoting reason and science while refusing liberal 
individualism. The liberal individual brought out the competition of interests and 
contributed to the tensions experienced all around. The end of guilds and loss of 
bargaining power with industry left workers without enfranchisement. Social utopias 
responded to the social and cultural conditions brought about by capitalism, 
industrialization, and movement from traditional social relations and modes of 
production. The three most well-known—Fourier, Owen, and Saint-Simon—agreed on 
the goals of harmony and cooperation but not how to get there. Each took different tacks 
on integrating industrial models of production, of private property versus common 
ownership, and place for religion in making this work.189  
Utopia as Abstraction for Society 
As shown above, Goodwin and Taylor draw attention to how Utopia transitions 
from literary form to political tool. Through their work, I point to how modern 
philosophy took the conditions of global exploration and turned them for thought and 
reflection. What I also pull from them is the way political theory found in Utopia a means 
to abstract politics from historical context, contributing to the formation of the discipline. 
                                                
189 Religion worked in favor of the socialist utopian movements. Religious groups, especially Christians, 
were attracted to those leaders and organizations that countered the selfishness and individualism seeming 
to undermine the common goods of harmony, community and cooperation. As Goodwin and Taylor note, 
religion was seen as an ally to the movements because it “created a sense of attachment without which no 
movement can endure for any length of time.” Christianity was the main force behind this connection, 
however Judaism helped in the Saint-Simonian movement after 1835. Other bonds were exploited: Fourier 
used anti-Semitic teachings to attack commercial classes. The religious liberties and new land available in 
the growing United States brought out the most of the religious experimentations with novel societies. 
Religion hinged utopian socialism to the past, be it through coloring science with religious quality, the 
social mysticism of Saint Simon, or reforming Christianity to be more counter-cultural and radical, in such 
cases as millenarianism of the US. Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 133. 
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While some would like to see political theory emphasize the positivist and empirical 
modes, Goodwin and Taylor highlight the role of abstraction in any theoretical endeavor. 
Because Utopia is formed through speculation and imagination, it is also a form of 
abstraction and thus, connected to political theory more than political history or the study 
of political institutions. 190 As they see it, Utopia plays a role in political theory where 
there are alternative proposals that extend or emphasize an aspect of the present, such as 
John Rawls’s ideal of justice as driving political life or the contest of anarchic groups 
within an open context of mutually beneficial associations as articulated by Robert 
Nozick.191 Reviving a past golden age, however, is not Utopian, nor can it simply be used 
to justify the present. Instead, constructive political theory that both criticizes the present 
and provides it with a replacement can be called Utopian. Both political theory and 
literary narratives address human problems and harmonize conflict through novel 
political and social arrangements.  
Goodwin and Taylor advance my analysis of the transposition of Utopia from 
literary work to abstract concept—from Utopia to utopia—by way of articulating 
political theory's co-optation of Utopia's formal features and its representational dynamic. 
Utopia is not merely an alternative social order en total that provides a blueprint for an 
ideal social order or even just a workable adjustment. Instead, Utopia provides a heuristic 
                                                
190 Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 21. 
191 For Goodwin and Taylor's discussion of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic, 1974), 
see 51-52. For their brief treatment of Rawls's A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972), see 65. Their overall concern with these two liberal voices in regards to utopia is that they cast 
utopia as a hypothetical present that ends in justifying the present. Another tack in relating these liberal 
voices to the matter of utopia would be to draw out the status of the individual and its natural abilities to 
seek its own good. This, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation because it would demand a 
resituating of the categories of "subject" along the lines of "individual" in a more Anglo-American 
philosophical register and would depend on tackling the premises that are orthogonal to strand of Hegel 
that I am taking up. For more discussion on how society and politics might structure around rights and 
obligations, see the collection of essays in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (eds). Communitarianism 
and Individualism, Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992). 
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"nowhere" from which to gather and perceive what is otherwise too close. By this 
argument, the unreality of Utopia is not an impediment to political theory, but integral to 
its imaginative work. This imaginative labor is the intellectual work of abstraction: 
The academic separation of utopianism from ‘realistic’ political thought 
proceeds via the challengeable assumption that imaginative 
representations do not convey truth, whereas an abstract account of reality 
does so. But often the necessity of abstraction, which distinguishes all 
political theory from political history or the study of political institutions, 
a priori removes it as far from reality and verifiability as does the 
invention of an imaginary world.192 
 
To restate: abstractions—categories and concepts created to tie together, re-describe, and 
explain phenomena in other terms—are themselves not real things. They do important 
work, however, in that they are constructions that can be used for interpreting and 
perhaps even predicting. Like an abstraction, Utopia is not a real thing but provides a 
different position from which to view and test.  
 Such an insight further extends Utopia and its overlaps with theoretical endeavors, 
ones that have brought forward not only the work of Bloch and Levitas, but also, as I will 
suggest in Chapter Four, theories used in the study of religion. As political theory 
depends on abstractions to distinguish it from political history or the study of political 
institutions, one can also say that critical religious studies makes use of abstractions to 
distinguish its projects from its descriptive and historical counterparts. Connecting how it 
is that theories of religion overlap with Utopia in other ways will need further discussion. 
What is important at this moment is that Utopian forms are leveraged for political thought 
specifically in the way that resemble other "no-things" like theoretical abstractions that 
collect and re-describe data so as to perceive the present from a different—and hopefully 
more precise—vantage point. This homology of theory in general and Utopian form in 
                                                
192 Goodwin and Taylor, The Politics of Utopia, 21.  
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particular is not to be globally applied. Instead, as I argue in Chapter Four, the Utopian 
form relates specifically to the development and use of the abstraction of a social 
totality—the fantasized construct of a bounded, coherent system known through its 
differentials.  
 In sum, Utopia, as I have discussed, is affected by these intellectual and historical 
streams of Europe. Utopia signals a change in relationship to political futures and 
possibilities, from spatial examples that create self-reflection and contemplation of 
current conditions, to temporal logics of transformation. The meaning of Utopia changes 
to reflect its orientation to political alterities. This first occurs with the possibilities 
created through liberalism and the French Revolution, with time stretched into an 
alternative, progressively available society located in the same place but in an “out there” 
future. Utopia shifts again in the nineteenth century as industrialization concentrates labor 
and production in cities, spurring both utopian programs and political and social thought 
on the political role and welfare of the worker. The criticism of liberalism and the utopian 
socialists by Marx and Engels inaugurates another era for utopia and utopianism, one that 
develops a perspective integrative of politics and economics and religion, and one that 
refracts utopia and harnesses the appeal of totality, practice, and abstraction and deploys 
it for what comes to be known as social theory. 
Having considered how Utopia becomes a mobile, modern concept formed from 
reflection on revolutionary events, Enlightenment philosophy, Marxist historical 
materialism, and the emergence of political theory as a discourse, I now consider several 
sites of its transposition into social theory. Social and political theory shows how mobile 
Utopia can be, how its operations are a part of a more general kind of intellectual labor of 
  131 
  
comparison and contrast. This intellectual labor, however, enjoys a distinctly modern, 
post-Enlightenment style of abstraction, category formation, differentiation, and 
evaluation. These operations are in many ways related to what happens within the process 
of reading Utopian literature—comparison, contrast, and evaluation. In the following 
chapter, I will say more about how the Utopian literary form consolidates and 
miniaturizes society, and thus colludes with other imaginative projects and fantasies that 
give Utopia its particular charge by relating the subject and the social totality. Yet, before 
turning to the particular literary form, I want to further expand how social theory has 
adopted social totality for its own uses of describing and effecting change at the level of 
structure and how, in this project, it gets caught, in ways as religious studies has—
between a static version of society for the benefit of tracking, authorizing, and 
legitimizing practices in ideology and an active, open-ended logic of the subject's 
experience of unfolding time and possibility. 
Historicizing Social Theory for Utopia—and Vice Versa 
 The relationship of social theory to Utopia has both historical and thematic 
connections: social theory emerges from the nineteenth century to correlate the complex 
relations of economics, politics, and culture to individual experience. Society, for 
political theory, is an artifact for manipulation. In social theory, society is an object of 
study. The normative claims on political theory subsume Utopia under the work of 
improving political relations. Social theory’s normative work is more ambiguous. The 
emphasis is on charting the elements within society to show their relationships. Social 
theory shares with Utopia this ambiguous relation to normative claims, its abstraction as 
theory, and its interest in mapping the social as a totality with intricate moving parts. 
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Goodwin and Taylor claim that, if Utopia has waned at the end of the twentieth century, 
it is in part due to the rise of social science and its modeling of society as a totality 
working in harmony. Ralf Dahrendorf, writing in the middle of the twentieth century, 
calls on sociology to move on from this kind of utopian treatment of social contents.193 
Where sociological theory fails to see the disruptive elements of society, it lapses into 
treating society as a static entity with its elements in too-tightly bound cooperation to 
reflect social process properly. While Dahrendorf, Michel Foucault, and others have 
transformed sociology and its concepts, the ties of abstraction, representation, and 
critique remain to link Utopia and social theory. These links play out in interesting ways 
for social theory and Utopia, as well as for religious studies, with its methods influenced 
by these theorists. In reviewing Levitas's sources, specifically Karl Mannheim, Ernst 
Bloch, and E.P. Thompson, I find cases of how scholars struggled with the analytic tool 
of social totality and its reifying effect as they sought to use social theory for social 
transformation. Through revisiting these thinkers and their concerns, I raise up how 
Utopia, cast as a conceptual operation of desire, attempts to suture the problematic of 
representing the subject as both self-knowing agent and as effect of social process, 
leaving the word "desire" to perform a host of functions of loss, comparison, and 
aspiration in the face of an awareness of the structuring force that social theory attributes 
to a historical entity called "society." 
                                                
193 Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis,” American Journal 
of Sociology, 64, no. 2 (1958): 115–27. 
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Mannheim 
 An early and influential social theorist, Karl Mannheim, charted Utopia within the 
social sphere, naming it as a force of novelty within social change.194 Mannheim is 
consistent with Bloch and Manuel’s conception of "utopia" as a broad impulse to 
betterment. He also notes the comprehensiveness of utopia and its investment in what not 
currently in existence. Where he departs from them is his Marxist language that names 
ideology as the force of sedimentation and contrasts this with Utopia as a force of 
disruption. As mentioned above, Levitas sees how this puts Mannheim in line with others 
who see Utopia in its function, not in its forms or functions.195 Mannheim is seeing that 
social movements, in working towards better social conditions, use representations of 
ideal social conditions to motivate their causes. Utopia is an idea that shatters the present 
ideological frame. If ideas seem revolutionary or even authoritative, they will be tested 
against the social givens and ideas of the time: wishes will rise and fall until they are so 
bursting with urgency that they supersede the order around them. According to 
Mannheim, they take over because the wish overwhelms with so much promise of 
connecting people to the levers that power their existence, from an interpretive frame to 
the actual material controls of their conditions of existence. Mannheim sees the root of 
utopias within the alienation and oppression of their current systems.  
Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation of Mannheim highlights not just the relation of 
ideology and utopia, but also what distinguishes the form of utopia—its literary roots—as 
a means to deliver its uses and roles within social processes. This becomes important for 
what is possible for society. If utopia is confusing or too heterogeneous to categorize, it is 
                                                
194 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology Of Knowledge, trans. Louis 
Wirth and Edward Shils (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985). 
195 Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, 69. 
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because of its role of representing either what is outside of society or alternatives to what 
society has to offer. This is not a single alternative but is often quite diverse. The debate 
then begins about whether or not this alternative is actually better. The consistency of 
contents—the revised family order, the organization of political life, the distribution of 
material goods—can be a distraction for an analysis of utopia, Ricoeur claims, for first 
identifying how utopia is structured to produce a position from which to analyze the 
dense relations established within society. In order for any alternative to be registered as 
better, it first must construct itself as a meaningful, significant difference. “Nowhere” of 
utopia gives it this position of difference from which to launch a legitimate alternative. It 
then becomes subject to judgment. 
 It is this approximate distance provided by utopia that engages it within the gears 
of ideology. Ideology, as defined by Marx and expanded by Ricoeur, fundamentally 
functions “to pattern, to consolidate, to provide order to the course of action." If ideology 
distorts the real relations of existence for the purposes of a ruling class, it does so to 
enable the current authorities to continue. Thus, ideology has a conservative function.196 
Utopia is disruptive to this conservative function where it subverts not only present 
authorities but also undermines these authorities’ claim to legitimacy. Utopia challenges 
power, both those with power and, more substantially, the ways power works without 
resorting to violence. Ricoeur expands Mannheim’s theorized relationship between 
ideology and utopia with this emphasis on how utopia inspires and, paradoxically, can 
produce violent revolution. Ricoeur also adds to Mannheim by exploring how utopia’s 
pathology corresponds to ideology’s pejorative valence of manipulation: both are most 
                                                
196 Paul Ricoeur, “Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination,”  in Being Human in a Technological Age, 
ed. D.M. Borchert and D. Stewart, 107-125, . (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1979) 
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destructive when they distance themselves from the material conditions. The dysfunction 
of ideology is distortion and dissimulation; utopia loses its potency for exposing the 
operations of power when its images detach into regressive nostalgia or a distraction for 
acting, or, in Marxist terms, the praxis of lived existence. Ideology and utopia are thus 
connected through their roles in indexing different moments in the social imaginary. Both 
traffic in the symbols of the culture, in the representations, ideas and conceptions that 
preserve social relations within material conditions. They compliment each other in the 
ways that they stand in as figures at different points in the concealment and critique of 
real relations.  
 Levitas revisits Mannheim—and Ricoeur's reading—in her final chapter and 
concludes that, for the purposes recognizing the human desire for better living in its 
fullest sense and as still active in the present day, both Left and Right politics can be seen 
for their ways of better living, even if they are conservative in their direction. I think this 
a correct reading of Mannheim, but, by losing the Marxist critique in her definition by 
proposing a comparative "better way of being," Levitas loses the oppositional force that 
Utopia signals, especially at the level of social totality and the way that Utopia signifies 
social reorganization as the source of that improvement. Also missing in Levitas's reading 
is the representational economy that Utopia is embedded in. I can understand how Utopia 
and ideology can collapse into one another, however both maintain their life through 
material culture as the source and destination for the imagination and this is not sustained 
by Levitas's definition towards impulse or desire. Levitas's use of desire, in uses of 
Mannheim, Bloch, and others in the Marxist lineage implies this representational lineage 
but then centers back on the affective or energetic level. While desire may be aligned 
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with more affective registers via Luce Irigaray or Gilles Deleuze in reaction to the 
psychoanalytic discourses of desire, these thinkers are not in her genealogy.197 I agree 
that Utopia and ideology need to be seen in their cooperative work, and that Utopia 
cannot alone be thought of as a novel insight or novum that refreshes social life and 
motivates social transformation; it does still carry alterity to the status quo that is more 
than a comparatively better condition. As I argue in the next chapter, Utopia is best 
analyzed as a historical figure, not as a concept, and both ideology and Utopia carry 
within them the social contradictions of their historical contexts and, to different degrees, 
formulate solutions and satisfactions of better ways of living. What distinguishes Utopia 
from ideology is how it images the social totality through representation and offers the 
                                                
197 Levitas's engagements with the discourses of desire comes up in the new preface to the reissue of The 
Concept of Utopia in 2010. In responding to critics and interlocutors, she reports: "Others have been 
puzzled by the category of desire, wrongly assuming a Lacanian reference, and this too would have merited 
further explanation, or at least a disclaimer. Lacanian psychoanlaysis makes me lose the will to live, which 
seems a dystopian rather than utopian effect; and the Blochian of desire, hunger, longing has a broader 
existential reach." xiii-xiv. She nods to Deleuze here, saying that "Lacan's theorization of desire can be 
brought to bear on questions of utopia, and the work of both Gilles Deleuze and Slavoj Zizek is important 
here." xiv. However, she stays with Bloch and Marcuse, not broaching either Deleuze or Lacan to clarify 
her position. As I see these genealogies, Deleuze and Irigaray both are arguments against Lacanian 
psychoanalysis with emphasis on affect, materialism, and intimacies whereas Lacan's (and Jameson's) route 
is with narrative, language, and structuralism.  To link Utopia to these discourses, as I am arguing, requires 
an account of form, and not only impulse. Lucy Sargisson connects Iriagary and utopia via theme of 
transgression in Contemporary Feminist Utopias but as I propose in Chapter Three, the connection is better 
mapped by form than theme. As for Deleuze and Utopia, Deleuze's remapping of desire is an extensive 
revisioning of power (of the Foucaultian kind) and affect. This would be a fruitful exploration that could 
easily include Bloch's temporal, anticipatory ontology.  Deleuze's desire fits well with Bloch's impulse but 
in a less universal way. Deleuze offers this definition in an interview: " But why? For me, desire does not 
comprise any lack; neither is it a natural given; it is but one with an assemblage of heterogenous elements 
which function; it is process, in contrast with structure or genesis; it is affect, as opposed to feeling; it is 
'haecceity' (individuality of a day, a season, a life), as opposed to subjectivity; it is event, as opposed to 
thing or person. And above all it implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a 'body without 
organs', which is only defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, gradients, flux." Deleuze, section D in 
"Desire and Pleasure" trans. Melissa McMahon, editorial forward Francois Ewald, 
www.artdes.monash.edu.au. accessed 01/16/2012.One path connecting Deleuze and Utopia is through 
Bloch's use of process and open temporality, mapped by Susan McManus in "Fabricating the Future: 
Becoming Bloch's Utopians," Utopian Studies 14, no. 2, (2003): 1-22. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20720008. For my own treatment of the potential relationship of Delueze to 
Utopia via the constitution of collectivities, see Holly White,"Desiring Utopian Subjects: Collectivity and 
Its Discontents," in Hope and the Longing for Utopia: Futures and Illusions in Theology and Narrative, ed. 
Daniel Boscaljon (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 58-78.  
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"better way of being" through a proposed collectivity that can disarm the antagonism of 
the self and its situation. To reorganize Levitas's formulation, what distinguishes Utopia 
is that it calls out the scarcity gap as socially constructed and satisfies the subject through 
a reorganized society. As always, this is a fantasy, an impossibility, but, in its proposal 
and formalization, society does change, if only in the way that it reflects on its own 
construction and sees possibility where there was once nature. 
Bloch and Thompson 
 As mentioned above, Levitas makes the most use of Bloch and E.P. Thompson for 
her own theory of desire and utopia for reasons that relate strongly to my own project of 
clarifying the representational dilemmas of social constructionist and existential 
dimensions of subjective life. Levitas is aware of this problem and registers it in her 
discussions with Bloch and Thompson, but most forcefully in the conclusion of her 
chapter on William Morris. Here, Levitas sifts through the arguments left over by E.P. 
Thompson, Perry Anderson, Paul Meier, and Michael Lowy about the reception of 
Morris as Marxist. The concerns run along the lines that claiming Morris for both 
Marxism and Utopia leaves behind a legacy of Marxist antipathy to Utopia. In a moment, 
I will explain more of what is at stake in these exchanges about Morris for my own 
reading of Utopia specifically. Levitas's closing paragraphs, however, gesture to what I 
regard as central to Utopia and its relation critical religious studies: the problematic of the 
obstacles scholars face in representing self and the social world. 
 In these paragraphs, Levitas raises sets of pairs that seem not to resolve: Marxism 
and Utopia, Romanticism and utilitarianism, knowledge and desire. Levitas presents that 
these are just formulations of another question: it is not a choice between Romantic and 
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utilitarian, or a problematic relationship between "Marxism" and "utopia." "The real 
problem,” she explains, “is how we should think about the future and, specifically, how 
we should think about feelings and about experience." Any effort at synthesis—or claim 
of synthesis—is misguided: 
In the form of knowledge versus desire and the cold and warm streams, 
Thompson and Bloch propose their dialectical relationship, stopping short 
of a synthesis which overcomes the difference and tension between them. 
If some writers manage to synthesize the two it is a fragile synthesis, 
constantly in danger of disintegrating into its component parts.198 
 
The route through is a dialectical relationship provided by Thompson and Bloch who stop 
short of a synthesis. But here, as in the end of her work, Levitas truncates the movement 
of the dialectic. As I argued above, she does not provide enough ballast for her use of 
desire and leaves out the role of representation in this construction, ending on the side of 
a humanist self that she, in other ways, so carefully frames as constructed. Her own use 
of desire could do more for “thinking about feelings," depending, from what I can tell, 
too much on aspects of Thompson that exceed her discussion. I posit this dependence 
because of her rejection of the psychoanalytic streams in Bloch and Marcuse. I will first 
discuss her presentation and rejection of Marcuse's and Bloch's psychoanalysis, then her 
hesitant use of Bloch, and finally the arguments that sit behind Thompson’s own 
dependence on desire to frame the problematic that Levitas and I are both addressing. 
Psychoanalysis: Marcuse and Bloch  
 While Levitas appropriates Bloch and Marcuse's Freudo-Marxist language of 
desire, she disavows the erotic, libidinal components of their projects.199 She gives only 
                                                
198 Levitas, Concept, 130. 
199 See footnote 197 above for the note about Levitas's unexplained yet acknowledged resistance to Lacan 
and with it, a larger stream of sexual and intimate attachments.  For a more robust, embodied look at 
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eight lines to Bloch's re-reading of Freud, an argument that hinges on reworking 
daydreams, night dreams, and fantasy as not part of a repressed unconscious memory of 
unacceptable sexual fantasy but as a part of the filling in of consciousness with 
anticipation.200 The more sustained attention to psychoanalytic language is through 
Marcuse, but even after a chapter-length treatment of his promotion of Freudian drives 
and their surfacing in commodity culture and repression through wage labor economy, 
Levitas denies any association of libidinal or erotic force to her use of desire. After 
raising their use of desire as it relates to utopia, she strikes out the claims to 
psychoanalysis as used by her sources of desire by how they have associated utopia with 
an essential human impulse: "The ides of a utopian impulse is, however, both 
unnecessary and unverifiable. The idea of an innate impulse to utopianizing is intimately 
bound up with essentialist definitions of human needs and human nature, which are 
themselves deeply problematic." While I agree that an essential utopianizing is 
problematic, and separately, that a Freudian account of innate drives is problematic, 
Levitas does not offer a better account of the mechanisms of desire other than that they 
are socially-constructed and not unrelated to ideology, as discussed above. She shifts to 
associating the lack of an innate utopian impulse with an anxiety about its contemporary 
expression, not offering any hint how desire has anything more to do with sexual 
difference, conscious and/or unconscious processes, or repression. Desire, here now 
                                                                                                                                            
Bloch's potential for discourse that weave sexuality, erotic attachments and time, see José Esteban Muñoz, 
Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York: New York University Press, 2009). 
200 Levitas short synopsis of Bloch's is an accurate enough gloss of Bloch's treatment of Freud, however, 
her book's conclusion about utopia as desire centers on Bloch's conclusions from this argument with Freud 
and more about desire could be explained through a longer engagement with Bloch's 40-page argument that 
Levitas gives eight lines, found between pages 86-87.  For Bloch's discussion, see The Principle of Hope, 
78-118. A closer look at what Levitas could mean about the process or openness of Bloch can be found in 
Ben Anderson, "Transcending without Transcendence: Utopianism and an Ethos of Hope," Antipode 38, 
(2006): 691-710. 
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attached to utopia, emerges untroubled, consistent, and directive, offered by social 
conditions, disconnected from the body but attached to subjects.  
 Levitas situates Bloch in a stream like William Morris that flows with both 
Marxism and Romanticism, finding trouble with the places that Bloch veers in and out of 
his materialist commitments and relies too heavily on the satisfactions that aesthetics 
provide individuals for both their experiences of fulfillment and as outlets to express their 
hopeful futures. Where her uses and criticisms of Bloch most intersect my questions 
about the problematics of representing self and social registers in critical work are in her 
characterization of him as insufficiently materialist for her own sensibility. Levitas avers 
that Bloch depends heavily on a Marxist historical materialism for his analysis of utopia 
that directs towards a future of an un-alienated society where equality and fraternity 
become available after a revolution towards socialism and then to full communism.201 
She is skeptical that this Marxist teleology can really be so associated with the broadly 
available anticipatory consciousness that is within all wishes, and sees where his 
argument would be helped by delineating the contents and forms that divide the less-
purposeful abstract wishing from its more explicitly practical political concrete "will-full" 
projects towards those ends.202 Where Levitas's criticisms grow cloudy are where she 
identifies Bloch's way of endeavoring to weave together what Bloch himself calls the 
"cold" and "warm" streams of Marxism—the cold stream of analysis, of a "science of 
                                                
201 Levitas, Concept, 96-97. 
202 The slide first moves from wishes to actions, and then from abstractions to concrete: "All wishful 
thinking thus draw attention to the shortcomings of reality, a necessary step on the way to change. In 
addition, the Not yet is intended to convey not just the interdependence of want an satisfaction, but the 
drive from one to the other, towards change—not just wishful, but will-full thinking." Her discussion of his 
abstract and concrete distinction proceeds in the next section and later his failure to give more specifics of 
content that would distinguish the abstract and concrete utopias. Levitas, Concept, 88-90, 100. 
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conditions," and the warm of the "passionate pursuit of un-alienated experience."203 
Levitas argues that Bloch too heavily depends on the warm stream for his position of 
utopia, focusing on aesthetic works as a broad expression of utopianism that he 
disconnects from the processes of material production and his emphasis on subjective 
experience.204  
 While I agree with this observation of Bloch's work, I do not think that her own 
work does much more to escape this tendency towards the liberal-humanist pole that she 
keeps pressing as the alternative to the Marxist formulation. Her introduction of his 
chapter lifts from his Principle of Hope that "dreams of a better life" –from daydreams 
escape to religious forms—are what direct actions that go on to transform the future.205 
The chapter's concluding sentences also hold out his utopia for the way it "involves 
fundamental questions about the human condition and its future" and his refusal to 
"abandon faith in that future.”206 As mentioned in Part One, her definition of desire relays 
a more individualized "better being" than the collectivity and coordination of 
satisfactions of individuals and community that I see operating in the historicized form of 
                                                
203 Levitas, Concept, 93. She quotes part of what I lift here from Bloch: "Only coldness and warmth of 
concrete anticipation together therefore ensure that neither the path in itself nor the goal in itself are held 
apart from one another undialectically and so become reified and isolated. And the conditional analysis on 
the whole historical -situational stretch emerges both as an unmaking of ideologies and a disenchantment of 
metaphysical illusion; precisely this belongs to the most useful cold stream of Marxism. Through it Marxist 
materialism becomes not only the science of conditions, but at the same time, the science of struggle and 
opposition against all ideological inhibitions and concealments of the ultimately decisive conditions, which 
are always economic. To the warm stream of Marxism, however, belong liberating intention and 
materialistically human, humanely materialist real tendency, towards whose goal all these disenchantments 
are undertaken. From here the strong appeal to the debased, enslaved, abandoned, belittled human being, 
from here the appeal to the proletariat as the turntable towards emancipation." Bloch, Principle of Hope, 
209. 
204 Levitas, Concept, 105. She also lists his weakness of "the failure or refusal to provide clear or verifiable 
criteria fro his distinctions; and a teleology which suggest that history has a goal rather than simply that 
human beings have purposes"—points I mentioned above.  
205 Levitas, Concept¸86. 
206 For her discussion of his specific concern about his too broad use of forms and unspecific Marxist, 
concrete utopian contents, see Levitas, Concept, 101-02.  
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Utopia. Also, it makes no use of the relationship of Utopia to the abstraction of "society" 
as a fantasized social totality that enables scholars to derive a socially-constructed 
subject. Instead, it leans back on the work of desire, yet an anti-psychoanalytic formation 
of it. 
Education of Desire: E.P. Thompson 
 Thus, Levitas's use of desire derives most from E.P. Thompson's description of 
William Morris. In her chapter on Morris's role in English Marxism, Levitas lifts from 
Thompson's biography of Morris a phrase that originates with French critic Miguel 
Abensour: the "education of desire." In claiming Morris as both a writer of Utopias and 
not just romances, and also as a visionary for a socialist society of England with proper 
revolutionary credentials, Thompson follows Absensour in recognizing a new kind of 
Marxism with Morris, one that resisted a Marxist tradition that "was becoming enclosed 
within a self-confirming doctrinal circularity" and instead had a more heuristic, Utopian 
discourse, one that rejected Engel's strict scientism and the classical Utopianism of 
"juridico-political model building."207 What was released with Morris's New from 
Nowhere was precisely something romantic and archaic—sounding of fantasy—to 
present "alternative values sketched in an alternative way of life."208 In detaching from 
                                                
207 Edward P Thompson, William Morris: From Romantic to Revolutionary (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 
789-90. Absenour's study of the Utopian textual tradition and Morris's News from Nowhere (1890), 
combined with John Goode's writing on Morris, connect with Thompson's own appreciation of Morris and 
Thompson's project of reclaiming Morris for an ethical-political Marxism. There is much in the archive of 
Morris to argue for or against his Marxist credentials and how close or far he was to the historical 
materialist Marxism of the more party-political strands of Marxism of England from Morris's time to 
Thompson's first edition of his biography in 1955. Thompson's own project is a part of this reception 
history of Morris.  
208 This is Thompson quoting his own translation of Abensour (p. 298) in Thompson, William Morris, 790. 
The text of Absensour's is in French and seems to neither have been translated into English or even much 
circulated. I could not locate it through Worldcat. According to the footnote, Abesnsour was on track to 
publish his doctoral thesis at the time of Thompon's revised edition of William Morris published in 1977. 
The footnote for Thompon's citation of Abensour to aid in your own search: M. M-H. Abensour, "Les 
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naturalism, from precision, Morris offers a "challenge to the imagination to become 
immersed in the same open exploration. 
And in such an adventure two things happen: our habitual values (the 
commonsense" of bourgeois society) are thrown into disarray. and we 
enter into Utopia's proper and new-found space: the education of desire. 
This is not the same as "a moral education" towards a given end: it is, 
rather, to pen a way to aspiration, to 'teach desire to desire, to desire better, 
to desire more, and above all to desire in a different way."209 
 
This is Thompson quoting Abensour, who will then be quoted by Levitas with the same 
formulation. I repeat this as both recognition of the archaeology of this idea—which is 
repeated often in other texts about Utopia—but also for its potential in contributing to my 
own analysis of the role that the figure of Utopia has as both aesthetic object and its 
signifying position in the problematic that I have been addressing throughout my 
dissertation—the obstacle of giving both a social constructionist account and what is 
more casually called a "humanist" version of the subject—incremental spatiotemporality, 
immediacy, or the strike of affect that feels like and goes by the name of "just living life."  
 Thompson's concern with Morris centers on just this question: "Was Morris a 
Marxist or a not-Marxist?" Here, Thompson reflects in his text a question that 
biographers of Thompson have pegged to Thompson's own position within English 
Marxism and an argument that Thompson had with both the stricter materialism(s) of the 
socialist party in England from the 1950s and with Althusser's structural Marxism in the 
1970s. The argument, as Anderson portrays it, is that Thompson opposes "desire" to 
"knowledge" and then privileges "desire," which Anderson rejects as a "fashionable 
philosophy of Parisian irrationalism." Anderson associates it with Deleuze and Guattari's 
                                                                                                                                            
Formes de :L'Utoie Socialiste-Communiste", these pour le Doctorat d'Etat en Science politique, Paris 1, 
1973, esp. chapter 4. Forthcoming as Utopies et dialectique du socilaisme, Pavot, Paris (1977?).  
209 Ibid., 790-91. 
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Anti-Oedipus and "the expression of a dejected post-lapsarian anarchism. Intellectually, 
the category operates as a license for the exercise of any fantasy freed from the 
responsibility of cognitive controls."210 Andersons' own analysis moves between Morris's 
and Thompson's Marxisms, but Thompson is Anderson's ultimate target in the way that 
Thompson's Marxism has more than enough romanticism of its own, calling out where 
Thompson overcorrects for the structuralism around him, linking “values” with 
“feelings” against “ideas” in The Poverty of Theory (1978). Levitas work wades into 
Anderson's evaluation, coming out on the side of Thompson in her concluding 
paragraphs, as mentioned above: Thompson wins the day because he does not attempt a 
synthesis of feelings and thought, but allows them their dialectical relation. 
 This dialectic of Thompson's work is not explicit in Levitas. But reading more of 
Thompson shows how his method of social history weaves the "cold" and "warm" 
streams. One of the most famous passages from The Poverty of Theory addresses how 
crucial human experience is in Marxist history and Marxist praxis: 
Experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, 
crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide. 
People starve: their survivors think in new ways about the market. People 
are imprisoned: in prison they meditate in new ways about the law.211 
 
In this particular polemic against Althusser's "irrational" and "theological" Marxism, 
Thompson makes vivid what is at stake in his own commitments to social history as a 
method: to draw out what in Marx made Marxism necessary. Resisting what he saw as 
rigid materialism within both places of Marxist practice and theory, Thompson set out to 
articulate the formation of a class as a process of both conditioning and agency, and that 
                                                
210 Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (New York: Verso, 1980), 161. 
211 The Poverty of Theory and other Essays (London: Merlin, 1978), 200-01. Quoted in Scott Hamilton, The 
Crisis of Theory: E.P. Thompson, The New Left, and Post-War British Politics (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2011), 199. 
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while the productive relations of capitalism might create the contours of class, they did 
not offer how the consciousness of class would be particular to different social 
locations.212 Seeing the formation of class in motion, he highlighted the cultural and 
psychological resources that factory workers drew on for their own consciousness, 
specifically the discourses of birthrights and freedom of expression from the British 
Enlightenment.213 Thompson, through readings of Giambattista Vico and William Morris 
together, saw how human actions appeared simultaneously free and unfree, and that there 
was a dialectical relation of particular individuals to their social locations that could not 
be accounted for in Marxist materialism.214 In a biography of Thompson's intellectual 
work and its relation to his nuclear activism, Michael Bess summarizes that for 
Thompson,  
Human agency, therefore, was alike a form of play taking place within 
limits—limits whose evolution the players could consciously influence 
over time. Each individual possessed a finite yet open-ended opportunity 
to contribute to the shaping of culture.215 
 
Thompson resisted the reduction of humans to abstract categories, using close readings of 
specific historical circumstances as his method to draw out how individuals synthesized 
both the structures that impinged on them and their own role in interacting with and 
potentially changing their structures. 
                                                
212 A close reading of Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class is put to use for analyzing his 
perception by other English Marxists in Theodore Koditschek, “The Possibilities of Theory: Thompson’s 
Marxist History,” in E.P. Thompson and English Radicalism, ed. Roger Fieldhouse and Richard Taylor 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 71. 
213 Koditschek, “The Possibilities of Theory," 72.  
214 In his chapter on Thompson, Bess recounts the risks and oppositions that Thompson held that 
distinguished his intellectual work as reflecting his political commitments to social life of people and how 
Thompson's resistance to structural Marxism was because of how it failed to address the needs of those he 
studied. Michael Bess, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud: Four Activist Intellectuals and Their Strategies 
for Peace, 1945-1989 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 122.  
215 Bess, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud, 122.  
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 This background of Thompson is imported into Levitas, not made explicit. But, 
by rejecting explicitly psychoanalytic, erotic desire, in focusing on the "cold" and "warm" 
streams that Bloch highlights, and in referencing the arguments in British Marxism over 
Morris's legacy, Levitas suggests this archive is what is guiding her formulation of desire 
as common to places where scarcity gaps, constructed under particular historical 
conditions, generate interest in making life better. Levitas wants utopia to exceed any 
form, to be known as experience itself:  
Utopia does not express desire, but enables people to work towards an 
understanding of what is necessary for human fulfillment, a broadening, 
deepening and raising aspirations in terms quite different from those of 
their everyday life. Thus News from Nowhere, as a critique of alienation, 
does not just ask us to think about an alternative society, but invites us to 
experience what it would mean to be fully in possession of our own 
humanity—an experience which Bloch claims is offered to us through 
artistic works in the ‘fulfilled moment.216  
 
I agree with Levitas that Marxism—or more generally critical, social constructionist 
approaches—struggle to work with human experience in their texts and that desire is 
related to this articulation. I, however, argue that there are ways other than hers, more 
inclusive of the ruptures that Thompson endeavors to include that are theoretically tuned 
and methodologically coherent with critical theory. This is my figure of Utopia that 
interprets Utopia for its contradictions, for its explicit appeals to fantasy, and for its 
address to the affective, libidinal dimensions of collectivity that Bloch calls forth but that 
Wegner warns of as dimensions of a nation-state subjectivation and individualization that 
excludes as it includes—a process still underway. I argue that staying focused on the 
Utopian literary form delivers something of the experiential that Levitas wants to capture 
with "desire." Theory is here to play a role in this labor, but differently than her more 
                                                
216 Levitas, Concept, 141. 
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straightforward analytic directs or the affective charge that is carried in 
Abensour's/Thompson's "education of desire" that too easily is wrapped in its own 
tautological vortex. The materiality she endeavors to insert with desire too quickly 
disintegrates with her formulation, and what might be a generic fantasy becomes 
indistinguishable from something properly Utopian.  
 This chapter argued that the weaknesses of a generalized utopian theory, rather 
than failings, are evidence of the presence of another valuable discourse struggling to 
hold up the subject and its particularity within structural methods of analysis. Utopian 
theory brings these two points of view together by defining Utopia as a dream, an 
impulse to fantasy, and as desire. These efforts, I contended, are displacements of two 
orders: one, of the structural dilemma of sustaining both of these perspectives at once—
the concrete relation of subject to society and the fantasy of a perfect and total society—
and two, of Utopia's role in signifying contradiction, specifically the contradiction of 
sustaining those two in perspective to one another. Simply said, Utopia both enacts and 
represents the enactment of this contradiction. Thus, naming Utopia as fantasy is not 
"wrong," but the theoretical labor in collecting social diversity and contradictory 
elements under one heading that is, itself, a label for the rifts of social contradiction, 
creates itself as a Utopian form. This is not merely another case of another modern 
malady, however. Utopian theory holds insights to its own formation that can be attended 
to through its history. When Utopia's history is engaged, Utopia is seen not only for how 
Utopia (it, or, the genre) reflects the abstraction of "society," but also how the genre 
inflects this abstraction, shaping it as it is used in the study of religion, carrying in it 
intonations of collectivity and oppositional logics as residues of its Utopian history. As I 
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retraced Levitas's use of desire through its particular locations in twentieth-century 
European and English Marxism, I found more to recommend that Utopia and desire are 
more suitably understood through this history—the one that shows the conflict of 
representing raw existence and the productive fantasy of social totality as a part and 
parcel of critical theory. From this point, I want to pursue how this dilemma—the 
problematic of representation—is figured by Utopian narratives. There is much that is 
consistent between my understanding of the role of Utopian literature and Thompson's—
something I will develop next. I want to show, however, that psychoanalytic discourses 
have a role to play in understanding the desire for Utopia as it affects modern life 
generally and critical projects specifically. 
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Chapter Three 
Utopian Literature: Formal Conventions and Figuration 
 
 This chapter continues my argument that critical approaches in Religious Studies 
can be supported in their dilemma of representing the structuring forces of society and the 
subjects structured by these forces by considering how the figure of Utopia signifies this 
diremption. As I argued in the previous chapter, theorists of Utopia dissolve historical 
and social differences in attempting to create a more widely applicable, generalized 
"desire." In seaming the contradictions of Utopia, they collapse into unity what is better 
viewed for its differences. This leaves unexamined some suppositions about coherent 
subjectivity of desire—a critique that is immanent to the use of desire and dreaming but 
that go unexamined. In short, scholars such as Sargent and Levitas propose that Utopia is 
about desire, but lack a theory of desire. I have proposed that by historicizing Utopian 
theory for these investments, critical scholars can make better use of Utopia by naming it 
as a figure that displaces the contradictions experienced by western, modern subjects into 
an aesthetic, delivering a pleasure of a temporary resolution. This chapter further 
examines Utopia as an aesthetic figure within modernity and its role as a deposit for 
modern fantasies. By analyzing the Utopian literary form and how it consolidates and 
represents self and social through the dual expressions of social totality and collectivity, 
critical scholars of religion can consider how intellectual projects may reflect dimensions 
of a desire for modern Utopia. I will make these applications to Religious Studies explicit 
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in Chapter Four, considering there how the Marxian desire for social transformation is 
predicated on representations of social totality and collectivity. 
  In this chapter, I will further explain how I derive my category of Utopian desire 
from modern literary form and the Marxist literary criticism of Fredric Jameson. As 
explicated in the previous chapter, scholars of Utopia should not subsume its violent 
aspects into a well-modulated desire, but instead interpret it as a historicized, modern 
figure. Here I continue with these Marxist approaches and argue that, in representing the 
idealized society, Utopia is more precisely a formal resolution of social contradictions 
that offers a means to analyze the material conditions that form subjects and inform 
subjective perspectives. I first consider how the genre of Utopian narrative fiction, taking 
its cues from More's inaugural satire about a distant island, figures itself as a genre of 
boundaries. I argue that the Utopian literary form suspends both the fantasy of 
satisfaction and the blunt reality of social contradiction simultaneously through its 
conventions of travel and boundary crossing. I then consider, through Jameson's Marxist 
and psychoanalytic frames, how modern literary forms generally, and the Utopian literary 
form specifically, hold together the desires that inflect and accompany modernity and 
capitalism, particularly those that speak to the anxieties that arise from social 
contradictions. Jameson regards literature as a repository of ideological and libidinal 
investments that can bring into view the pleasures of analysis as well as put the 
interpreter into contact with conflicts of analytic and existential perspectives with which 
modern humans wrestle. Literature holds the ideological wish fulfillments of their 
communities, yet also can be sites for confronting the ways that society delivers those 
ideological fantasies to the reader through their place in symbolic and imaginary 
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networks. Jameson, I contend, offers a robust historicism along with a means to consider 
the existential, lived dimension of social life, inclusive of that affective and libidinal 
attachments that limn and contour that social life and give off the impression of "personal 
experience." I conclude from Jameson's formal method that Utopia develops as a figure 
within modernity for holding together two, entwined desires: one, of representing social 
life as a totality for analytic and explanatory purposes and two, for ending the 
experiences of incongruity or conflict that appear as generated from the production, 
distribution, and organization of material and social life. As such, Utopia is a fantasy of 
the fulfillment of the self through the social—a cognitive fulfillment of social totality and 
an affective fulfillment of collectivity.  
 I am particularly drawn to how Jameson's formal method bridges the immediacy 
of the present with the difficulty of thinking this present and how critical thought is an 
extension of this difficulty. He notes the obstacles to formulating thought under the 
conditions of western commodity culture—specifically American-style—conditions 
which include the "techniques of mystification practiced by the media and particularly by 
advertising in its enormous expansion since the onset of the Cold War" in the 1970s. 
Since that moment, he perceives a further expansion, an "invincible universality of 
capitalism." Even with social gains on the left, socioeconomic alternatives to capitalism 
seem not only unviable, but unthinkable.217 The most recent (2016) of his published 
writing, an essay called An American Utopia,218 answers his own challenge to think 
Utopia under these conditions, offering both diagnosis and prescription with a large dose 
                                                
217 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, xvii; Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, xii. 
218 Fredric Jameson, An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal Army, ed. Slavoj Žižek, (New 
York: Verso, 2016). 
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of self-conscious humor.219 His keen attention to the present cultivates a type of 
historicism that tracks present knowledge production as consciously modern in its 
formulations of history, change, and abstraction for the service of analysis and 
postmodern in its awareness of the faults, failures, and inadequacies of the project of 
thought—all within micro and macro climates of capitalist reification, commodification, 
and instrumentalization. Out of the present tense, Jameson looks around and understands 
the moment as marked by a crisis of representation. In postmodernity, representation is 
not conceived as a dilemma, but as an impossibility; "reason, turned cynical, has been 
displaced by art and the multiplicity of images, none of which corresponds to 'truth.'"220 
He observes how this is distinct from modernism's own crisis of representation that took 
on "heroic formal invention and the grandiose prophetic visions of the modernist 
seers."221 The present tense of postmodernity does not lead to or excuse relativism; it 
demands new commitments to history and to praxis with the awareness of these as always 
incomplete and both useful and longed for in the face of the proliferations of social life 
into more and more forms due to reification and commodification. 
 By interpreting the Utopia as a modern figure within a postmodern moment, I 
identify Utopia as providing the pleasures of an imaginary social wholeness along with a 
potential interpretive satisfaction of glimpsing the saturations and sedimentations of the 
social on the subject. I conclude that Utopia can be a means for critical religious studies 
scholars to investigate these twin desires—one, of representing social totality through 
                                                
219 In the first two pages of this essay, Jameson catalogues the present, particularly of power as it has been 
theorized and how it is distinctively deployed by nation-states against their own citizens since the 1960s 
and concludes that: "This is the situation in which I want to propose a project which I can't be sure whether 
I am proposing a political program or a utopian vision, neither of which, according to me, ought to be 
possible any longer." "An American Utopia" in An American Utopia, 1. 
220 Jameson, Archaeologies, 212. 
221 Ibid.  
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social construction and two, of the attunement of the self to the social as collectivity and 
the possibilities of the end of social contradiction. Interpreting Utopia for these aspects 
generates perspectives relevant to the critical study of religion for the way that the 
Utopian form is itself a "social construction"—a constructed society. This overlap affords 
a momentary glimpse of the scholar's affective attachments to analyzing society for its 
constructedness.  
Outline 
 
 In Part One, I claim that Utopia develops as a figure for thinking social change 
and difference by way of its status as an aesthetic object—specifically modern literary 
fiction. If Utopia has come to signify a desire for a better way of living (as Levitas avers), 
it does so by the way that modern readers have encountered narratives of travel to 
isolated communities that function smoothly and present happy inhabitants. When Utopia 
is seen through its literary forms and conventions, it removes Utopia from the category of 
philosophical concept to one of aesthetic figure and directs attention to how thought—
especially thought about Utopia—is a matter of comparatives, sustained by a logic of 
spatial relation. I advance these claims by first discussing some of the issues that are 
raised by isolating Utopia as a genre of literary fiction and discover the homology of 
Utopia and genre: that both are made possible by their boundaries. Like in Chapter Two, 
Utopia again is mired in representational problems related to its own form. I untangle 
these threads by describing some features of Utopian literature, turning specifically to 
how the narratives themselves are constructed out of differential space and assert new 
spaces for thought because of the traveler or narrator. Utopias, then are travel narratives 
of alternative, self-sufficient societies that move the reader dialectically between worlds, 
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generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader to 
recognize their own social world and its complex problems. Utopias are and are not like 
other narratives: they rely on structures of narrative satisfaction but present them spatially 
instead of through a temporal resolution of plot. Here, I note some closely related genres 
like dystopias and Science Fiction and compare them for how they differently figure the 
crux of the Utopian form—spatial difference—and how difference is both a register for 
otherness as social groups but also, in the postmodern turn, differential subjectivities. 
Thus, claims of a Utopian future are more precisely understood primarily through an 
aesthetic logic of spatial and not temporal difference. 
 In Part Two, I (re)turn to Fredric Jameson from Chapter One. Jameson's analysis 
of modern western literature highlights the role cultural products have not only in 
circulating and expressing ideological contents but also in relaying historical shifts 
through diverse literary forms. Jameson's thought affords both a materialist-historical and 
Lacanian analysis of cultural production that supports my argument that Utopia can be a 
useful tool for framing the problematics of representing attachments and affections that 
afflict and comfort, at the same time as proposing these as social constructions to be 
analyzed as aspects of a social totality. I relate Jameson's broad Marxist formalism to 
Utopian literature specifically. Jameson underscores how narrative Utopias frame and 
consolidate the social contradictions of capitalism for those in Western Europe and North 
America. Their attention to quotidian details and revised human political and material 
intercourse are representations of societies both similar to and different from those of 
their authors and readers. Jameson adds dimensions to historical materialism and formal 
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analysis that permit a historicization of thought and categories themselves, not just the 
works he analyzes, making him a particularly rich addition to critical methods of religion. 
I. Utopian Literary Form—a Genre of Boundaries 
 
 A common or conventional understanding of Utopia is that it represents a perfect 
or an ideal society. In this section, I argue against this traditional definition of Utopia to 
privilege the boundaries of Utopia and to argue that recognizing the constructedness of an 
alterative, fictional society catapults one to consider the constructedness of thought itself. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Utopia has historical connection to a particular 
moment of European nation-state building and becomes abstracted as something more 
general through its use by political and social theory. In this section, I continue with this 
argument by showing how the political realities of modernity get translated through the 
literary form of Utopia and then, in the ways that thought can be considered as a spatial 
operation. I contend that fixations or fantasies of satisfaction in the modern era are 
signified through wholeness or totality, especially as it can be characterized as a human-
directed society. First, I discuss this wholeness as it presents in anxiety of boundaries of 
the genre of Utopia itself. I present three theorists of Utopian genre, each of whom 
demonstrates for me how intellectual claims have material and political dimensions. 
These are the historical conditions of nation-state formation, differential category 
formation in modern scholarship, and sexual politics in the late twentieth century. I 
reference how theorists have defined the Utopian genre of literature and in so doing, 
demonstrate the inherently historical and political dimension of all category formations. 
These topics are particularly relevant to my questions of the critical study of religion in 
that each reflects a different dimension of the problematics of representation inherited 
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from modernity now more evident within our late capitalist, postmodern situation: the 
necessary but limited nature of category formation; the political and economic material 
realities as informing these categories; and the assumed modern, masculine liberal subject 
of knowledge production that has been challenged by psychoanalytic interpretations and 
feminist restatements.  
 I determine from these discussions that several Utopian literary conventions can 
serve as a means to investigate these problematics because of the "wholeness" that Utopia 
represents. I identify several conventions for discussion: Utopias are travel narratives that 
have boundaries that people cross, moving the reader dialectically between worlds and 
generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader into a 
realization or recognition of estrangement while simultaneously satisfying the reader 
through the double closure of a narrative ending and the Utopian society. Said another 
way, the fantasy of satisfaction, fulfillment, or wholeness is given shape as a bounded 
society that redirects attention to material, lived, social reality. After discussing these 
conventions and the reading protocols that they demand, I consider how Utopia 
transitions from literary form into cultural signifier or figure. Drawing on the work of 
Louis Marin, I propose that the heightened drama of estrangement propels Utopia into a 
figure that ties its signification back to an aesthetic form more than to a philosophical 
concept. Through this analysis of the Utopian literary form, I clarify how Utopia, when 
recognized for these mechanisms of its literary production, is in a longer line of 
representational logics that wrestle with the presence/absence of signification. Thus, 
Utopia is layered with several kinds of satisfactions and deferrals which are, in Lacanian 
discourses, the movements that constitute desire itself. 
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Utopia Literary Genre 
 
 Deciding the boundaries of a genre is, in some senses, a reflection of the 
boundary-making projects across modernity. This can be seen in three discussions of 
Utopian genre. The first is with how the effort to claim a territory of a specific genre of 
"Utopian literature" is an intellectual mirror to the material history of European nation-
state development. Phillip Wegner makes use of the homology of Utopian genre and the 
form of Utopias as discourses of boundary in his argument for interpreting Utopian 
literatures as reflective and constitutive of modern nation-state, where the double move of 
bounded collectivity of place and people—a nation— and the "abstracting social 
mechanism, the state" combine to form a contradiction of a universalizing move and a 
contracting, particularizing gesture.222 Wegner relates genre formation to modernity and 
Utopia: genre itself comes into being through its crossing of boundaries—national 
culture, temporalities and canons or sets of other literatures, forming and reforming like 
an institution with its own sets of conventions and practices. As the genre becomes rigid 
enough to be recognized, it then becomes "portable" in the sense that its conventions can 
be picked up by other literatures and reference other places.223 Wegner claims that the 
development of the Utopian narrative and the institutionalization of the nation-state each 
are reflections of this kind of movement and formation of genre: genre disseminates like 
a nation-state and also is a vehicle of nation-state dissemination.   
                                                
222 Phillip E. Wegner, Imaginary Communities, 2. Wegner connects his discussion of the racializing force 
of nation-state formation through Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: 
Ambiguous Identities, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 1992).  
223 "The successful dissemination and subsequent flourishing of a genre then results from its inherent 
'portability,' its capacity to be carried into and redeployed in contexts quite different from those within 
which it first emerges." Wegner, Imaginary Communities, 8. 
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Utopian fictions reproduce the spatial logics of nation-states by the bounded, 
isolated and organized groups they encounter through some travel escapade, reflecting 
geographies of the maps available in the real worlds of their authors while at the same 
time producing interior space of imaginative production in the readership developing 
within these colonializing contexts—readers at home reading of abroad and developing 
new horizons of interior subjectivities. Referencing Henri Lefebvre's The Production of 
Space, Wegner points to how the reified Enlightenment conceptualization of space as a 
static construct is more precisely "an open-ended, conflicted, and contradictory 
process."224 Thus, the genre of Utopian narratives results from larger political 
contradictions: the extension of rights and privileges to citizens of states when the 
dominant understanding of these same rights is constructed out of exclusions and 
otherness. Reflecting on specific Utopian literature, as Wegner shows, is an occasion to 
consider how the author-readers of particular places articulate the contests of who 
belongs, how they belong and where belonging occurs as ambivalences of the violence 
necessary to secure belonging. Like the time traveler Julian West in Bellamy's Looking 
Backward (1889), returning home from the idyllic future is a nightmare—a terrible 
outcome. Thankfully, it is only nightmare: West wakes up again, restored to Boston in 
2000. And like his middle class Americans he is addressing, they too should learn to 
forget their European immigrant pasts and come into assimilationist ideology. Wegner's 
spatial analysis of Utopian genre directs attention to the ways in which the material 
conditions—in this case, spatial markers of national identities—are reflected in the texts 
                                                
224 Wegner, 13. For Wegner's discussion of Lefebvre and other modern spatial theorists, see Imaginary 
Community, 10-17. See, also, Henri Lefebvre The Production of Space, trans. David Nicholson-Smith, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
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themselves at both the level of a formal convention, e.g. a traveler, and the sentiments 
expressed through these forms, e.g. belonging. 
 A second means for considering Utopian genre for modernity is the way that 
genre allows the reader to move dialectically between worlds. Asking this question of the 
division of literature from non-literary Utopias, Gary Saul Morson resists the collapse of 
fiction and non-fiction for the genre of Utopia where political tracts cozy up to satires and 
Science Fiction, as in the case of J.H. Hexter's More's Utopia: A Biography of an Idea.225 
Morson distinguishes Utopia's fictional aspects as part of a "contract" for the reader that 
does not present a plausible sequence of events like a novel but yet, has a realism—that is 
still different from realism as a genre.226 Utopian fictions propose, claim and assert in 
ways that novels do not and thus require different reading protocols than novels—a 
distinction I make below. His larger argument, however, is to situate Dostoevsky within a 
field of Utopian genre, despite the Russian writer's notably anti-Utopian texts such as The 
Brothers Karamozov. His proposal moves to advance Utopia with three neat criteria: 
written with a nod or in a tradition to previous Utopian works, depicting an ideal society, 
and advocating the realization of that society when viewed as a whole text.227 His re-
reading of Dostoevsky's The Writer's Diary is a larger project than what my own research 
undertakes, but Morson's challenge to view Utopian texts "as a whole" so as to consider 
                                                
225 Morson's discourse on Utopian literature as a genre is within a treatment of Dostoevsky. The larger 
conversation involves parody and anti-utopianism of Dostoesvsky, thus developing genre as something 
done in dialectic relation. Gary Saul Morson, The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer and 
the Traditions of Literary Utopia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); Jack. H. Hexter, More's 
Utopia: a Biography of an Idea. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952). 
226 Morson, Boundaries, 76. 
227 My italics here. His succinct list begins on p.74 and goes through p.78, yet could be said to continue for 
the rest of his text as he turns to distinguish "anti-utopias" and "meta-utopias," forming all in dialectical 
relation. But this list is "a work is a literary utopia if and only if it satisfies each of the following criteria: 
(1) it was written (or presumed to have been written) in the tradition of previous utopian literary works; (2) 
it depicts (or is taken to depict) an ideal society; and (3) regarded as a whole, it advocates (or is taken to 
advocate) the realization of that society." Morson, Boundaries, 74-8. 
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them for their polemical role raises the question of the relationship of the category of a 
genre and the conventions of that genre. Is there something about the "whole text" that 
relates to the wholeness or completeness of the society that it represents? This slippage of 
the tools of analysis and the form of the work are framed within Fredric Jameson’s 
theorizations as a case for historicizing critical approaches—attending to how arguments 
and analytic tools reflect particular concerns of historical moments and resemble their 
aesthetics. Jameson does not make an explicit point about this collusion of wholeness at 
the level of analysis and form, addressing instead another register in Morson on irony, 
modernity and Utopia, but I want to hold out that Morson's association of Utopia with 
wholeness can offer insight into the general social reception of Utopian literature and 
help to understand its ability to generate a particular kind of desire that is recognizable as 
Utopian.228 
 The third account of the Utopian genre comes from a consideration of late modern 
and postmodern feminist Utopian fiction, introduced by literary theorist Lucy Sargisson. 
Sargisson argues against a traditional reading of utopianism that makes it about closure, 
perfection, and blueprints and emphasizes instead its subversions of status quo and 
foregrounds process, imperfection and uncertainty.229 She develops Utopia for its logic of 
transgression and argues that this applies to the way that late twentieth century science 
fictions cross the boundaries of Utopian genre, as feminist theory resists the conventions 
                                                
228 Jameson reviews Morson for his claim of irony—where the synthesis of opposites are constructed 
within a text and develops a reflexivity that wraps up Utopia and its opposite, anti-Utopia, within its 
boundaries. Jameson regards this as a style of modernity, "an aesthetic and aestheticizing fashion, 
valorizing art as the space in which the incompatibles can reach a positive kind of fullness,” Jameson, 
Archaeologies, 179. For this larger discussion of Morson in Jameson,, see Archaeologies, 176-180.  
229 "Only an understanding of utopia that destroys old perceptions of genre, transforms them into something 
new, and thus revives utopianism, can adequately reflect the conventions, needs and wants of contemporary 
malcontents. And so, the critical utopia does not blueprint, but rather it privileges social change in process. 
It embraces imperfection and uncertainty" Lucy Sargisson, Fools Gold?: Utopianism in the 21st Century, 
11. 
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of philosophy.230 This argument for heterogeneity as a fundamental feature of the genre 
of Utopia serves, in Sargisson's work, to focus on how Utopia can "anticipate the 
possibility of radically different 'nows,'" to "explore alternative states of being to those 
presently existing—to stretch and expand our understanding of the possibility, thus 
making a multiplicity of radically different futures not only desirable but also 
conceivable."231 I do not disagree with her valuing of feminist discourses—fictional or 
philosophical—to challenge and critique hegemonies, but I find it more relevant to 
consider that Sargisson retrofits a definition of Utopia specifically for the political work 
of feminism so as to include a range of fictions within the second half of the twentieth 
century. The debate to preserve "Utopia" for feminist politics is countered by standpoint 
theories that, as Sally Kitch argues, avoid the lure of the idealized in all its forms. 
Realism, not Utopia, makes use of the "gaps between human beliefs and practices" and 
though Sargisson's redefinition of Utopia promotes complexity and ambiguity, it does not 
easily work with the contradictions that will appear in all desires for political change: 
Utopias have few strategies for combating such inherent contradictions. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of achieving perfect consistency should 
make realist theorists humble about [their] suggestions and analyses. It 
should alert [them] to the many cases in which social change should be 
                                                
230 Sargisson is optimistic about French feminist philosophers Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray and their 
ability to provide the ballast for thinking alterity. “In order not to oppress the other, for example, we must 
greet it as other and learn to know it, not to assimilate it. This approach to the other is non-possessive.” 
Sargisson treats feminist philosophical and feminist fictional texts together and lauds both forms for 
asserting a non-dominating authority. Both forms offer utopian vision for Sargisson in presenting an image 
of the end of the hierarchical binary of men over women in favor of differentials and plurality: “The 
function of the utopian society is that of the dispassion or dislodgement of power from the hands of men—
not, however, to erect a new totem of femininity, but to render the concept of power over defunct. To 
paraphrase Cixous, the desire expressed is the one to destroy the space of domination: ‘If I take over the 
world, let it be to dispossess myself of it immediately, let it be to forge new links between myself and the 
world.’" Lucy Sargisson, Contemporary Feminist Utopianism, Women in Politics (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 195, 209. 
231 Sargisson, Contemporary Feminist Utopianism, 52. 
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pursued incrementally, provisionally—in jagged rather than in straight 
lines.232  
 
Kitch sees little achieved for feminism in this move to redraw the genre of Utopia for the 
concrete, practical work of feminist politics. Utopia is too invested in fantasy, too rooted 
in a metonymic fallacy that reduces social complexity to a single or small set of problems 
to fix. The language of Utopia is too redolent with leaps. Realism believes in social 
change but starts with the premises of variation and complexity. Feminism can be 
optimistic and action oriented without being Utopian.233 
 What I want to preserve from Sargisson's Utopia-of-transgression is both the 
concern about what is feminist in Utopia and the implication of her term "transgression." 
She argues for a broad definition of Utopia as transgressive in its function for its 
provision of heterogeneity and multiplicity at the place of the subject away from the 
oppositional logics of representation—a binary of is/is not—that have too long held sway 
without account for their construction from exclusions. What I want to press from a 
contemporary feminist standpoint in analyzing Utopian literature is how the Utopian 
literary form—be it an early modern version like More's or a contemporary feminist 
science fiction of Ursula LeGuin's like The Dispossesed (1974) with its contrasting 
planet/moon societies—is the construction of a total society where subjects are in 
harmony with that society. With LeGuin, however, the harmonies are incomplete, in 
varying stages of discord. From this moment of history, after the labors of many kinds of 
feminism in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, harmony is decidedly not the 
case for subjectivities within modern, class-based societies. This is more radically stated 
                                                
232 Sally Kitch, Higher Ground: From Utopianism to Realism in American Feminist Thought and Theory, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 177. 
233 Kitch, Higher Ground, 111. 
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with psychoanalytic terms, especially in Luce Irigaray's critique of Lacan, where the 
Phallic subject is ever deriving its confidence from an Other who appears to hold the 
secrets of the self, an Other that is the position of Woman and thus, is barred from 
subjectivity itself.234 Sargisson's main contribution is not in her preservation of Utopia for 
feminism as much as in raising how philosophy and psychoanalysis had excluded, written 
over, or further removed the category of Woman from registering as a legitimate social 
subject, different from a masculine, white, able-bodied, western bourgeois or middle-
class subjectivity. The contributions of feminist critiques of the perfections, wholenesses 
or fullnesses of modernist aesthetics has yet to (and may never) be written through 
theories of social construction. My own project, while not so explicitly referencing these 
contributions, is indebted to them, regarding the figure of Utopia as an occasion to 
analyze the limitations of all theoretical projects while acknowledging their conditional 
usefulness.  
 While Sargisson treats transgression as a function of Utopia, as its goal of 
transformation through its disruption of normativity, I regard the transgression as 
something that is first recognizable through Utopia's literary conventions. If there is a 
desire or interest in transgression, it is a postmodern response to the closures of 
modernity, and thus, has become a rallying cry, its own new postmodern norm. This 
                                                
234 The writings of Irigaray are impossible to summarize effectively, but I will say that I am ever-grateful 
for Speculum of the Other Woman and I Love to You. Also, Elizabeth Grosz's writings on Irigaray, along 
with Kristeva and Le Doeuff, have been valuable in my understanding of these women's contributions to 
philosophy. Sexual Subversions (1989) and Lacan: A Feminist Introduction. Ellen Armour's work 
communicates the difficulty that feminist writings have faced and the "necessity of completion" with the 
attention to the ever-incompleteness of thought. See, Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, Gillian 
C. Gill, trans. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three 
French Feminists, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1989); Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (New York: 
Routledge, 1990); Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, trans. Allison Martin 
(New York: Routledge, 1995); Ellen Armour, Deconstruction, Feminist Theology, and the Problem of 
Difference: Subverting the Race/Gender Divide, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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reasserts the distinctly modern character of Utopia and its production of boundary for 
some purpose, some use, and to ask this as a question—about what and who boundaries 
serve. In this way, I ask how it is that Utopia presents society as a construction, reduction, 
or reconstitution of the multiplicities of its functions to socialize—to educate implicitly 
and explicitly—into its orientation. Thus, to consider Utopia at this moment is not to 
contrast it to perfection, blueprint, or idealization but how it signals modern 
preoccupations with totality or wholeness—of functional completeness—that mirrors in 
the satisfaction of its subjects a relation to that totality. "Feminist" Utopias may earn their 
label from their address of sexual difference or multiple sexualities, their reimagination 
of kinship relations or reproduction, or their risks of hospitality. 235 However, I argue that 
they are Utopian, not for their emancipatory potential explicitly, but for their formal 
features of enclaves that sit at a distance that both require some traveler and some world 
en total to generate questions about the constructedness of subjectivity, of social 
relations, and of "society" as an abstraction. Their political value may be in their contents 
as they achieve satisfactions or pleasures from these relations but also may not hinge on 
these contents.  
 To summarize, a question of a genre of Utopia will pulse with other generic 
delineations—parody, satire, romance, myth, political tract, realism—without necessarily 
                                                
235 In the case of feminist Utopias and the label, there are several books that collect and describe this 
particular genre. Postmodern Utopias and Feminist Fictions, by Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor, treats feminist 
fictions and Utopias for their hospitality and the recuperation of imaginative inquiry. Francis Bartkowski's 
Feminist Utopias focuses on the signification of family as a recapitulation of the state. Bartkowski applies 
feminism to the occasions where the "everyday life of women becomes an exercise of willful imagination, 
demanding revolutionary transformation." Feminism is utopian when "longing and desire, anger and 
despair, are reshaped by hope" and fiction helps with this "in that a narrative sets the pattern of these 
desires and transformation as if a potential future had erupted into the reader's present,"9-10. See also 
Marlene Barr, et al., Future Females, The Next Generation: New Voices and Velocities in Feminist Science 
Fiction Criticism (London: Rowan & Littlefield, 2000); and Jennifer Burwell, Notes on Nowhere: 
Feminism, Utopian Logic, and Social Transformation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
  165 
  
settling easily. I pull from Wegner's identification of Utopia with "scaled space" in 
contrast to character or setting descriptions in other genres such as modern novels or 
romances to give a handhold for grasping some elements of political economic conditions 
of the production, reception and analytic moments of Utopia.236 This includes the present 
moment of my analysis in 2017 where the transgressions or boundary markers of Utopia 
echo a present political economic contradiction of the refugees and the reinforcement of 
national identities while capital flows unimpeded. Utopia is rife with these kinds of 
contradictions: it suspends the possibility of a good place while at the same time saying it 
does not exist; it holds out an image of peaceful co-existence while offering only 
memories or traces of the violence of its foundations (even Morris's telling of the 
revolution that brought on the epoch of rest is not in the minds of his primary hosts); and 
it suggests itself as the ultimate social arrangement while simultaneously depending on 
Utopian literatures to make it recognizable as a Utopia.  
  I will further unfold other contradictions that mark Utopia later in this chapter. 
What this genre discussion holds into view for my argument is that what is recognizable 
as Utopian literature is the particular way that it presents narratives of boundaries and 
crossings, reflects how modernity has variously thought itself through this formulation of 
geography and spatial relations, and references particular histories such as nation-state 
formation and liberal subjectivity (as differentially formed and unevenly distributed or 
even actively withheld). Utopia—when seen first as a literary form of boundary 
crossing—forces into its definition political economy and subjective forms. This makes 
Utopia a commentary on how the lines of "society" are drawn to include and exclude and 
that these boundaries have conceptual use and existentially experienced effects.  
                                                
236 Wegner, 12-13. 
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 To repeat from my earlier investigation into critical methods in the study of 
religion: representing social life means drawing boundaries around a thing called 
"society" that then allows for describing and explaining behavior particular to groups of 
people, permitting scholars of religion to point to how religion functions ideologically. 
Utopian fiction is a process of boundary-making in many similar senses in that it depends 
on a construction or fiction called "society"—a miniaturization of social life and 
condensation of complex relations—so as to reveal insight that would otherwise be 
difficult to describe or relate. But isn't the society that religion scholars describe real, 
whereas the Utopian one is not? Neither are real in the absolute sense, a fact critical 
religion scholars would do well to remember, since they are forever in the process of 
boundary creation in their formations of categories. In this simple sense, social 
constructionist approaches are built on the desire for Utopia—to represent social life as a 
totality, depending on a kind of objective status, that miniaturizes the vast and intricate 
social field into a bounded and isolated whole that is also, visible and available to the 
traveler/scholar who returns to deliver news of the peculiar yet fascinating ways that 
others function that is, at all times, a reference to and recognition that the source or 
present society of the traveler/scholar is also summoned and related to these operations. 
Naming social constructionist approaches as, in part, a desire for Utopia can offer a 
means for critical scholars to catch in their view the affective and libidinal dimensions of 
social construction, all the while seeing them as particular to modernity, weighted with 
political and economic concern. I turn now to describe these literary conventions—of 
travel narrative, social totality, and boundary crossing—as formal features of the genre 
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that excites questions about the influence of institution, organization, and order on the 
existential, affective and cognitive dimensions of human existence.  
Convention of Travel after the "Age of Discovery" 
 
 As the Renaissance enjoyed the new access to the "old world" of the classics, it 
also enjoyed the surprises of the "new worlds" coming into view through ocean 
exploration.237 As mentioned above, More's text is in two parts— Book One, a 
commentary on the state of affairs in London and Book Two, a travel narrative to the 
island Utopia. This text has inspired many commentaries as to its form of satire, its 
structure, its historical conditions, and its proposals—all of which situate it as a product 
of its esteemed author, its specific audience of Erasmus and friends, and its unique two-
part form.238 It earns this attention, however, mostly from the other texts which borrow 
and extend its formula of a distant land discovered by accident by a curious explorer who 
returns to tell of not just a community but a fully complex society with similar-yet-
different methods of sustaining itself materially and through a social order. It is also 
relevant to consider how the narrator functions as a literary device to make the 
comparison to another society explicit. A century after More's text, Francis Bacon pens 
New Atlantis (1629), disguising a more scientifically advanced England as another island 
in the sea. John Harrington's The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) presents a 
government balanced across several centers of power but not as a fictional narrative, 
whereas Thomas Campanella's "The City of the Sun" (1623) recapitulates the travel 
                                                
237 J. C. Davis "Utopia and the New World, 1500-1700" in Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the 
Western World. ed. Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent, 95-118, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
238 For commentary on More's use of satire and social commentary, see Robert C. Elliot, The Shape of 
Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), Chapter 1. For 
considering the relationship between Book One and Book Two, see J.H. Hexter's More's Utopia.  
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narrative and dialogue form of More's text, along with the account of the fantastic land 
with unusually named sub-groups that say something of their type—a convention picked 
up and carried on as part of the satirical travels of Gulliver in Jonathan Swift's popular 
eighteenth century tale.239 The travel narrative form continues, but with a shift from 
spatial exploration to time. Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888) and William 
Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890) reflected the late nineteenth century's progressive 
attitudes with a focus on the future as the traveler's destination. This movement to 
temporal distance is captured with H.G. Wells's The Time Machine (1895) who added the 
machine to the leap made in sleep by Bellamy and Morris. As the twentieth century 
Utopian form morphs into its dystopian cousin and is displaced by the more prolific and 
imaginative genre of Science Fiction, travelers and their tales persist as the convention 
for encountering alternative, self-sufficient societies. 
 This convention of a distant land visited by a mediator is crucial to appreciating 
how Utopia comes to be compared with political treatises and deployed as a rhetorical 
tool for promoting social change. As literary theorist Peter Ruppert explains, the reader 
occupies a vital place alongside the other places of the Utopian narrative: the place of the 
Utopia, the home of the traveler, and then the empty place that is generated in the mind of 
the reader.240 These places are set up by the boundaries—walls, trenches, moats—that are 
indispensible features on the maps of Utopias. Utopias produce a critical effect through 
the dialectic of the familiar and unfamiliar, similarity and difference. By providing a 
"shocking mirror," Utopias and other forms like science fiction, myth, fantasies and 
                                                
239 A very quick survey of literatures for comparison can be found in "Utopian Traditions: Themes and 
Variations" Lyman Tower Sargent in Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World, 2000. 
8-17. For segments of a variety of texts, see J. W. Johnson, Utopian Literature, 1968.  
240 Peter Ruppert, Reader in a Strange Land: The Activity of Reading Literary Utopias (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1986). 
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folktales do not merely mirror but deflect the source world as strange. While permeable 
with its boundaries as a genre (like each literary example of Utopia has permeable but 
meaningful boundaries), the category of Utopian literature is a "heuristic device" 
permitting insight into forms of alienation and injustice.241 Ruppert wants to pull the 
dialectical form of Utopia—its back and forth between the multiple places—into the 
dialectical procedures of both reading for pleasure and reading for analysis.242 The reader, 
then is pulled into imaginative work: 
Once we recognize the deficiencies within the boundaries of utopia itself, then 
reading utopias can no longer be simply a question of accepting or rejecting 
utopian values: in rejecting utopia we are left with the intolerable social reality 
that it has exposed, and conversion to utopia implies that we can get outside of 
time and history—a possibility that, even in utopia, exists nowhere. Unable to 
simply convert to utopia, the reader is also unable to return unchanged to the 
actual world of strife, conflict and history. Thus, suspended in the gap between 
history and utopia, or between 'now' and 'nowhere,' the reader is provoked to 
engage on her own terms the problems, aspirations, and the potential solutions 
that constitute the inspiration of utopian thinking and of utopian activity.243 
 
In Ruppert's frame, the text activates the reader to engage the "intolerable social reality" 
of her own world, "the actual world of strife, conflict and history." These conditions are 
the social contradictions in the life of the reader that have been raised to a cognitive level 
through the defamiliarization procedure of the Utopian text—a text that renders society as 
an object with more porosity, more mutability than formerly thought.  
 
 
                                                
241 Ruppert, Reader in a Strange Land, 40. 
242 "Literary utopias are capable of evoking different responses in readers because, as boundary works, their 
functions can be seen differently, and their effects on readers can be realized in different ways. It is our 
own performance as readers that determines to a great extent which of their potential effects are realized." 
The boundary language plays well both for how boundaries in the utopian text are mirrored by the 
boundaries of generic categories across Ruppert's own text. Reader in a Strange Land, 50. 
243 Ruppert, Reader in a Strange Land, 75. 
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The Utopian Form as a Figure for Representational Logics 
 
 Literary Utopias, then, are neither dogmatic nor programmatic as once thought 
but sites of openness for thought ironically produced by the closure of a fictional society. 
The enclosure of the society is replicated in the closure of the Utopian literary form. 
Thus, Utopia not only signals the lived contradictions of material inequalities in the face 
of the promise of equality within liberal democracy, but also sustains cognitive 
contradiction. French philosopher Louis Marin investigates Utopia for the way that it 
signifies the gap within modern representational logics. Marin distinguishes Utopia for its 
way of making finite—bringing into space—modern semantic geographies such as 
"horizon, frontier and limit."244 Marin takes the slippage of Utopia as a Greek neologism 
as his point of departure for considering Utopia for the way that it "defines certain modes 
and modalities of literary, political, and philosophical imagination and thinking in 
modern times, modes and modalities themselves related to specific historical and 
ideological contexts in Europe"245 For Marin, Utopia is a figure in discourse that rests 
over a gap, what Wayne Hudson in his interpretation of Marin calls “utopian sublime,” a 
place of “the other of any place: the gap between two frontiers, neither this nor that.”246 
According to Marin, Utopia plays out a neutralization of the negative and positive of 
Hegel. The juxtaposition that More invests in his Utopia appears as a Hegelian 
contradiction to Marin. Thus, Utopia is not a concept but a figure—a textual product that 
is a practice of signification. As it refers to its negation, its own absence, Utopia marks 
the indifference to its difference.  
                                                
244 For Marin's discussion of the totalization of Utopia to frame or contain the horizon or frontier, see Louis 
Marin, "Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present" Critical Inquiry, Vol 19, No. 2 (Spring, 1993):. 397-420.  
245 Marin, "Frontiers," fn 27. 
246 Wayne Hudson, The Reform of Utopia, 23. 
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 Marin takes Utopia as the occasion to analyze language’s differential features and 
its inherent contradictoriness as it makes visible what is already present and hides what 
cannot be seen. Thus, the importance of Utopia is not its standing as one kind of literature 
or narrative alongside others within modernity but the fact that the Utopian aesthetic form 
displays the representational logic of language in ways that structure a response to what is 
not present and not presentable.  
Actually, every text performs an equivalency between space and 
discourse. The utopic text, however, is a remarkable form of it because it 
places the performative definition of text in general next to its own 
project, its own specific signified. The ‘content’ of utopia is the 
organization of space as a text. The utopic text, in its formal makeup and 
operational procedures is the constitution of a discourse as space. In other 
words utopia brings about an interesting equivalency between its 
referent—that about which it speaks, its particular project—and its 
emitting, receiving and transmitting codes. The content of its message is 
not the transmission of the message but the code of transmission.247 
 
Utopic practice is, then, spatial play that signifies in a textual system. It is about 
representation and the limits of representation, the differences between an icon and a 
schema, a reconciliation of the impossibility of representation, where no-thing can be re-
presented. Thus, for Marin (and Jameson) all fiction is "utopic," at the level of ideology 
and representation and also in self-referencing its place as non-place. Marin’s 
deconstructive, linguistic interpretation of Utopia as a figure for language’s gap in 
representation is a radicalizing of Utopia within a post-structural moment. The burden 
that Utopia bears is related to the fictions' forms and the ways that they make visible the 
divisions that make for language.  
\ 
                                                
247 Ibid., 9. 
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Narratives of Space, not Plot 
 
Because of these representational logics of Utopia, the literary form depends on 
different satisfactions than do other narratives. Theologian Paul Fiddes finds Utopia in 
line with other more religious forms that substitute a plot ending with an end-of-history 
ending. Using literary theorist Frank Kermode, Fiddes maps how the ends of narrative 
unify the whole and express the ultimate ordering factor.248 Utopia can be confused with 
messianic and millenialist religious texts because of the temporal “end of history” aspects 
to each of them. Narratives have a surplus of meaning, provided by the structure of 
metaphor that displaces one image for another. Because narratives structure to organize 
human experience into time, their ends are particularly important. Christianity, especially, 
has made use of narrative’s powerful ordering properties and has thus, impacted western 
historical methods in treating all stories as like a Christian drama of redemption.249 The 
western sense of time has integrated both Christian and Jewish traditions of time’s 
fulfillment, not just its passage, seeing fulfillment through an end. Fiddes exploits the 
poststructuralist linguistic turn to discuss the metaphoric aspects of language and how 
meaning is displaced at the level of all signification. In the spacing of language, he finds 
an immanent space for the irruption of transcendence.  
Fiddes advances my discussion of Utopia by showing how the immanence of 
Marin’s deconstructing figure of Utopia relates to the general narrative form. Fiddes 
displaces Bloch’s impulse to Utopia with an impulse to narrative. While I disagree with 
Fiddes’s conclusion where he leaves behind the deconstructing Utopian figure for an 
                                                
248 Paul S. Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature, Challenges in 
Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000); Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: 
Studies in the Theory of Fiction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).  
249 Fiddes, The Promised End, 9. 
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immanent instance of Christian apophasis in a Derridian differential spacing of language 
and time, I appreciate how he emphasizes that segmenting time and space is satisfying. 
Fiddes separates Utopian narratives from others by how unmotivated they are by plot. 
The closure is not in the end of the narrative as much as it is the "closure" of the society. 
Thus, closure is constructed along a different axis: the temporal closure of plot is still 
present in the return of the traveler, but the satisfaction is found on a register of spatial 
and social organization, where social contradictions are resolved by way of the relation of 
the Utopian subject to her society, yet left unresolved or open for the traveler in the 
narrative and for the reader. Marin's more philosophical register delivers how the Utopian 
formal convention of travel and the closure of the society generates a particular 
subjective formation—a reader—prepared to confront her own unknown by the 
confidence supplied by the textual return and the boundedness of the textual object itself: 
Any travel is, first of all, a moment and a space of vacancy, an 
unencumbered space that suspends continuous time and the ordering of 
loci. The ideology of the travel implies a departure from a place and a 
return to the same place. The traveler enriches this place with a large 
booty of knowledge and experiences by means of which he states, in this 
coming back to the 'sameness,' his own consistency, his identity as a 
subject. The utopian moment and space of travel, on the contrary, consists 
in opening up, in this ideological circle, in the tracing out of its route, a 
nowhere, a place without place, a moment out of time, the truth of a 
fiction, the syncopation of an infinity and paradoxically its limit, its 
frontier.250 
 
Utopian literature distinguishes itself, then, for the ways it generates a particular kind of 
reader—a subject "satisfied," ironically, by an encounter with a nowhere. In Part Two of 
this chapter, I will return to examine the ideological dimensions of this identification with 
the traveler and will relate this to Jameson's method, for reading Utopian literature for its 
ways of reflecting modern desires. For now, it is relevant to consider that it is aspects of 
                                                
250 Louis Marin, Utopics: Spatial Play, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1984), 204. 
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the Utopian literary form that hold aspects of the appeal of Utopia and generates desires 
particular to modernity in the way that thought and political, social and economic 
conditions co-constitute one another in ways more complicated than any simple Marxist 
base-superstructural account would have it. 
 In addition to the closure of the Utopian enclave, the porosity of the traveler, and 
the narrative satisfaction displaced onto the reveal of the society itself, Literary theorist 
Northrop Frye notices how the Utopian narrative form bears a mythic quality for its 
condensations of complex social connections. Utopia often features in-common property 
where leisure and movement are minimized and the individual is perceived as part of a 
social whole. The pastoral at the center of Utopias is, by Frye's account, the relief of 
anxiety through simplicity, through nature, and through an anti-intellectualism, such as 
the eighteenth century collision of nature and society reflected in Rousseau, the 
nineteenth century's break from the industrial age city with a retreat to the woods at 
Walden Pond, or Morris's Thames tour and hayfields in News from Nowhere.251 Utopia 
is, at root, a simplification and in this way, is a genre of Romance for Frye. Its potency 
and appeal is in surfacing social procedures and the latent potentials of society, 
simplifying them, and thus becomes a myth that connects certain social facts together.  
 Using the terms of the layers of consciousness, Frye labels the residues of 
unconscious material coming into consciousness through the Utopian form, growing in 
popularity around times where there is greater social transition, such as in More's era and 
in the nineteenth century. Thus, Frye is able to account for the rise of interest in Utopia at 
different moments of modernity: Utopian literature emerges where there is change and a 
collective, social compulsion to reacquaint with and reassemble the practices of social 
                                                
251 Northrop Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias," 40 
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life. Utopia appears on occasions of swift transition where, in Frye's terms, the "ritual 
habit[s] necessary to life" intensify and bring to consciousness the operations of life that, 
over time, are habitualized and return as background.252 This can be used to explain the 
shifts in genres around Utopia, such as the political tracts of the eighteenth century or the 
passing of Utopia and the rise of Science Fiction in the twentieth century. In sum, Utopia 
is not a perfect state of freedom but an imaginative practice in ‘visualizing possibilities’ 
for the purpose of seeing ritual habits and their formation compelling insofar as they 
address latent aspects of a social contract and make evident the commitments that bind 
the society.  
 The psychoanalytic language is strong with Frye's work, and his layers point to, in 
some part, how social material is buried and manifested structurally. This attention to the 
psychoanalytic interpretive potentials of literature draws a comparison to Jameson who is 
also keen to recognize the latent and manifest dimensions in literature. While both are 
useful for thinking how literature can be read for its function for culture to figure and thus 
negotiate its transitions and arrangements (what Marxists generally think of as 
contradiction), Frye does not have a way of sustaining this in the language of subjects in 
relation. Instead, he reinscribes literature's appeal—and the reader's desire for it —for the 
way literature reminds readers of a singular, transfigured body.253 Jameson can abide that 
Utopian literature may have some appeal in this way, but it is more about the relations of 
bodies, relations of subjects, and their coordination through political economy.  
                                                
252 Ibid., 28. 
253 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a 
longer discussion of Jameson's use of—and distancing from—Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, see Fredric 
Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1982), 69-74.  
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Dystopias and SF—Similarities and Differences in Texts of Difference 
 
 These generic features explored thus far—of a total society with a permeable 
boundary that enables passage for a traveler and a reader—have offered how the 
juxtaposition of social orders raises to the cognitive level social contradictions and 
features them as representations. The location of the satisfaction is not in the resolution of 
the plot but in the contentment of those citizens of the Utopia, a projection of a desire of 
the reader, as Ruppert might explain. What happens when this contentment is 
unconvincing or even repulsive? These have earned the reputation of dystopia or anti-
utopia. Literary theorist Krishan Kumar combines these two in his reading of the modern 
Utopian form.254 Kumar traces this literary sub-genre to H.G. Wells, especially The Time 
Machine (1895) which mocked socialist hopes that he saw in his fellow socialists of 
Bellamy and Morris whose Utopian visions were positive. As two sides of the same 
literary genre, Utopia and anti-utopias are to be seen through their reactions to one 
another as they figure social relations, integrating new technologies and political events 
coming down the pipe of late modernity.  
 But Kumar’s analysis centers on content, not necessarily on form, to construct 
the genre. Literary theorist Tom Moylan's expansive studies of the distinct but 
overlapping forms of utopia, dystopia, anti-utopia, and critical utopia, and critical 
dystopia extend beyond the scope of Kumar’s project.255 Kumar's anti-utopia is for 
Moylan (and Jameson) brought under the resisters to Utopian thought tout court. Like 
Kumar’s, Moylan's work is deeply committed to the texts themselves, but Moylan tends 
toward the formal aspects that connect the diverse literatures whereas Kumar's is more 
                                                
254 Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times,  (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1987). 
255 Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination, (New York: 
Methuen, 1986). 
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towards the texts’ reactions to socialism. Moylan's larger project is focused on the 
marginal Utopian forms—specifically the critical utopias of the 1960s and 1970s and 
then, the dystopias of the twentieth century that have much in common with Science 
Fiction. Moylan reads Jameson closely throughout, agreeing that Utopia and dystopia are 
not opposites as they both stage a social totality but that they differ more at the level of 
form—that it is the narrative quality of the dystopia and its focus on a dissatisfied, misfit 
protagonist that distinguishes it from its pair.256 Because the dystopian's trope towards 
more conventional fiction with its protagonist and plot, I will stay closer to the 
strangeness of the Utopian form with its more spatial than syntagmatic logics.  
 It is worthwhile to note another tree in this forest of genres of social totality and 
difference—that of Science Fiction, or SF. Darko Suvin characterizes the genre for the 
way it produces a "cognitive estrangement"—a dislocation that produces a question about 
epistemology that tests the limits of recognition. 257 Philosopher Rosie Braidotti 
summarizes that SF defamiliarizes the "here and now" both reflecting and provoking 
unease.258 For its force in producing unease, Braidotti separates it from Utopia for its less 
uncanny, more hoped features, whereas Suvin puts Utopia as a socio-economic sub-genre 
of the larger SF, a convention followed by Moylan and Jameson both.259 All agree that 
SF has displaced Utopia in postmodernity, where alterities are reformed, and as Braidotti 
                                                
256 Thomas Moylan Scraps of the Untainted Sky, 141. See, also, Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 56.  
257 Suvin's work has been widely read and cited by Utopian commentators such as Ruppert and Jameson, as 
well as Thomas Moylan. His theory of Science Fiction as "the literature of cognitive estrangement" is set 
up in the first chapter. I also appreciate his construction of the "zero world" as the "empirically verifiable 
properties around the author" in the sense of a "central reference point in a coordinate system, or of the 
control group in an experiment." Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and 
History of a Literary Genre, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979), 11.  
258 Rosie Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2013). 
259 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 61.   
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has described, the human is decentered and remapped as continuums of animal, extra-
terrestrial and technological becomings.260 Braidotti's reading of SF with Gilles 
Deleuzes's nomadology and Julia Kristeva's abject bodies shows how SF calls for 
representation of and resistance to the traumas and fears of global capitalism: there 
affirmation in SF that is more than nihilistic.261 Her work is highly suggestive that SF is 
the more precise cultural form for analyzing the conditions of postmodernity. 
 My own project does not contradict Braidotti's but takes on a narrower task in 
staying with the modern critical discourses of social construction and psychoanalysis still 
widely used by scholars of religion. SF may have surpassed Utopia in popularity and 
thus, bears the marks of the particular struggles of the political, economic, technological 
and ecological crises of the present. However, when situated within the field of literary 
fictions—as literary texts and not a wider claim about film or postmodern culture 
generally—the shared material culture of the fictional text is still in operation and crosses 
both SF and Utopia. Citing the SF and literary criticism of Samuel Delany, Moylan notes 
how both Utopia and SF demand a similar "reading protocol"—where the author delivers 
substantive pieces in sequence, not through summary but through emerging patterns, 
demanding that the reader make sense along the way.262 This is necessary because of the 
dominance of space over time in both Utopia and SF, though it is severely more 
                                                
260 Braidotti, Metamorphoses, 183. 
261 Braidotti's chapter "Cyber-teratologies" referenced here is as good as any to draw on for her overall 
critical-ethical project of sexed bodies, materialities and political economy. Her final sentences to this 
chapter offer something of her appeal to how the grotesque instructs on the unwelcome aspects of 
biological life: "It is against the contemporary forms of nihilism that that a critical philosophy of 
immanence needs to distoxicate us and to re-set the agenda in the direction of affirmation and sustainable 
subjectivity. In this project, the metamorphic company of monsters—those existential aristocrats who have 
already undergone the mutation—can provide not only a solace, but also an ethical model." Braidotti, 
Metamorphoses, 211.  
262 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, 8. Samuel R. Delany "Some Reflections on SF Criticism" Science 
Fiction Studies, 8, no. 3 (1981), 235. Moylan also draws on Delany's "Reading Modern American Science 
Fiction," Richard Kostelanetz, ed., American Writing Today, (Troy, NY: Whitston. 1991): 517-528 for his 
appreciation of the technologies of reading SF. 
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pronounced in SF. These texts parallel features of an aesthetic sublime that is 
thematically linked to romanticism, where the text supplants the reader with a "secular 
sense of magnitude that displaces and relocates the individual in a process both terrifying 
and satisfying."263 Comparing this to the aesthetic sublime of Marin's neutralization is 
subtle but distinct: the alterity of SF and Suvin's estrangement does not force open empty, 
disorienting space in so much as an initial disorientation that the reader then puzzles out, 
accepting the estranging details as inadequate knowledge, not the aporetic structure of 
Utopia. This inadequate knowledge is carried out through the lack of syntagmatic 
sequence in the text: "Writing within the fictive culture, the [SF] writer sets the level of 
relevant information higher than a reader’s actual knowledge, since no actual reader can 
actually know that world. "264 These subtle differences are significant but derive from the 
same convention: the extreme encounters with other-worlds in the SF genre and the 
human-scale worlds of Utopia both center the society as a protagonist. Moylan pursues 
Utopia and SF forms in tandem for the way they both deliver the political through an 
aesthetic form. SF, like Utopia, is engaged with the registration and treatment of identity 
and difference, but SF makes further demands on the reader to assemble society from the 
scraps of an alien world.  
The Narrative Form of Utopia—A Genre of Representational Logics 
 
 To summarize, Utopian fiction relies on the traveler's movement to generate a 
movement of thought in the reader—to consider her own social location and its 
conditions in light of those of the conditions encountered vicariously through the 
narrator. The new attention to the present draws out the social contradictions experienced 
                                                
263 Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, 7. 
264 Ibid., 53. 
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by the reader who then, is activated to consider how her own situation may be differently 
ordered. Utopia refracts the historical conditions of its production, connecting not only 
the specifics of the Utopian society—its contents—to the societies of its reception, but 
also the mechanisms of comparison and how it stimulates thought and action. These 
mechanisms are its representational dynamics: of how the cognitive contradictions 
encountered in the Utopian literary form project and reconfigure the social contradictions 
of historical existence. In Ruppert's words, the Utopian literary form, through the 
dialectical relation of the text and reader, reveals the contradictions of her present 
condition but also "some genuine utopian content—the yearning for community, social 
harmony, more authentic human relationships"265 It is worth noting here that these relays 
of social and cognitive contradiction contribute to another dimension of representation —
Utopia's transformation into an abstraction for use in social and political theory. 266 
 Thus, Utopia develops as a figure within modern Western (Anglo-European) 
thought that signifies the idealized social arrangement and the fulfillment of the modern 
self through its development initially as literature. As I have argued, to appreciate the role 
of Utopia in modern Western thought is to understand first its formal conventions of 
travel and representing society as a functioning totality—of social life condensed and in 
miniature. To desire Utopia, then, is not just to desire a better way of living. It is, in part, 
to desire the ability to represent social life in its totality—to be able to communicate how 
society constructs subjects. That raises the desire for Utopia as a cognitive capability. The 
ability to represent social totality is not the only desire that the figure of Utopia offers: 
Utopia also offers the ability to show that subject as reconciled or "happy" within this 
                                                
265 Ibid., 166.  
266 This can be seen in Mannheim, Marcuse and Bloch and the later utopian theorists like Ruth Levitas 
discussed in Chapter Two and Kitch, and Sargisson as discussed above.  
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social world. Happiness is what Ruppert refers to as "genuine utopian content" and what 
Levitas found in her study: that of the "better way of living," meaning the end to the 
chaffing, the friction, and disappointments created from social inequalities, misuse or 
abuse of resources, or whatever it is that is seen to be the cause of strife that could be 
addressed by a different social arrangement. This happiness or harmony is, as I defend, 
best understood as collectivity, or the recognition, acceptance, and appreciation for the 
subject's place within a particular social group. In sum, the desire for Utopia is both the 
desire to represent society as a totality and the desire for collectivity, or the end to 
conditions of social contradictions and thus, experiences of friction or mismatch at the 
existential level. I regard these desires as twined with one another, registering both as 
ideological pleasures but distinct for the position of the subject. While the desire to 
represent social totality shows the subject as the knowing subject—the one with the 
perspective to explain and describe, the desire for collectivity is the perspective of the 
subject within the social relationship where the particularity of the individual is matched 
and in cooperation with the others of the collective.  
 In the following chapter, I will show more of how these two desires can be seen 
operating within the critical study of religion. Before that, however, I want to further 
expand on how Utopia, as a figure is best referenced through cultural production. Using 
the Marxist interpretative work of Fredric Jameson, I discuss next how cultural products 
become repositories for and redistribute these twin desires for representing social totality 
and collectivity. Through the Marxist and psychoanalytic frames of culture offered by 
Jameson, I will be able to better account for how Utopia moves from the settings of 
Utopian literature into the realms of culture more broadly. As I overall argue, critical 
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religious studies struggles with its remit to present both "self" and "society," favoring the 
pole of a reified society that allows scholars to explain and compare the ideological 
dimensions of religious behavior and forms. As referenced through Jameson, this 
difficulty is not exclusive to Religious Studies but is developed out the critical 
approaches of distancing and objectivity more generally that sit alongside capitalism's 
reifying work. However, these reifications elide the particularities of subjective 
perspectives—the lived or existential dimension of social formation. I propose that 
Jameson's formal analysis of literature brings better into view the anxious and pleasurable 
dimensions of social life and how these are both constructed by culture and lived—what 
is, in a word, desire.  
 
II. Fredric Jameson and the Figure of Utopia 
 
 By way of an overview of Fredric Jameson's Marxist and psychoanalytic 
methods, I continue my argument that critical methods are caught in a problematic of 
representing both the existential, lived dimension of social life alongside their projects of 
outlining how social life structures subjects. Jameson's reading of cultural artifacts as 
"symptomatic" of the conflicts and motions of capitalism offers a means to consider this 
problem. His complex account of how cultural forms absorb and redistribute the libidinal 
connections that give the quality of attachment and desire in social life is a thicker, more 
nuanced alternative to ideology critique as it has been thought of in critical religious 
studies by those addressed in Chapter One. In addition to adding to the discourses of 
dialectical methods, ideology critique, and historicization, I introduce Jameson as a 
theorist who raises the figure of Utopia in modernity as a particularly rich site for 
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investigating how social theory struggles to represent the existential, lived dimension of 
social life as it focuses on society's structuring forces. Utopia, as a figure that reflects the 
optimism and ambition of social life outside of capitalism, has various roles in Jameson's 
work across his fifty years of writing. In reviewing Jameson's distinctive method of 
cultural theory, I address several dimensions of his use of the figure of Utopia, 
specifically how its literary form can be read as a symptom of the conflicts of capitalism's 
social contradictions across modernity through its representational conflicts and its 
signification as social life "solved" to the satisfactions and happiness of Utopia's 
inhabitants.  
Dialectical Method, Ideology Critique, and History in Jameson 
 
 American cultural theorist Fredric Jameson has not been used much by critical 
religious studies except as a justifying voice for the broad call to "[a]lways historicize," 
as recited by Russell McCutcheon or in Constance Furey's interest in the political use of 
renarrating history.267 In analyzing cultural products from American and European 
contexts, especially those of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Jameson is most 
recognized for his periodization of late-stage capitalist culture as "postmodernity" and his 
innovation of "cognitive mapping" as a modification for postmodern Marxist thought 
                                                
267 A survey of the journal Theory and Method in the Study of Religion shows only four references to 
Jameson's work directly: Furey's article and its response; a review of Lincoln's Gods and Demons Priests 
and Scholars with two sentences about Jameson's Political Unconscious and a 2008 article that cites his 
most popular Postmodernism. Roland Boer has probably written the most about Jameson in relation to 
Utopia and religion. See Criticism of Religion Chapter One "The Stumbling Block of Fredric Jameson" 
where he dialectically situates Utopia and religion. Boer, Criticism of Religion: On Marxism and Theology, 
II, (Boston: Brill, 2007). Also, Boer "Religion and Utopia in Fredric Jameson" Utopian Studies, 19, no. 2 
(2008): 285-312. Boer follows a dialectical method for Jameson, both religion and utopia and then also, for 
their mutually conservative or liberatory quality. Where I disagree with Boer is to see this liberation in 
terms only as rupture or event from the conserving work. As mentioned in my introduction, this is not my 
project, though it is an interesting and related topic worth more attention than I can offer here.  
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where full explanation is foreclosed.268 Though mainly treating the narrative forms of 
literature and film, he submits theorists and philosophers to equal critical attention, 
historicizing their projects within their own locations and concerns.269 Jameson 
emphasizes the "ideological and situational nature of all thought" and draws on the 
dialectics of Hegel and Marx, noting how both are self-conscious of their production. 
Though cognizant of both influences on historical analysis, Jameson favors the Marxist 
dialectic for how it regards the contradictions as not only logical inconsistencies that need 
reformulating but also as processes that stratify social life into groups or classes.270 
Jameson's method highlights one strain of the "superstructure"—modern literary forms—
to reflect on the ways that ideology is codified and redistributed in narrative form. He 
resists any such bifurcation of the economic from the cultural dimension,271 as both are 
                                                
268"An aesthetic of cognitive mapping—a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual 
subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system—will necessarily have to respect 
this now enormously complex representational dialectic and invent radically new forms in order to do it 
justice. . . . The political form of postmodernism, if there ever is any, will have as its vocation the invention 
and projection of a global cognitive mapping on a social, as well as a spatial scale." Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logics of Late Capitalism, (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991), 54.  
269 Two examples of this: Jameson reads Hegel as 'conservative' for the way that Hegel recognized the 
"moral anarchy inherent in capitalism" and was gravely concerned that any sort of social change in the 
Prussian state would have lead to a recapitulation of the revolutionary terror of 1793 in France. This 
explains for Jameson Hegel's investment in time's passing as the movement of history to a new socio-
economic situation. Jameson, Marxism and Form, 346. Jameson leverages a similar critique of Durkheim 
as a conservative for his interest in preserving the bourgeois parliamentary state situation within the Third 
Republic and the threats to secular institutions from both Right-leaning factions and working-class 
agitation. The 'eternal' drive of religion could be seen to be the stabilizing force under what might seem like 
the possibility of complete social breakdown. Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 292.  
270 Marxism and Form, 340. In this case, he is discussing the self-consciousness created with critical 
projects of Marx and the companion dialectics of Hegel. "In this light, the difference between the Hegelian 
and the Marxist dialectics can be defined in terms of the type of self-consciousness involved. For Hegel this 
is a relatively logical one, and involves a sense of the interrelationship of such purely intellectual categories 
as subject and object, quality and quantity, limitation and infinity, and so forth; here the thinker comes to 
understand the way in which his own determinate thought processes , and indeed the very forms of the 
problems from which he sets form, limit the results of his thinking. for the Marxist dialectic, on the other 
hand, the self-consciousness aimed at is the awareness of the thinker's position in society and in history 
itself, and of the limits imposed on this awareness by his class position—in short of the ideological and 
situational nature of all thought and of the initial invention of the problems themselves." 
271 As he remarks in his essay "An American Utopia," "I will not pursue the theoretical debate on base and 
superstructure, which has its own history and complications, except to say that I feel that it is 
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concretely lived, particularly as recognizable in and by the middle-class.272 This does not 
exclude the working class (or other classes, for that matter) from his analysis: only to pull 
forward how cultural forms and their ideologies show the relationship and antagonism of 
classes and that the discussion of culture never can be separated from materiality and 
individualized bodies—a feature of Marxism that Jameson stresses throughout his 
work.273 This aspect of Marx—the lived experience of ideology—is evident in Jameson's 
increasing references to Freudian and Lacanian interpretations of the relation of the 
individual psyche to the social world.  
 Jameson's dialectical criticism is anti-systematic, reflecting a Marxian 'permanent 
revolution,' and thus resists systematic presentation.274 Unfolding the questions of the 
present, Jameson characterizes contemporary intellectual conditions as inhospitable, 
demanding both immanent thought AND consciousness of class conditioning.275 
Dialectical criticism is self-critical in its structure and reflects the movement of thought. 
If thought does reach stasis, or an abstraction abandons its empirical roots, it can be 
challenged by seeing this abstracting tendency as itself historical, an "idealizing 
                                                                                                                                            
methodologically useful when taken as a starting point for questions and problems, rather than as a solution 
of any kind. Base and superstructure are in other words a beginning and not a conclusion, a laboratory 
experiment (whose results are often very different from each other) and not the tenet of some quasi-
religious belief or orthodoxy." Jameson, An American Utopia, 44.  
272 Jameson reads Marx against Hegel's temptation to separate off idea from material reality. "Rather, for 
Marxism the emergence of the economic, the coming into view of the infrastructure itself, is simply the 
sign of the approach of the concrete." Marxism and Form, 322.  
273Jameson tracks this emphasis on the concrete back through The Germany Ideology which bears 
repeating: 'We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated., thought of, 
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real active men, and on the 
basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of 
this life-process. . . . Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms 
of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no 
developments; it is rather men who, developing their material production and their material intercourse, 
alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, trans. 
Roy Pascal (NY: 1947), pp. 14-15. Italics are Jameson's. Quoted in Marxism and Form, 326.  
274 Jameson, Marxism and Form, 362. 
275 Jameson, Political Unconscious, 283. 
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tendency" that has settled into disciplinary domains which reflect the division of labor 
itself. It is within this modern knowledge production that dialectical thought and method 
intercedes: 
In this sense the anti-idealistic thrust of Marxism simply aims at breaking 
the spell of the 'inverted world' of conceptual thought. The dialectic is 
designed to eject us from this illusory order, to project us in spite of 
ourselves out of our concepts into the world of genuine realities to which 
those concepts were to apply. We cannot, of course, ever really get outside 
our own subjectivities: to think so is the illusion of positivism; but, every 
time they begin to freeze over, to spring us outside of our own hardened 
ideas into a new and more vivid apprehension of reality itself is the task of 
genuine dialectical thinking.276  
 
Jameson's attention to the present of historical thought reflects the dialectic of Marxian 
praxis. Simply said, Jameson shows thought at work. 
 Jameson's method differs in slight ways from the kind of criticism that constructs 
an implied narrator or reader, such as that popularized by Wayne Booth in his influential 
Rhetoric of Fiction, which treats the novel as a single cultural communication.277 This 
method is consonant with Ruppert's literary Utopia discussed above and its ability to 
generate an "outside" of the text for the reader. Jameson cautions against this approach, 
however, for how it too easily presupposes "a class of reader" that wants a uniform 
message from a text.278 This impulse should be, in Jameson's terms, read historically 
itself, as a symptom of its own era or class.279 Jameson's dialectical method moves across 
the abstract and existential, constructing them as positions to be occupied and abandoned. 
Attention to the form of art, especially the literary form—which is primarily the novel for 
moderns—is a way to track the positions, to gather together distance and proximity, the 
                                                
276 Jameson, Marxism and Form, 372. 
277 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).  
278 Ibid., 357.  
279 "Indeed, the very attempt to think through a noncontradictory, universally valid (and thereby ahistorical, 
nondialectical) reformulation of the concept of point of view is itself historically symptomatic.” Ibid., 358.  
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infrastructure of society and the individual. Classes and conflict come in and out of focus, 
depending on one's position in relation to the novel but the never disappear from view. 
Such an approach to reading literature positions Jameson squarely within the historicizing 
methods of critical religious studies but situates this scholarship as aesthetic production.  
 Through this close attention to Marxian dialectics, Jameson can attend to cultural 
production primarily as historicized aesthetics. This is his style of ideology critique. 
Through this, he counts critical scholarship as cultural production, averring that theory 
yields its own pleasures of production and consumption and is also subject to ideology 
critique. As discussed in Chapter One, critical religious studies shares this project by 
including religious studies scholarship in their purview of how culture legitimates and 
authorizes particular social formations—especially those that preserve and reinforce 
moneyed interests. For Jameson, the dialectical nature thought in modernity means that 
ideology critique cannot be swiftly and simply dispensed.280 Jameson is consistent with 
critical religious studies scholars in that ideology promotes and demotes social groups, 
legitimating some while delegitimating others. Also, ideology produces social formations 
where there is not only relations between the “base” and “superstructure,” but also 
relations between points of production.281 Thirdly, following Althusser, Jameson sees 
ideology as a part of a necessary illusion, one that interpolates and thus, is crucial to 
subject formation. Through this lens, cultural objects can be seen as elaborations, 
distortions, and transformations of their historical circumstances, and are a part of a field 
of abstractions—including conceptual categories—of the concrete conditions of 
existence. Altogether, Jameson treats his objects tirelessly to historical analysis: 
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everything, according to Jameson, is political and historical where the history of class 
struggle is all of history.282   
 His work can add to critical methods in religious studies by  presupposing the 
pleasures of ideology and by explicit inclusion of theory as aesthetic production. The 
cultural critic is allowed to enjoy her cultural products at the same time as she links them 
to their historical conditions. Instead of distance, Jameson's cultural criticism embeds him 
and his readers in the fields of cultural consumption and production that simultaneously 
inscribes his theorists both in history and then, in the sphere of cultural productions 
themselves. His approach takes on the contrariness reminiscent of Adorno and 
Horkheimer and their inheritors and turns it to ask: what about negative critique was 
historically necessary or conditioned, and what made their approach to commodification 
a political intervention into the blindness of leisure so dominant in the mid-twentieth 
century?283 Jameson does not imagine that those conditions of terror of fascism have 
disappeared since the 1940s and 50s, that he and others are somehow free to move on, but 
he does question the authority one claims in railing against the culture industry or how 
the outside of capitalism has all but evaporated. Suspicion of cultural products, in the 
form of ideology critique, is not over or complete; however, the investigations are more 
precise, more situated, more historically located, when they take into account the appeal 
that cultural products have to "us" as critics as well as "them" as consumers. Jameson 
dissolves this model of critical authority, of lording insight over the duped masses, 
replacing the other effects of ideology critique with the immanent critique of 
historcization. The pleasures of critique are for their explanatory authority—an authority 
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that is also ideologically situated and constructed. The historicization of the critic 
presumes legitimation but with some cognizance of the procedures of ideology. How 
thoroughly the critic can examine her own location—or would want to delegitimate her 
own authority—is a self-critical position that dissolves ideology critique. Jameson avoids 
this distortion with his turn to history and then, to psychoanalysis for this limit conditions 
of analysis. 
 As becomes clearer, Jameson's injunction to "Always historicize"—echoed by 
McCutcheon for critical religious studies—is a thorough and layered process. 284 It is an 
injunction that brings together the urgency to think the present with ideology critique 
through monitoring and inciting the dialectical procedures of thought. It is not 
historicism, where the stages of political economy are reductively applied within a 
totalized schema for history.285 However, this does not leave totalizing narratives out, as a 
glib poststructuralism would conclude. Jameson insists it is not so simple to abandon the 
modern interpretive frameworks: they are too thoroughly baked into modern thought and 
also are useful. Jameson transposes the term mediation from the register of literary and 
cultural analysis of aesthetic forms to the larger, historical register where mediations 
become  
a device of the analyst, whereby the fragmentation and autonomization, 
the compartmentalization and specialization of the various regions of 
social life (the separation, in other words of the ideological from the 
political, the religious from the economic, the gap between daily life and 
the practice of the academic disciplines) is at least locally overcome, on 
                                                
284 This kind of thoroughness is valued by the critical religious studies theorists, especially McCutcheon, 
whose work is in many ways dedicated to this injunction, performing an ode to the phrase by 
supplementing his final paragraph in Manufacturing Religion with Jameson’s quotation. McCutcheon turns 
to quote Thomas Huxley as evidence of this need to historicize for religion, specifically, in order to show 
religion as the “fabrication of men’s hands.” 213. 
285 Jameson, Political Unconscious, 27 
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the occasion of a particular analysis.286 
 
Taking this account, then of history and its mediation, the unity from a totalized history is 
a "merely formal and empty one" except insofar as it permits more concrete and local 
mediations which are themselves the stuff of history:  
Such momentary reunification would remain purely symbolic, a mere 
methodological fiction, were it not understood that social life is in its 
fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single 
inconceivable and transindividual process, in which there is no need to 
invent ways of linking language events and social upheavals or economic 
contradictions because on that level they were never separate from one 
another.287 
 
While concrete and finite, it is also not easily grasped, except through its cultural forms. 
"History can be apprehended only through its effects, and never directly as some reified 
force."288  
Jameson falls within a peculiar fault line of contemporary historical methods by 
staying close to the Marxist materialist history in the midst of more Foucaultian models 
of discourse analysis that scholars such as Tomoko Masuzawa and Talal Asad 
demonstrate. Noting this shift towards power/knowledge analysis in religious studies, 
Constance Furey draws out how Jameson’s approach at first appears anachronistic 
compared to the disruptive retellings of particular histories that operate with “the (usually 
implicit) conviction that telling a different story about the past will somehow expand our 
options for today.”289 Jameson abides in the philosophy of history camp that persists in 
concerning himself with teleology and materialism. Yet he does so through a 
radicalization of what he means by history. It is not "History, in the bad sense—the 
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reference to a 'context' or a 'ground,' an external real world of some kind" that is treated 
as 'linear history'.”290 Instead, as he unfolds over his introductory chapter of The Political 
Unconscious, Jameson offers a History that is akin to the Lacanian Real, complete with 
capitalization. Influenced by Althusser, Jameson sees History as an "absent cause" of a 
synchronic system of social relations as a whole. "History is what hurts, it is what refuses 
desires and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its 
'ruses' turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention."291 Or, in Furey's 
words, History is “what we cannot escape, should not want to escape, what we hope fully 
to embrace by foreswearing fantasy or promises of transcendence.”292 Jameson does not 
promote a legible history but a History that is always in need of reading, forever in 
surplus of what can be interpreted but yet, sets the impulse for interpretation. There is 
simply too much reality—of persons, intertwined with social identities, desires, 
consumption and production patterns, intricacies of biological life interacting with inert 
matter and other lives to produce what is modern society and its subcultures, spanning the 
globe—to be codified or managed through any conceptual map or descriptive enterprise. 
And yet, humans persist in this effort. History is both the social contradictions of capital 
and the response to these conditions—the cultural aesthetic products and intellectual 
formulations made in response to these conditions, which then, in turn, reproduce the 
conditions.  
 History, then, for Jameson, is a dense material process not readily accessible to 
any one mode of interpretation, be it Marxist, psychoanalytic, humanistic, or social 
scientific. This is, as I introduced in Chapter One, an important dimension of Jameson's 
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historicization: that there is both the history of synchronic and diachronic relationships 
and then, how these are read as a part of a Lacanian Real—that "which resists 
symbolization absolutely."293 Having considered Jameson's use of Marxist critical terms 
and his relationship to the critical methods of religious studies, I want to now show how 
it is that Jameson's use of psychoanalytic terms makes way for the discussion of Utopia 
as a figure that speaks to the representational dilemma of the subjective, existential 
perspective in critical modes that is elided in favor of these critical formations. It is from 
here that I now want to consider more deeply how psychoanalysis plays out in Jameson's 
reading of literature, how the Lacanian Real of "History" in Jameson connects with this 
elision and how representations of Utopia confronts the dilemma of "experience" for 
religious studies.  
A Marxist-Psychoanalytic Aesthetic Method 
 
 Because of his historicizing focus, Jameson's project coincides with social 
construction but does so in ways not taken up thus far in critical religious studies. His 
employment of psychoanalytic discourses, especially Jacques Lacan, is particularly 
relevant to my overall argument that critical discourses struggle to maintain perspective 
on the so-called "experiential" dimension at the same time as they deploy tools to point to 
social forces.  Whereas Ruth Levitas—through Ernst Bloch and E.P. Thompson—wants 
to call out the "warm stream" of Marxism against the structuralist "cold stream" 
caricatured as Althusserian, Jameson takes a different path. He, like Levitas, recognizes 
that there is habit of or preference for determinism or social analysis within Marxism but 
does not lift, like Levitas, only the words of psychoanalysis. As discussed, Levitas uses 
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"desire" from Bloch and Thompson but dismisses psychoanalysis as ahistorical, too taken 
with instincts or a universal collective unconscious. Jameson's use of psychoanalysis with 
Marxism generates a method distinctive from the Freudo-Marxisms of Bloch and 
Marcuse mentioned in Chapter Two. Jameson's psychoanalytic uses are historicized for 
their role in describing bourgeois life within industrial capitalism and for the way that 
Freud and Lacan after him can be treated as products of their time, speaking to their 
times. Since those conditions of bourgeois family life, of indvidualization by capitalist 
reification, and of the material cultures of novels, historical analysis, Enlightenment 
scientific reason, and image reproduction are still active aspects of contemporary life 
since Jameson's earlier works in the 1970s to the present, psychoanalytic terms have 
relevance for critical religious studies, despite their passing from popularity. In this way, 
psychoanalysis is like Utopia in that it is a vestige of modernity that is activated within 
and alongside of postmodernity's material conditions.  
 The greatest value that Jameson's discussion of psychoanalysis offers my own 
argument is its own foregrounding of the elision of subjective perspectives from within 
Marxist critique. In an essay from 1977 that Furey refers to for her category of "Utopian 
History," which is revisited with citation through both his 1981 The Political 
Unconscious and in his 2005 Archaeologies of the Future (and thematically in his most 
recent 2016 An American Utopia), Jameson leverages the discourses of Jacques Lacan for 
addressing the crisis of the subject in Marxism. As he sets out in the beginning of his 
essay,  
The attempt to coordinate a Marxist and a Freudian criticism confronts—
but as it were explicitly, thematically articulated in the form of a 
problem—a dilemma that is in reality inherent in all psychoanalytic 
criticism as such: that of the insertion of the subject, or, in a different 
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terminology, the difficulty of providing mediations between social 
phenomena and what must be called private, rather than even merely 
individual, facts.294 
 
As is evident, Jameson struggles what to call this dimension, having so thoroughly rooted 
himself within the Marxist analytic of social totality and its affordances of social and 
historical contexts. He refers in a footnote to Hegel for help for the "classic description" 
of the "unique experience of the individual subject" burying yet further in parentheses the 
qualities of this dimension: "sense-perception, the feeling of the here-and-now, the 
consciousness of some incomparable individuality".295 If psychoanalysis is construed for 
its "pre-verbal, pre-social facts" or archaic unconscious experience, Jameson wants to 
arrest this interpretation.296 He also wants to separate his own subject from that of Anglo-
American individualism or Deleuzian assemblages, wanting to think the subject as that 
which is inserted within ideology, which can see itself as constituted by its social 
surrounds and which yet, knows something of its own distinctive perspective.   
 Jameson does not propose to resolve the problematic of representation but raises it 
for consideration and demonstrates how literary interpretation permits perspective into 
this dilemma uniquely. He is not set on decoding literature through Marx or Lacan but 
transcoding it—showing how literature, Marxism, and psychoanalysis are each 
separately invested in similar-yet-different ways. Each is invested in narrative and 
necessitates praxis of interpretation. What compels the relation of these three is how they 
each afford a means for Jameson to develop a "materialist philosophy of language."297 
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Marx has a well-known materialist method that connects the changes of production and 
society, giving a case for how language as ideology is imbricated with materiality. What 
Lacan adds is to shift the western philosophical notion of opposing dumb matter/nature to 
consciousness/culture by regridding this language imbued with materiality.298 Lacan's 
schematic of the three sectors or orders (the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real) are the terms 
he uses to show the materiality of language as it registers for subjects. Each is an 
occasion where language links and makes available dimensions of perception—both at 
moments of developmental achievement and throughout life. I will discuss these orders 
briefly in a moment. What is important to mark at this moment in my discussion is to 
consider how literature functions for Jameson as a peculiar means of considering the 
problematic of representing the subject's perspective. Literature stands in for the way that 
it can be interpreted as a repository or distribution point for wishes and fantasies—
aspects of that particular "individual" dimension that Marxist critical discourse speaks to 
but struggles to speak of.  
Literary Texts as Objects for Psychoanalytic Interpretation 
 
 Modern literature, specifically novels, present a fascinating case for a discourse 
that delivers the connections of social life while also generating or producing affects that 
seem wholly personal or private. Jameson uses Freud to unpack how it is that aesthetic 
products like novels offer pleasure in their production and reception both. In a text on the 
connection of daydreams to the creative process, Freud describes how daydreams 
distinguish themselves from nightdreams: nightdreams in Freud's system are only known 
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through their "afterwork" of retelling and interpretation in the analytic setting.299 
Daydreams, however, are the gratifications of a narcissistic ego, frequently self-pitying or 
self-aggrandizing, and eminently uninteresting, embarrassing, or even repulsive to reveal 
to others. Yet, Freud contends that literature and other cultural productions are just 
disguised narcissistic wishes, dressed in the images available to the author, made 
palatable by disguise. Narcissistic pleasure then is found in two dimensions: the 
expression of the wish and the formal pleasure of its disguise. Like a joke, there is a 
discharge of psychic energy by way of the shortcuts and displacements of the aesthetic 
work.300 To use an example relevant to my argument in favor of Utopian literary forms, 
Utopian literature could be seen to abide by this process, where the peccadilloes of the 
author—e.g., William Morris's narrator's constant remarks on the edifying architecture—
are cloaked with broader cultural appeal, i.e. a proposal of an epoch of rest where 
pleasures are widely available and reflected in the health and happiness of this account of 
life along the Thames. Jameson’s insight into this scenario is that Freud's transposition of 
narcissistic fantasy to aesthetic object depends on the ideological contents of the era for 
its reception and popularity, and that the "private" fantasy itself was only ever first 
available because of the social economy and its particular formation: "There are no 
personal ideologies, except by a metaphorical transfer in which the function of purely 
private associations and symbolic images in the psychic economy of a given individual is 
compared to the dynamics of the social economy generally."301 This relation of private 
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wish to ideology is, I would propose, what is happening with Levitas's use of desire, 
where the social world provides the "wants" that are yet experienced as privately held 
"desire."302   
 Jameson wants to further account for how it is that novels package wishes under 
heavy disguise and thus, become compelling enough for circulation and in turn, circulate 
fantasies as ideology. It is under these conditions that Jameson turns to a "symptomatic" 
reading of cultural objects, whereby all cultural artifacts are to be read as symbolic 
resolutions of real political and social contradictions. This formulation is Althussers's 
imbued with Lacan's terms, showing the debt of Lacan in his analysis in The Political 
Unconscious (1981) that he carries into his later work on Utopia. Jameson cautions that 
the political unconscious is not a solid or coherent story, not a “master narrative,” but a 
construct: "it exists nowhere in ‘empirical’ form and therefore must be re-constructed on 
the basis of empirical ‘texts’ of all sorts, in much the same way that the master-fantasies 
of the individual unconscious are reconstructed through fragmentary and symptomatic 
‘texts: of dreams, values, behavior, verbal free association, and the like."303 The 
reconstruction begins with the cultural products of our time, especially fiction, which 
with its investments in narrative, are privileged sites for the history-becoming-
conscious—historicity itself.304 What one finds in this unconscious are the remnants of 
life lived outside of capitalism, memories of belonging to something other than the 
apparatuses of the state. To summarize: the stories that groups tell themselves, left in the 
fictions that are written and read—should be looked at not for what they say just about 
themselves but how they say it—what structures they use to tell. This leads Jameson to 
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focus on the forms that different cultures use: fairytales, epics, detective fictions, realism, 
romance, or Utopias. Each of these can be looked at for how they are residues of the 
"private" wish that was never actually privately held. The fantasies that are distributed in 
fiction, while registering affectively and consumed "privately," are social, ideological 
objects. However, because literary fictions use aesthetics to generate affect, they are also 
mostly distinct from treatises from Marx or even psychoanalytic case studies. And these 
differences from and similarities with the contemporary analytic discourses of Marx and 
Lacan give a means to reflect on the whole scene of language use, albeit from different 
angles. 
 The scene of language use—broken out into three distinct but interrelated orders 
of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real— is brought into fuller view through Lacan than what 
Freud could say in his time, according to Jameson. 305 These three dimensions of 
language are not easily summarized but their evidence in literature helps to make my 
point that literature is useful for accessing desire and libidinal aspects of social life. 
Different than the interpretation of dreams or the decoding of the meaning of symptoms, 
Jameson details Lacan for the way that art is not just a repressed social life but is more of 
a symptom for considering the "perpetual alienation" that conditions subjectivity as 
such.306 This alienation occurs in all three orders and each traffics with language: the 
Imaginary in the dualities and oppositions of identification, the Symbolic with the 
differentials and the abstractions of language, and the Real with the limits of language. 
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Less differentiates the various discourses of fiction from social constructionist terms than 
the critical scholars mentioned in Chapter One would have one think. Literary fiction, 
however, has more ready access to the Imaginary register or order of language, offering 
more descriptive accounts of objects that appeal to the perceptual associations and hold 
these in spatial relations that center a perceiving "self." Objects are affectively charged 
and valorized as their connection to the body as part-objects—a relationship that is first 
seen (but repeated in life) in what has since, in Lacanian terms, been called "the mirror 
stage." This translates into fiction where there are objects in fuller description. Adding to 
this, literature also presents the social worlds and characters to chart a path through, 
which readers identify with. Said another way, cultural objects—Marxism and 
psychoanalytic interpretations, along with literature and other discourses—do not signify 
the self's wishes but are all lines of fiction—"'dans une ligne de fiction,' which 
underscore the psychic function of narrative fantasy in the attempts of the subject to 
reintegrate his or her alienated image."307 
To review: the unconscious and desire are not the instincts or drives, nor should 
they be discussed as expressions of a better way of living that is either repressed or held 
privately, as Levitas has described. Language pervades and constructs subjects at levels 
of materiality, from the part-objects of libidinal attachment that are given by way of 
language as discrete objects during language aquisition and then, as the otherness of 
language itself, that is never one's own private cipher but held by a social system that also 
holds and orders subjects in relation. This perspective holds for Jameson in his recent 
writing in An American Utopia that also shares with the concern of envy alongside 
desire: 
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The primacy of desire in Freud remained essentially personal, and 
included the 'otherness' of the family in a merely casual fashion. Lacan 
was able to insert otherness into the heart of Freud's path breaking 
conception of desire, and to offer a picture of desire from which the 
presence of the Other—big or small—is never absent, so that in a sense, 
or rather in all possible senses, individual desire is the desire of the 
Other, is the Other's desire. This socialization of desire itself now at one 
stroke renders the attempts to build a bridge between Freud and Marx, 
between the two great scientific discoveries which characterize 
modernity unnecessary. For now the psyche is already essentially social, 
and the existence of the Other is at the very heart of the libidinal, just as 
all our social passions are already drenched in the psychic. But we must 
grasp the originality of this view, whose power is negative rather than 
positive, for the universal envy which is necessarily at the heart of all 
social life is not some positive desire, but is rather envy of the jouissance 
or satisfaction of the Other.308 
 
This concern of the negative, less savory feelings when confronted with others' desires 
was notable to Jameson in his first articulation of Lacan in 1977. Nothing is so simple as 
an expressed desire, but this is then immediately challenged by the "envious rage at the 
gratification of others" disguised as a larger or more commonly-held sentiment and the 
formal play of language.309 Thus, what sets Jameson apart from both critical religious 
studies scholars and utopian studies scholars is raising the representation of "experience" 
as a problematic, holding out that this is visible in contrast to cultural products such as 
literature, and that desires are subtended by others and their desires, configuring a subject 
caught by and carried through language that is not always pleasant.  
 Widening the view of the novel and revisiting the ideological dimensions of 
Jameson's interpretations of literature resituates Lacan for use in Marxist analysis of 
literary form. As mentioned above, the stories that groups tell themselves (be they 
fictional or theoretical!) should be considered for not only what they say but also the 
forms they take. Fairytales, epics, detective fictions, realism, romance, or Utopias—each 
                                                
308 Jameson, An American Utopia, 74. 
309 Jameson, "Imaginary, " 341.  
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can be looked at as residues of the "private" wish that was never actually privately held. 
Here is a case for the different genres that appear and succeed under different conditions, 
be they shifts in the novels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or across other eras 
and their concomitant modes of production. The text, a social-symbolic act, is 
efficacious—it serves the community it is written for both by guiding it and also figuring 
what is otherwise unrepresentable. Jameson imports the structural logics of Claude Levi-
Strauss's analysis of myth for his interpretation of the modern literary form.310 Jameson 
points to Levi-Strauss's analysis of Caduveo facial decorations and their design, one of 
duality and symmetry, for how they reflect or enact the social hierarchy. This is different 
from their more egalitarian neighbors. In the Caduveo, the "real social contradictions, 
insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic 
realm."311 From this example, Jameson extracts an interpretive model that is able to 
cooperate with his particular definitions of ideology and History. For ideology, the form 
is not just shaped or informed by ideology but the aesthetic form itself is ideological: its 
characteristics, materials, and situation all playing together to make the imaginary 
resolution to the social problem or the contradictions which cannot be surmounted in the 
intercourse of resource production.312 Thus, the form of the art indicates information 
about the organization of the society. 
 A simple example of this is how the novel—a privately consumed, personal 
narrative developed to reflect the European social relations—etches the individual onto a 
                                                
310 Jameson, Political Unconscious, 77-82. 
311 Ibid., 79. 
312 Ibid."This interpretive model thus allows us a first specification of the relationship between ideology 
and cultural texts or artifacts: a specification still conditioned by the limits of the first, narrowly historical 
or political horizon in which it is made. We may suggest from this perspective, ideology is not something 
which informs or invests symbolic production: rather the aesthetic act is itself ideological, and the 
production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own right, with the 
function of inventing imaginary or formal 'solutions' to unresolvable social contradictions.  
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transforming landscape which then transforms the individual. The political conditions of 
modernity are read by Jameson on the surfaces of the novel, which become a "political 
allegory" for a "sometimes repressed ur-narrative or master fantasy about the interaction 
of collective subjects." Novels are not individual texts for individuals but "grasped as 
'utterances' in an essentially collective or class discourse."313 Modern history appears in 
literature, then, as revolutions, market economies annulling old aristocracies, with a 
changing cast of collectivities, from the proletariat and the masses in industrialized cities 
to the transnational forces of communism and fascisms, super-states and global 
corporations marking characters and plots. Thus, Jameson's formal analysis interrogates 
History in terms of a context both diachronic and synchronic (a method familiar to 
literary analysis) but also posits History as an immanent subtext that is fundamentally not 
representable. History, in short, is that which is inaccessible to us except in textual form, 
or in other words, "that it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization."314 
This confrontational but unresolved sense of History comes into contact with the 
concerns raised in Chapter One by Tyler Roberts as incongruity. But with Jameson, it is 
now materialized, an effect of political economy.  
Utopia in Jameson 
 
 Two key points can be taken from this summary statement about the value of 
Lacan for Jameson—points that are crucial to my argument for both the problematic of 
representation in the study of religion and the role Utopia can have in mediating this 
problematic. First, is that cultural products are dense ideological formations that refract 
libidinal attachments as social objects. Second, that what is ever thought of as existential, 
                                                
313 Ibid., 80. The political conditions of modernity are quickly summed in a lengthy sentence here. 
314 Ibid., 82. 
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private, or "experience" is in a chain of relations—of Otherness—that keeps any claim to 
experience distant from any sort of interior or liberal self. The effect is that, with a 
psychoanalytic frame of Lacanian desire applied at the site of cultural products, a 
dialectical method of interpreting culture, where this method is always the unity of theory 
and practice, elicits the effect of a simultaneous subjective and social perspective. As 
Jameson reflects in his most recent writing on Utopia in An American Utopia: 
To put it methodologically, where in other systems the operation of 
transcoding is unavoidable—we must pass from a language of subjective 
or psychological individuality to a very different terminology governing 
the social or the collectivity (a passage involving a mediation I tend to 
describe in terms of a translation process)—here transcoding is 
unnecessary and the same code can apply to either reality.315 
 
Jameson employs this primarily to literature while recognizing the narrative overlaps 
both novels and Marxist historical materialism. These two narrative forms echo with a 
third narrative—the "personal" dimension where subjects string events into stories to 
interpret existence. When this is applied to the distinctive Utopian literary genre, the 
subjective or "individual" aspect is brought into closer relation to its already collective 
identity. Collectivity, in Utopia, disrupts the presumed modern individuality and offers 
subjectivity as it is both constructed by others and also, shows this constructedness as 
satisfying, untroubled, and harmonious, or, as I have said other places, resolved of its 
social contradictions.  
 This is, then, how Utopia becomes a figure for modernity. Within capitalism, the 
genre with the most telling fragments of the political unconscious is Utopia.316 Utopia is 
                                                
315 Jameson, An American Utopia, 75. 
316 And its post-industrial counterpart, Science Fiction. Jameson takes the popularity of Science Fiction as a 
queue for considering what has replaced Utopia in the late twentieth century for the function of thinking 
with social contradictions within postmodernity and particularly in mapping the "geopolitical Imaginary" as 
he does with regards to William Gibson in his 2003 article, "Fear and Loathing in Globalization" or with 
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particularly ripe because it symbolically resolves social contradictions but then, delivers 
contradiction back in the form itself and across the genre. Jameson's formal analysis 
allows those contradictions to be read across multiple literary works within the same 
genre of Utopia: some Utopias emphasize work while others leisure; abundance solves 
some social problems whereas in others, thrift is the solution; and political centralization 
marks some Utopias while others depend on a democratic complexity. Utopian literature, 
then, gives access to the micro disjunctures—History—at the level of form through the 
way that Utopia—as a literary form and as a figure—is caught up in giving and taking, 
presenting and withholding, attending to the present while projecting some other time or 
place beyond. Reading symptomatically allows the unacknowledged desires and 
expressions of socio-political life to be read across the surface of the text.  
It is from Jameson's near-obsessiveness with trying to think the present that 
Utopia comes in as a remnant of modernity. As discussed already, Utopia references the 
material conditions of travel and exploration, of French and English revolutions of an 
emergent middle class, and the increased comfort provided by mechanized production 
and factory labor that simultaneously constructed a new class of urban workers to first 
produce and then consume these goods in the twentieth century. Jameson insists on 
holding Utopia within view of his theoretical work despite its negative associations with 
fascism or the failed Soviet state. Jameson does not exclude these from his interpretations 
of Utopia, recognizing Utopia is just as associated with xenophoic or racist group 
practices as with collective class consciousness or desires for better ways of being. What 
                                                                                                                                            
the aliens of Olaf Stapeldon where Jameson interprets how Stapledon's variety of his "alien life forms is 
determined by semic oppositions which seek (structurally and narratively, which is to say unconsciously) to 
resolve social contradictions." Fredric Jameson, “Fear and Loathing in Globalization,” New Left Review, 
(Sept-Oct. 2003): 384-92 reprinted in Jameson, Archaeologies, 130. 
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is most important is that Utopia will simmer as unconscious impulse within modernity 
due to the contradictions of capital until brought into more conscious projects.317 While 
an absolutely impossible goal, full consciousness—like Utopia—is a fool's errand and a 
worthy effort. The praxis of a dialectic applies.  
 Whereas Utopia has been thought of as hope and change, psychological 
fulfillment, particular communal groups, political treatises, or technological 
advancement, Jameson associates Utopia most with its formal operation of representing 
the material contradictions of capitalism and raising these contradictions to the level of 
the form itself. To read Utopia as either a blueprint or an impossibility would be to 
misread Utopia, and what it demands instead is a dialectical method. The formal method 
of Furey describes the dialectic as it operates with regards to Utopia's stubbornness in 
being formalized at all: 
In Utopia, this far-away land, there are no clear divisions between 
unfamiliar and familiar, novel and known, critiqued and approved. This is 
the point. Absolute difference sounds intriguing, but not only is it both 
theoretically and practically impossible, it's not what Utopias offer 
anyway. They put existing pieces together into a non-existent form, like 
Homer's chimera, a never-before seen animal with the head of a lion, the 
body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent. This is not merely the familiar 
rendered strange, but dialectically so: distinctive in a way that leverages 
critique, it enables us to see where we are while imagining that it could be 
otherwise. 318  
 
Utopia compels through this instability of representation both in its form and its content, 
what Jameson describes as not just about content of Utopia—the city its features, its 
kinds of relations—but about what it can and cannot register: “The representational 
                                                
317 Jameson, Archaeologies, 8-9. Also, recall: with Lacan, Utopia-as-unconscious is not "beneath thought" 
but "the language of the Other," speaking with authority because it is the object of desire. 
318 Furey, "Utopian History," 387. 
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relations established between the form and the content of the Utopia.”319 Beyond the 
contradiction of the name itself, Utopia generates its fundamental appeal by being 
simultaneously both strange and familiar, and thus only accessible by way of dialectical 
movement. This is evident in the example of Utopia's closed off island that is available 
by way of a familiar traveler who mirrors the reader's imaginative participation in the 
space. 320 These have been noted above.  
 What Jameson adds is how Utopias (the literary form)—by entering into the 
circuit of representation in being written out and shared—spread Utopia (the figure) 
across materiality and fantasy, where in taking form, it annuls itself as the possibility of 
actually being the Utopia.321 In Freudian language, the Utopian text would need to obey 
both the pleasure principle and reality principle simultaneously—to deliver jouissance 
and also, to keep itself in the realm of the believable, possible, long enough to appear 
realistic in human terms of relation, meeting objections of the reader along the way.322 In 
these ways, Utopia depends on being moved into representation where it then, in being 
caught in several contradictions, points back to the ways that social life itself is always 
mired in the material contradictions that Marx described as intrinsic to capitalism's 
development. Because of the literary Utopia's particular ability to deliver capitalism's 
contradictions into view, Jameson marks Utopia for special attention in his Marxist, 
formalist method.  
                                                
319 Jameson, Archaeologies, xiii. 
320 Jameson, Archaeologies, xx. In Furey's reading of More's Utopia, the "reader who wants something 
different encounters the well-known author, sanctioned by reputation, and the familiar thereby mediates 
what is yet unknown" "Utopian History," 390. 
321 Jameson sounds very Derridian in these moments where he avers that Utopias continue to decide that 
which is undecideable, or as postulating the possibility of the impossible. Published in 2005, The 
introduction to Archaeologies appeared when these turns of phrases had more cultural force.  
322 Jameson, Archaeologies, 223. 
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 This attention of form, as mentioned, does not excuse content. At the level of 
content, Jameson identifies the absence of money as More's fundamental principle.323  
Utopias distinguish themselves for their details on how to arrange social life, such as 
Saint-Simon's administration, Bellamy's industrial army, Morris's aesthetic directive, or 
Callenbach's ecological harmonization. If these programs are of the authors’ 
predilections, they also are responses to larger social or historical situations. These 
contents of Utopia—the ways that the society is organized for maximum fulfillment and 
satisfaction—are woven from the economic necessities of their time. Throughout, 
however, is the abolition of money and property, "run[ning] through the Utopian tradition 
like a red thread" that is "now aggressively affirmed on the surface, now tacitly 
presupposed in milder forms or disguises."324 Jameson does not leave the questions of 
resource distribution to a matter of Utopian contents: he also regards this will to 
economic satisfaction as mirrored in the Utopian enclave itself, a kind of mental space 
that has been stilled and quieted against the rush of historical change.  
 In this relationship of the contents that abolish money and the form that creates an 
enclave from which to launch a comparison to expose the conflicts of the present society, 
the Utopian form highlights anxieties of capitalism and attempts to puzzle its resolution. 
As discussed in Part One above, other literary theorists proposed that the imaginative 
force is constructed through the bounded island that is then traversed, reported on, and 
generative of alternatives outside of the text. Jameson emphasizes the "closure" of the 
island that is mirrored in the closure of the narrative. This is repeated in the concepts and 
categories that distinguish the text from others and thus, "close" it off. As mentioned 
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above, this closure has the paradoxical effect of opening up to other possibilities. What 
Jameson adds to this analysis of the Utopian form is that in being a genre about islands 
and enclaves, it constructs social life as a bounded form, a totality and that this total 
formation displaces thought: 
Totality is then precisely this combination of closure and system, in the 
name of autonomy and self-sufficiency and which is ultimately the 
source of that otherness or radical, or even alien, difference already 
mentioned above and to which we will return at some length. Yet it is 
precisely this category of totality that presides over the forms of Utopian 
realization: the Utopian city, the Utopian revolution, the Utopian 
commune or village, and of course the Utopian text itself, in all its radical 
and unacceptable difference from the more lawful and aesthetically 
satisfying literary genres.325 
 
Thus, as contrast, it is not just that Utopian literature generates imaginative 
possibilities—difference—by its representation of a different society. The more radical 
possibility Jameson upholds is that Utopia, as imagined enclaves within the existent 
world, does not offer only alternatives but somehow is "felt to replace our world 
altogether."326  
 It is important to note the inclusion and radicalization (dare I say Aufhebung?) of 
Ruppert's formal analysis of contradiction. Whereas Ruppert treats the transpositions of 
marriage practices and technological innovations as temporary resolutions of lived social 
contradictions, and he regards the Utopian form itself as igniting a cognitive 
contradiction that redirects the reader's attention to her own experiences of contradiction, 
Jameson sees how Utopias both displace the immanent social world and occlude 
thought—in other words, they generate antinomy. Jameson here reflects a kind of 
deconstructionism, inscribing the formal contradictions of Ruppert's Utopia within the 
                                                
325 Ibid., 5. 
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Late capitalist moment, arriving at the situation where Utopias continue to try to decide 
that which is undecidable.327 Thus the contradiction is more overwhelming, stepping the 
analysis of the Utopian form back into the open-endedness of temporality, like Bloch.328 
Jameson widens the scope of the effect and place of Utopia's contradictory force to the 
point of seeming to "replace our world altogether." To reiterate: the social totality —of 
representing society en total—has effects beyond the ability to deliver social 
contradictions. While Utopia does this, it does more. 
 It could be leveraged that Jameson overstates his case for social totality and its 
role in delivering both contradiction and antinomy to present interpretation. Jameson sees 
the contradictions of Utopia also across the genre in the way that some texts promote a 
pastoral while others a city life. The oppositions multiply across the texts: work/leisure; 
abundance/thrift; political centralization/democratic complexity; 
individuality/collectivity.329 Utopia figures the obstacles met in social discourse and 
attempts a solution. In this effort, Jameson finds that it is the formation of the collective 
itself, its presupposed unity of individuals, that shocks and disorients, earning the proper 
name of Utopia. Thus, if Utopia strikes an ambivalent tone, this is as much to do with its 
structuring of contradictions as with the historical record of twentieth century political 
failures. The Utopian form is then, for Jameson, its combination of its consistent contents 
that attempt to resolve lived social contradictions and the effect of these attempts when 
circulated through an aesthetic of written, fictional narrative.  
                                                
327 Ibid., xvi-xv. 
328 The totality of the form of utopia and the philosophy of history that can see the whole is a question of 
temporalities for Furey. Her pull of Derrida into this conversation signals her recognition of the blur of time 
and its representation.  
329 Jameson's chapter "Utopia and Its Antimonies" from Archaeologies does the most work of showing the 
contradictions at the level of content and how these drive toward the contentment of the Utopian citizen. 
His discussion of the Utopian subject in this chapter bears comparison with the liberal Utopian subjects of 
Levitas and the proletariat Utopian subject of E.P. Thompson. See this conversation in Chapter Two.  
  210 
  
Utopia as Figure of Desire, not Concept about Desire 
 
 Jameson differs from Levitas in two ways that I find particularly salient for my 
considerations of Utopia: first, the claim that desire depends on representation—on taking 
form—and, in doing so, becomes something for introjection and projection. The second, 
the claim that desire always refers to a collectivity—a determinate set of ideological 
material, in many cases, a social class—that constructs itself differentially from an Other. 
Both these cases of desire relate it directly to ideology but an expansive definition of 
ideology that inscribes all social activity within it. With this kind of encompassing 
definition of ideology, the question arises: how can we see outside of it? The answer is by 
the differential logics that construct it; that is, by the particularities of a text that appear as 
odd or strange, and therefore do not satisfy. To return to an example from Morris, there is 
something aberrant to me about the sexual attention given to the women within the text, 
particularly the attentions that are differently given to different women, with Morris 
lingering on the details of younger women. I can read this as nineteenth-century 
bourgeois sexism because my social formation is differently constructed from that of the 
text, whereas the romanticism of the rowing along the Thames is quaint but appealing for 
my positive associations with exercise and fitness as a part of beauty.  
 To summarize: where there is a desire for Utopia, there is a representation of 
ideological material. The material aligns enough with a particular social formation that it 
reasserts and legitimates this formation. How it distinguishes itself from other literature is 
in its particularly modern wish-fulfilling fantasy of aligning the "individual" (made so by 
capitalist reification) with its formative institutions. It delivers the pleasure of this 
fulfillment aesthetically—as a formal closure—but does so incompletely, prompting 
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desire to keep going, to keep searching for its Utopian object. Utopian literature, in as 
much as it presents the reality principle as the Utopian social order, subtends the private 
wish as ideology. Yet as a representation, Utopias return the gaps of all representations, 
all systems of signification, and echo with the qualitative incommensurability of what is 
particular, isolate, "me" and "my" desires and what are the systems, discourses, and 
languages that "I" am embedded in. Utopia as a figure stands for the aesthetic, linguistic 
object of desire—the private wish of the end of social contradiction and the modern 
scientific orientation that representing social life "just properly enough" is what can 
precipitate this end.   
Utopia in Critical Religious Studies 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the Utopian literary form generates the 
ambivalence that moderns encounter with Utopia and contributes to Utopia's association 
with desire. I explained how Utopian narratives are primarily travel narratives of 
alternative, self-sufficient societies that move the reader dialectically between worlds, 
generating a mix of familiarity and unfamiliarity that ultimately propels the reader to 
recognize their own social world and its complex problems. By operating with a logic of 
spatial relations of difference primarily, Utopia develops as a figure of wholeness or 
totality. This totality, as I proposed through Jameson's Marxian-Lacanian method, has 
several representation effects. It comes to signify the resolution of social contradiction at 
the same time as it generates awareness of the social as a "whole." This makes for a 
displacement or, as Marin calls it, a "neutralization" of the present, as if to replace it. 
Utopia becomes associated with desire not only through its wish-fulfilling fantasy quality 
against the modern conditions of capitalism but also through its insertion into the circuits 
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of ideological and libidinal relations. It amplifies these circuits through its simultaneous 
"resolution" of social contradiction in form and its failure because it is ultimately 
someone else's fantasy and also always impossible for the restructuring of everything to 
everyone's satisfaction. 
 This chapter on the representational dynamics of the Utopian figure continues my 
overall argument that critical approaches, particularly ones in religion, face a dilemma in 
presenting the existential lived dimensions of existence alongside their explanatory 
arguments. Utopia offers a means to consider this problematic. I contend that critical 
approaches are invested in Utopia by way of their dependence on representing social 
totality and imply social collectivities in their formulation of social construction. They 
come across as dry, objective, or overly locative in that they emphasize the social totality 
and analyze subjects by their various social formations. However, critical methods 
contain in them a kind of "Utopian seed" as they draw on their explanatory tools of social 
totality and historicization. Through these tools, they reference the Real of History, the 
frictions of social contradiction, and the political potentials that are within the 
descriptions of formations as always social, thus not isolated or individual. Thus, 
explanatory projects of social construction are linked to the existential by way of the 
aesthetic figure of Utopia. When critical religious studies is read for its Utopian 
connections or as an expression of a desire for Utopia, it turns from being an account of 
society's structuring forces and subjectivizing procedures to offering an oblique glimpse 
of the existential, lived dimension of social life. Never fully representing "experience," it 
offers explanatory jouissance, recognizes the psychic pull of History, and delivers the 
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Utopian wish of collective association. I will continue this mapping of Utopian desire to 
critical religious studies in Chapter Four.  
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Chapter Four 
Utopia as Method: Encountering Representational Dilemmas 
 
 This chapter connects my argument to others who make similar claims about the 
problematics of representation in social constructionist methods. I have argued Utopia is 
uniquely situated to provide a means of considering the problematic of representing 
social constructs and existential life for critical religious studies. I examine a similar 
claim by Utopian Studies scholar and Sociologist Ruth Levitas and distinguish my 
narrow use of Utopia as a modern figure from her more generalized utopia. My 
distinction preserves the historical and thematic connections of Utopia to sociological 
methods while holding on to its connection to its aesthetic form. I contend, contra 
Levitas, that the existential, lived dimension of social life that has been repressed through 
the twentieth century should not be revived through an appeal to secularized religious 
tropes. I argue instead that it is in the analysis of the consonance of Utopia and critical 
projects, in their shared aesthetic of representing social totality, that the existential is 
raised obliquely. For existence to be "represented" in critical religious studies, it will 
need to emerge via a dialectical method of reading and interpreting social life without an 
explicit articulation. Utopia does not immediately present itself in critical religious 
studies but is uncovered by symptomatic readings. Tomoko Masuzawa takes a 
symptomatic approach to reading scholarship in religious studies in her own "quest" for 
origins. Her method of reading origin provides a parallel to my own in reading Utopia. 
By her approach, I show how desire is an apt term for how complex aesthetic figures like 
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Utopia inhere in critical projects and energize scholarly work in unconscious ways. 
Raising attention to the Utopian aspects of critical religious studies invites in an 
aesthetic-critical perspective and opens to the affective and libidinal dimensions of 
scholarly practice.  
Outline 
 In my goal to develop the category of Utopian desire most relevant to critical 
religious studies, I consider the work of Ruth Levitas and her claim that contemporary 
sociological methods suffer from a repression of its utopian history and themes. Both 
sociology and utopia are reconstitutions of society, and social methods, she argues, would 
benefit from A stronger association. I present her work as it intersects with my own 
position within critical religious studies. In her claim of the shared historical foundation 
of sociology and utopia in the nineteenth century, I find the overlap of the explanatory 
value of representing society as a discrete object. I separate my Utopia from her own 
lower-case, more broadly defined "utopia" when it comes to the value she gives to its 
explicitly normative role and to how it can communicate a range of universal, existential, 
and positive themes. Levitas depends on overtly secularized religious tropes to carry 
messages of temporal and spatial heterogeneity she finds in life and ascribes to utopia. 
While I agree that utopia generally can signal these differential dimensions of existence, I 
argue that my own figure of Utopia makes a better case. Supported by the dialectical, 
critical method of Fredric Jameson, I argue that an historicized Utopia makes existential 
"experience" an aspect approached obliquely rather than through explication. 
 In Part Two of the chapter, I turn to Tomoko Masuzawa's Freudian symptomatic 
reading of origin in religious studies scholarship. Like Jameson, Masuzawa offers a 
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complex, historicized account of psychoanalytic desire. Steering psychoanalysis away 
from an account of innate drives, Masuzawa shows how figures like origin come to 
signify potent associations. I compare her project to mine for the ways that prohibitions 
function in scholarly discourse. Masuzawa's argument about how the desire for origins 
fuels religion scholarship has been tremendously influential. Because of her impact on 
the field, it is important for me to contrast what she claims about origin to what I am 
arguing about the useful fantasy of social totality. Where Utopia is a representation of 
social totality, it is a fantasy that serves a purpose for critical religious studies. This has 
overlaps with origin. By following Masuzawa's lead, I introduce desire as a historicized 
tool for interpereting the attachments and interests of scholar-subjects.  
I. Utopia as Method-Levitas and Jameson 
 
 In a late-stage career reflection, Sociologist Ruth Levitas considers the 
relationship of Utopia to sociology through the histories and repressions of the field in 
her series of essays Utopia as Method: the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. In this 
text, Levitas revives her argument from The Concept of Utopia published 23 years 
previously with the definition that utopia is, at its core, "the desire for being otherwise, 
individually and collectively, subjectively and objectively."330 (For my discussion of 
Levitas, I return to her lower case "utopia" to signal our differences.) She expands this 
definition further, arguing that utopia and sociology both imply a normative perspective 
and that both demonstrate the relationship of social structures and their effects on social 
life. Levitas avers that her primary reason for bringing utopia to sociology's attention is 
that there is a need for  
                                                
330 Ruth Levitas, Utopia as Method: the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society, xi. 
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exposing the limitations of current policy discourses about economic 
growth and ecological sustainability. Utopia facilitates genuine holistic 
thinking about possible futures, combined with reflexivity, provisionality 
and democratic engagement with the principles and practices of those 
futures. And it requires us to think about our conceptions of human needs 
and human flourishing in those possible futures.331  
 
This visionary introduction expresses both political and ecological urgency for western 
ideals that are, by implication, either absent or threadbare in her scholarly field and in 
need of (re)assertion. While permitting that utopia includes the possibility of "utopianism 
of right-wing politics," her wish is plainly for constructions which provide more 
egalitarian, more ecologically-sustainable relations, ones which switch to biofuels, 
protect subsistence farmers, and "deliver secure and sustainable livelihoods and ways of 
life for all."332  
 I do not object to her political interests, and her connections of utopia to sociology 
are salient to my own interest in the representational dilemmas that critical social theory 
raises in regards to subjective life. However, I contend that my formulation of the 
Utopian figure is better suited than hers to address the obstacles of critical methods. 
Because of the kind of capillary quality of Levitas's utopia—going in so many places 
with its various ways of promoting social change—her analysis disperses Utopia across 
so many domains that Utopia's contradictions appear as a problem of application instead 
of as the operation of Utopia itself. Said simply, Levitas's broad definition attempts to 
contain Utopian contradiction instead of explain it.  
 To track the import of this distinction, I look at how Levitas relates her utopia to 
sociology through its mutual historical development and how utopia might be developed 
as a method. I first investigate her claim of the shared historical foundation of sociology 
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and utopia in the nineteenth century. This includes how her reflects utopian position. 
Then, I will examine how Levitas regards utopia as a method of social analysis. This 
reflection includes her argument that utopia is normative and that it offers sociology 
"holistic thinking." I find her claim to utopia's holistic perspective particularly relevant 
because of how she perceives sociology to exclude existential, lived experience. I 
contend, however, that her appeals to holism does not effectively reintroduce this 
dimension for my argument. She relies on secularized religious tropes that sound too 
close to what religion scholar Craig Martin calls "individual religion." To counter these 
limitations of her project, I revisit Fredric Jameson and his proposal of "utopia as 
method." Overall, I contend that Levitas's generalized "utopia" raises relevant concerns to 
critical religious studies that are, after consideration, better addressed by my own 
theorization of Utopia for how it figures social contradiction.  
Shared History of Sociology and Utopia 
 
 For Levitas, the shared aspects of utopia and sociology are that both are 
"imaginary reconstitutions of society." Her argument is not against any specific text or 
method in the field, only against the concern that twentieth century institutionalization 
has stripped sociology of its association with utopia: sociology has turned away from its 
utopian past and, in turn, repressed its interest in the future, its normative dimension and 
"the existential dimension and what it means to be human."333 While offering a glimpse 
into the sociology of utopia, her attention is mostly on utopian dimensions of sociology 
and how, over the twentieth century, these aspects have been driven underground, 
returning intermittently through such political-theoretical perspectives as feminism and 
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the realism of Rawls and Rorty. Levitas’s recovery of the overlapping history of utopia 
and sociology and her assumptions about how they both reconstitute society supports my 
claim that Utopia condenses social life in service of critical thought.  
 Her primary mode of recovery of utopia and sociology is to show this shared 
history. Pointing to the end of the nineteenth century, Levitas presents each as subtending 
the other, "where there is sociology as utopia, as well as utopia as sociology."334 Reading 
utopia back into sociology, Levitas returns to Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and Emile 
Durkheim for evidence of social theory’s congruence with utopian themes. She then 
picks up the overlapping sociological/utopian writings of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and 
finally returns to the authors of nineteenths century utopias—Edward Bellamy, William 
Morris, and H.G. Wells—to frame her discussion. Gilman and Wells stand out in this list 
for their writings of both sociology and literature. Through Gilman, Levitas sees the end 
of the nineteenth century as a site for opportunities for emergent forms of gender 
relations. 335 Wells's sociological writings are frequently ignored in sociological 
discourses, and Lewis Mumford was to use Wells as an example in his complaint that 
social scientists, in their antipathy to utopia, had turned their discipline dull and were 
guilty of "not being good scientists by not being any good at literature."336 
 Sociology was utopian at the start, she argues, because it was normative: early 
figures proposed the good life in the midst of their analysis. In Comte, she identifies his 
value of social laws that stabilized and precipitated change and that he "argued for a 
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scientific organization of society matching individual aptitudes to occupational roles."337 
Comte's interest in making work more satisfying through matching ability to occupation 
becomes Levitas's basis for the normative edge of sociology. From Marx, she reads 
against his condemnation of the unscientific utopian socialists (an argument she makes in 
Concept) by associating Marx with a voluntaristic and idealistic perspective of social 
change. Marx wanted the world "to be otherwise" and held a vision of the "good society" 
(though resisted formalizing it) and this, under her lights, is appropriately utopian. 338 
Marx also held "biography and history together," making sociology both collective and 
individual. From Durkheim, she takes his claims to "normal" society as an implicitly 
utopian ideal. Her reading of Durkheim bears attention for my own project, since it is not 
his normativity but his use of society as an object of analysis that lends him his Utopian 
dimension. 
Durkheim as Utopian 
 Whereas Levitas avers that Durkheim was explicitly antipathetic to utopia, she 
reads his 1893 text, The Division of Labor in Society, as presenting utopian vision. 
Durkheim writes, "the actual state of the world [is] pathological, contrasted with a benign 
normality which should have emerged, and which must and will."339 Durkheim proposes 
"normal" and "abnormal" forms, setting up a contrast of a non-existent-yet-normal of 
highly-divided labor societies verses pathological forms where the "'division of labor 
ceases to bring forth solidarity'"340 The maldistribution of workers to jobs and the 
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weaknesses in non-familial bonds like social clubs or even the state's failure to secure the 
coordination of different social elements threatens the modern society. Durkheim's 
evolutionary perspective, while mentioned, is folded in as a utopian aspect of his thought, 
reading his "normal" mode as a guide for sociologists and wider readers to see the better 
society that is possible.  
 Levitas's reading of Durkheim serves as a useful case study for considering the 
purchase gained by a narrow definition of Utopia. Her overdetermined concept of utopia 
shines brightly across a range of material, washing out distinctions that I see as crucial for 
treating Utopia, specifically its complex representational logics, its critical potentials, and 
its associations that make it rise and fall in currency. For example, she seeks out 
examples that support a universal utopia, citing Durkheim that "'[m]en have long dreamt 
of finally realizing in fact the ideal of human fraternity' and that such aspirations 'can be 
satisfied only if all men form one society, subject to the same laws.'"341 This equates 
utopia with human nature, which, as I argued in Chapter Two, is a claim that gives so 
much to Utopia that it overlays a western ambition and behavior on those who have 
suffered from its force. This seems a cruel twist. Second, this equation renders all 
aspiration as utopian, erasing what might distinguish my version of Utopian longing with 
economic or political valence—a distinction Levitas does not make. Is it that all longings 
are for political and economic change through total social revision? Levitas's concept of 
utopia is too abstracted, too inclusive for the political, institutional, or intellectual shifts 
that she is pushing for. Third, her comparison of Durkheim's thought to themes in Wells's 
A Modern Utopia for the purposes of establishing their mutual interests seems more like a 
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general attitude of intellectuals than of Utopia specifically.342 In contrast, I contend that 
Durkheim's and Comte's normative visions, especially Durkheim's "normal" and 
"abnormal" categories, are better when historicized as a remnant of a Eurocentrism and 
its evolutionary theory of society.343 This does not remove these sociologists from my 
own considerations of Utopia, but treats them by different criteria. it isn't normativity that 
makes Utopia but how these norms offer a resolution a resolution to contradictions 
produced in industrial capitalism—the alienations of subjects constructed through a labor 
economy. Levitas's formulation of utopia involves Durkheim's arguments of moral and 
ethical claims that while relevant for proposing a normative dimension to sociology is 
more precisely a discussion about relative social goods. I would say that Durkheim's 
potential as an author of Utopia—in my sense—is more through his emphasis on the 
value and means of sustaining social solidarity.344 This social solidarity is constructed 
both out of love for others and loyalty to society—two phenomena that, according to 
Ernest Wallwork, lose their distinction in The Division of Labor text.345 In this way, it is 
Durkheim's aspiration and interest in preserving collective associations in all of society's 
"evolutionary" expressions that makes him, by my lights, Utopian.  
 Beyond his emphasis on collective associations, I more strongly associate 
Durkheim with Utopia in his dependence on and use of the abstraction of "society" to 
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guide his theory and method of sociology. Levitas sees this connection as so foundational 
that utopia and sociology itself are at risk when postmodernity questions, among other 
tightly-held assumptions, society as a totality.346 However, Levitas layers extra 
expectations onto utopia, calling it "holistic, social, future-located, unequivocally better 
and linked to the present by some identifiable narrative, and one which embeds a view of 
human flourishing."347 I contend that the Utopia of sociology is not the ideal or good 
society of normative comparison; it is instead how Utopia articulates the relationship of 
social structures and their effects on social life. This is how social totality functions: 
imagining the society as a totality that generates its subjects from its institutions.  
 If Durkheim does imagine society as better than it is, then it is by means of an 
optimism endemic to his era for a progressive direction of change, a wish or assumption 
in line with Marx that depends first on an analytic of "society" that can be described 
functionally: 
Although we set out primarily to study reality, it does not follow that we 
do not wish to improve it: we should judge our researches to have no 
worth at all if they were only to have a speculative interest. If we separate 
carefully the theoretical from the practical problems, it is not to the neglect 
of the latter; but ... to be in a better position to solve them.348  
  
I contend, therefore, that sociology is Utopian not for its interest in social reform but for 
the form to reach that that reform—by tracing structures to behavior, interests, and 
desires that determine the dispositions of society's members and by comparing these 
structures for their configurations and effects. Levitas says it is in Durkheim's 
specification of a good society, of its ultimate unrealizability and the voluntarism needed 
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to get there, that makes him utopian.349 While these are elements in Durkheim, I argue 
against Levitas that they should not be used as the basis of claiming them as "utopian" 
because they can just be as easily claimed for a realist position—a position he claims for 
himself against a utopian one.350 Levitas acknowledges Durkheim's claim against utopia 
but calls him utopian anyway on the basis of the "normal" society set to contrast the 
precarity of his surrounding social situation and established as a "goal."351 But Durkheim 
resists the term goal. Instead of exposing these dimensions of Durkheim as contradictory, 
Levitas overlays her intention without acknowledging the text's resistance to the utopian 
label.  
Utopia as Method of Social Analysis 
 As I have proposed, what makes sociological analysis Utopian is its ability to 
derive critical insight from treating human life through the lens of a social totality—an 
innovation that is shared between sociology and the form of Utopia. Levitas includes this 
nod to social totality but adds several other dimensions, two of which bear on my 
argument for Utopia. One is that of the normative agenda of utopia and two is utopia's 
ability to speak to the whole of life—"of the existential dimension and what it means to 
be human." 352 I will address these two dimensions of her method separately. First, I 
contend that her account of normative debates is not directly Utopian, by my formulation 
of the figure of Utopia, and that hers supposes a more direct temporal or future direction. 
Second, I address her claim that utopia captures the sense of existence that is lost in 
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critical methods. It is this second one that most directly relates to my own interest in 
Utopian desire for critical religious studies. While I agree with her appeal to utopia to 
reintroduce sociology to its "existential dimension," I contend that her proposal as it 
stands suffers from a generalized, liberal utopianism. By way of Fredric Jameson, I will 
sustain that Utopia can serve to introduce the existential dimension but will have to go by 
other routes than what Levitas proposes. 
Normative Method 
 For Levitas, any normative assertion stands as enough of a utopian element to 
generate the kind of comparison to spark interest in things being otherwise. This is a 
dimension Levitas sees as repressed within sociology, a "speculative mode" of "possible 
futures open to criticism and debate."353 Thus, by her account, the normative or 
prescriptive dimensions that sit with social critique as a method should not be ignored but 
embraced. As mentioned above, Levitas sees how early sociologists insert norms within 
their analytic and explanatory theories of social forms. Utopia, she argues, has been since 
rejected by sociology because of its evaluative content, contrasting utopia to science that 
seeks out an "is" and not an "ought." Sociology could bear to learn from utopian literature 
as they "contain narratives of the place in history of both originating and alternative 
societies, of how we got here and how we might get there."354 Levitas challenges the 
separation of description and evaluation, not so as to "collapse this distinction, but to 
admit normativity as a proper aspect of sociology itself" by arguing that "evaluation and 
openness to the future are intrinsic to description and explanation" and through the 
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example of feminist challenges to academic practices that were—in the 1970s and 
continue to be—both methodological and substantive.355 
 As discussed above, Levitas unearths the normative elements in early sociology. 
In another gesture to preserve the normative, she describes her own scholarly method as 
utopian in its hunt to draw out evidence in political claims and policy initiatives of the 
"good society." Calling it an "archaeological" mode of sifting through the cultures to lift 
out the shards and fragments of the "good society" that are buried, Levitas pieces together 
these remnants and occlusions through imaginative reconstruction to show how social 
orders that claim pragmatic objectives are also latticed by ideas of what makes for human 
flourishing.356 Her examples of research from the United Kingdom on the implied or 
explicit rhetorics of meritotocracy, civil society, and economic growth in New Labor to 
resist the neo-liberal and neo-conservative utopias of the new-Right demonstrate how 
sociological research can sustain the "ought" within the "is": by bringing these aspects of 
discourse to light, sociology can move into democratic debate the implicit or the partial 
embedded within policies. One such example from her reflections on the utopianism in 
meritocracy is how state-funded schools have not made private-pay education (what are 
called "public schools" in the UK) obsolete or irrelevant in the UK despite claims and 
initiatives to improve and support education since the 1950s. Meritocracy is a platform of 
the Labour Party but so is equality, and these cannot easily sit side by side, with 
meritocracy promoting social mobility (up as well as down) whereas equality can be a 
platform for sustaining the inequalities as they stand (i.e. if everyone gets the same 
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benefit, then those who start out with more still have more afterwards).357 The method of 
utopia that Levitas applies in this example is how meritocracy harbors in its rhetoric the 
utopian collective norm of fairness and openness while at the same time is challenged by 
the individualizing forces of markets and competition—decidedly un-utopian for the way 
they instrumentalize human productive capacity. Levitas's method of archaeology to 
recover the competing norms in order to trace the interactions of policy, rhetoric, 
influence, and quality of life is a compelling case for how sociology can both study value 
claims at the same time as assert the relative merits of policies for how they actually do 
what they promise to do.  
 As an outsider to sociological methods, I find Levitas's use of normativity in 
relationship to Utopian formations compelling. However, her claim of its "utopian" 
quality is more interesting to me for the way that her use of "utopia" in this case depends 
on the collective norm of fairness against individualizing forces and that this collective 
value is what makes society better. This matches my own definition of Utopia for its 
ability to signify collective social arrangements within a dominant liberal capitalism. 
Thus, I would argue that this is a Utopian norm because of the value of collectivity, and 
not that normativity in sociology is generally utopian. I think that Utopia—as collectivity 
and social totality—can be located through an archaeological method but think that it 
should also include a focus on the contradictions of Utopia. I will explain how Jameson 
adds to Levitas's method at the end of this section. 
Holism Method 
 My second frame for considering Levitas's utopia as method is her claim that 
utopia recovers a lost vision the subjective perspective within sociology. As quoted 
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above, "Utopia facilitates genuine holistic thinking about possible futures, combined with 
reflexivity, provisionality and democratic engagement with the principles and practices of 
those futures."358 This definition of holism at first would suggest that it is a kind of 
mapping of various social processes in coordination. However, such a view must also 
make "connections between economic, social, existential and ecological processes in an 
integrated way."359 She goes on to add that sociology could most be helped by utopia 
through a "holistic approach" that connects "individual biography and history"—what 
Levitas names as "the essence of the sociological imagination."360 What has been lost to 
sociology is an evaluation of life from a normative perspective of "human flourishing," a 
perspective she shares with sociologist Andrew Sayer, whom she quotes:  
Sayer suggests that '[a]s sentient beings, capable of flourishing and 
suffering', we are 'particularly vulnerable to how others treat us' and that 
'our view of the world is substantially evaluative'. Wellbeing is an 
objective condition. It is also relation: we exist not as discrete individuals 
but necessarily embedded from the outside in relations with others.361  
 
Later on the page, Levitas contends that, "[a]lthough he does not present it as such, 
Sayer's argument is also deeply utopian. He addresses, as I do here, the existential before 
the institutional." This existence is the one that is suspended "between the present and the 
future."362 Comparing these ideas to Bloch's temporal unfolding, Levitas insists that when 
utopia is added to sociology, sociology can more fully accept its history that permits a 
category of human nature that itself is completed through culture.363 Levitas sees what I 
have identified: that Utopia opens to the existential. However, to claim utopia as holistic 
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thinking overdetermines Utopia and erases its contradictions. In her account, holism 
begins to speak with agential human subject that, in my formulation, does not sit with 
critical methods, especially those in religion.  
 For utopia to be a useful method to sociology, Levitas asserts that it needs to 
include the "ontological mode" that gathers together the claims to a good society and 
human flourishing along with the existential, a dimension of being that includes the 
experience of time and of affect.364 She bundles these features together as elements of the 
"warm stream" of Marx that have been forced "underground" by critical approaches.  
Sociology is comfortable with utopia only as an element in the social 
imaginary that is the object of explanation. It repeatedly approaches 
utopia and retreats from it. And yet the impulse towards social 
transformation, there at the origin of the discipline, does not go away. 
The warm stream runs underground. Both the general diffusion of utopia 
across culture (in Bloch's sense) and the parallels between sociology and 
utopia (in Wells's sense) would lead us to expect this. For the excitement 
and promise of sociology lies in this presence; the disappointment lies in 
its recurrent repression and denial.365 
 
In this case, it is critique that she claims that is pressing the warm stream of Marxism 
away. I might add that it is not only critique but scientific positivism that displaces this 
dimension of Marxist attention to human flourishing. Levitas is not alone in catching how 
critical, social scientific methods, active in Marxist historical materialism, can turn 
Marxist critique rigid. It is a concern of Bloch's, an argument waged between E.P. 
Thompson and Louis Althusser, an interest of Perry Anderson, and an abiding focus of 
Fredric Jameson. Each has found a way into the "warm stream" by way of Utopia. It is 
also overreliance on the "cold stream" of ideology critique, historicization and dialectical 
criticism that concerned religious studies scholar Tyler Roberts. As discussed in Chapter 
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One, Roberts identified in Russell McCutcheon, Steven. Wasserstrom, J.Z. Smith and 
others an overly "locative" approach that did not have room for considering incongruity. 
This dissertation points out this representational dilemma within critical approaches and 
considers that Utopia has a role to play in its engagement for contemporary religious 
studies arguments.  
 I want to distinguish myself from Levitas's reclamation of existential perspectives 
through Utopia by way of my narrower definition of Utopia that I have established thus 
far and with the critical tools that Fredric Jameson uses. The reason for this is that Levitas 
unnecessarily bundles so much within her definition of a general utopia that it becomes 
confused with a left-liberal perspective and in doing so, borrows religious tropes to speak 
address the specialness of the transformative power. Thus, the second way her holism 
intersects with my own use of Utopia for critical religious studies is negatively. Levitas 
naturalizes utopia through Bloch and does so in such a way that returns his religious 
language the fore. Her method of utopia as a process of recovery works hard to 
reintroduce an unalloyed "utopian marvelous" and a "quality of grace" that can be used to 
address "what it means to be human."366 Social conditions contribute to the desire for 
alternatives, however, utopia is cast as an experience of "grace": "Everything that reaches 
to a transformed existence is, in this sense, utopian."367 In using Bloch to help figure a 
view of humanity with "moral and existential depth", Levitas defers to secularized 
religious language. This, she admits, is due to "evacuation of existential depth from 
secular culture." She cites Paul Tillich as offering a secular grace, in line with the 
perennial philosophy, of "the incursion of redeemed experience into the mundane, which 
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transform both our relation with ourselves and our relations with others."368 These 
references to a secularized religious sensibility hold also for how encounters with 
aesthetic objects like the color blue or music invite this transcendence that she calls 
utopian. Utopia enters in to substitute for representational failure: "The use of 
'otherworldly' or utopian metaphors may illustrate the limits of language. It may also 
suggest that, as with colour, music's affective character is associational rather than 
intrinsic." The presence and absence of color and music—the spacing of color and the 
spaces of musical rest—is utopian for its suspension.369  
 I argue that while religion and utopia may both culturally signal the failures of 
representation, the encounters of heterogeneities of time or space, or of a post- or trans-
individualism that confronts the individualizing forces of capitalism, a scholarly approach 
needs to go further to explain this connection. Levitas renders utopia as a model for 
holistic thinking, thus expanding the concept of utopia across many domains, including 
secular-religious transcendent experience alongside of normative claims for a "good 
society" and hopeful futures. She has brought in universalism, human nature, aesthetics, 
temporality and social transformation together as one word. What develops through her 
claim to holism is not only a confused notion of utopia but also a kind of secular 
religiosity that adds meaning, value, awe, and poignancy to life and calls this "utopia."  
 I find this too-confused a figure for thinking alongside of critical religious studies. 
Craig Martin's category of "individual religion" seems to capture a dimension of Levitas's 
utopia. Martin identifies how contemporaries in sociology of religion have failed to take 
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into account research from religious studies and have unreflexively employed 
spiritual/secular distinctions.370 In preserving individualism as a category, they have 
imported a privilege of freedom in their claims and repeat insider accounts. Whether or 
not this is intended—if it is a rhetorical slippage of an insider’s claim to freedom or the 
sociologist’s assertion of their freedom—the assertion overall points to a lack of 
theorization or reflection about the perceived or actual autonomy claimed by sociologists. 
Martin argues how such slippage is little more than repeating what is hegemonic: 
Social theory at its best explains how individuals or individual choices are 
products of social forces. To explain things by pointing to individual 
choice is in fact not to explain them at all. . . . To posit self-causing 
monads, even out of apparent respect for individuals, is to turn social 
theory into liberal ideology, or worse, theology—for what is more 
theological than self-causing agents, unmoved movers, which escape 
causal fields yet make effects in the world?371 
 
Martin's argument against the category of individual within social theory as it relates to 
religion is instructive in critiquing religion where it is defended as a distinctive, non-
socially prescribed experience and in troubling the private/public binary about religion—
a distinction that fails to hold up when and since private choices of faith come to 
influence public policy or sentiment, or inversely, "choices" are promoted and legitimated 
by public conditions.  
 Martin identifies in sociology that claims to spirituality reinforce a concept of an 
individual that is not active in early sociologists like Durkheim, and that claims to 
experiences like "grace" or "transcendence" within sociology reinsert liberalism within a 
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sociological discourse that does not support a category like the "individual." I follow 
Martin in thinking that the individual is derivative in Durkheim: it has no substance but is 
an effect of social totality. To avoid Levitas's collapse of utopia and into religion and a 
reinsertion of a liberal individual, I have emphasized how it is that Utopia refracts the 
existential dimension and signals the diremption of "biography" and "history” within 
social theory. This is a subtle yet crucial distinction for considering Utopia alongside 
critical approaches in religious studies. Utopia cannot be approached so directly as 
Levitas presents in her wish to preserve holism. I go by way of other means, ones that 
make use of psychoanalytic and postmodern terms and conditions of social life that have 
rendered the subject more suspiciously.  
Jameson's Archaeology of Utopia as Method 
 Levitas's utopia-as-method bundles utopia's functions such that the figure 
becomes overdetermined. As a counter to this, I argue that Utopia is a figure that carries 
the existential dimension through its aesthetic form. Utopia in this way maintains its 
critical value by highlighting social contradiction, but not explicitly characterizing or 
representing the existential dimension. Instead, the subjective, lived quality is 
encountered through the Utopian representation as a wish-fulfilling object. As is the case 
with Freud, this wish is never truly fulfilled, as is the case in Lacanian desire that the 
proper object does not exist except as Symbolic and Imaginary language—itself always 
in deferral. I traced these moves in Chapter Three. In revisiting Jameson's take on Utopia, 
I can better set up how critical religious studies can see its own projects for their desires 
for Utopia.  
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 The archaeological methods of Jameson apply here more than Levitas's. 
Jameson's archaeology attends to the different modes of production that settle and layer 
within culture, never fully passing out of use but which are covered over and then heaved 
up again by history's work. This archaeology is active in Jameson's own "Utopia as 
Method," an essay published in 2010, five years following the first appearance of his 
collection, Archaeologies of the Future.372 In the essay, he revisits the book’s main 
themes as if responding to interlocuters and critics of his reading of Utopia through 
literary form. Jameson shares Levitas's primary concern of "ecological catastrophe” and 
also admits that there is a pervasive cynical reason that makes Utopia difficult to consider 
at this historical moment—a perspective the coincides with Levitas's observation of the 
repressed of utopia.373 Levitas lists a variety of causes but Jameson focuses on one: the 
saturation of global capitalism. If postmodernity is to blame, it is because it coincides 
with this event and because the ideas are a part of an infrastructure of capitalism.  
 This grandness of Utopia as the counter to capitalism sounds in some sense 
hyperbolic compared to Levitas's multiple small repressions and their counterbalance of 
diffusive utopian events, from musical performances to political policy to the structuring 
of thought towards normative ends or ontologies of the future. I contend, however, that 
Jameson's concentrated approach does more to target Levitas's concern—that of the loss 
of holistic approaches to social analysis that include the existential and subjective drives 
                                                
372 Fredric Jameson: "Utopia as Method, or the Uses of the Future," in Utopia/Dystopia : Conditions of 
Historical Possibility ed. Prakash, Gyan, Helen Tilley, and Michael D. Gordin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) 
373 Ibid., Section 1. Also in his view:  "worldwide poverty and famine, structural unemployment on a global 
scale, and the seemingly uncontrollable traffic in armaments of all kinds, including smart bombs and 
unmanned drones (in armaments, progress does apparently exist!)--leaving pandemics, police states, race 
wars, and drugs out of the picture."  
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and desires that activate social change. The lack of content that he gives to Utopia 
broadly is precisely the point:  
that what is important about Utopia is not what can be imagined but what 
cannot be imagined. [T]he utopia, I argue, is not a representation but an 
operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the 
future, the lines beyond which we do not seem able to go in imagining 
changes in our own society and our world (except in the direction of 
dystopia and catastrophe).374  
 
 In speaking back to Levitas, I would say that she invokes Utopia not because "utopia" (in 
its many styles and types) is being repressed but that Utopia is a signifier for what is 
repressed within capitalism. Said another way, Utopia is the figure that speaks for what 
cannot be said within capitalism. 
 In Jameson's use, Utopia speaks of the grand overhaul of society, not just 
counterforces or pragmatism. It isn't so much that utopia is being repressed by anyone but 
that it has lost is footing or its soil has eroded. The conditions that Jameson is reporting 
on overlap with Levitas: the shift from the late nineteenth-century highpoint for Utopia 
and the subsequent 120 years: 
The waning of utopias is thus a conjecture between all these 
developments: a weakening historicity or of a sense of the future; a 
conviction that fundamental change is no longer possible, however 
desirable; and cynical reason as such. To this we might add that sheer 
power of excess money accumulated since the last great world war, 
which keeps the system in place everywhere, reinforcing its institutions 
and armed forces. Or maybe we should adduce a different kind of factor, 
one of psychological conditioning—namely, that omnipresent 
consumerism, having become an end itself, is transforming the daily life 
of the advanced countries in such as away as to suggest that the 
utopianism of multiple desires is here already and needs no further 
supplement.375  
 
                                                
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid., section "Virno." 
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Thus, Jameson's viewpoint on the waning is that it occurs not from a socially-forced 
resistance or fear (that defines repression) as much as capitalism's steady advance.  
 Under these conditions, Jameson's method for Utopia recognizes that there are 
repressions of Utopia, as Levitas argues, but that recovering it or retelling it will not be so 
straightforward as providing evidence of hopeful projects or feelings of collectivity. 
Capitalism, as Marx points out, demands interpretation because its forces bend and 
distort. Marx's methods have been refined through interpreters like Althusser, who 
brought forward that the imaginary relations to the real conditions of consistence will 
never be completely unfolded and smoothed out for complete and total explanatory 
access. However, tracing the creases can offer clues for where capitalism will fold itself 
again. In this way, Jameson appreciates the complexity and difficulty of repression that 
Levitas misses by some of her bolder, more hopeful claims to the normative contents that 
fit her own ideological profile. This profile is hard to unpack because of its sympathies 
with both left-leaning projects and humanities disciplines. Unfolding her method from 
within my own opens up the question first of how to interpret Utopia as a repressed 
object.  
 Jameson's archaeologies keeps to the claim that periodizations mark distinct 
material relations but also are heuristics for explanatory purposes. Periods, such as 
postmodernity, mark differences and should not be seen in any evolutionary sense. 
Instead, they function as a style or structure of knowledge that makes use of distinctions 
in service of the mode that is most dominant. Jameson's archaeological method is similar 
to Levitas’s in its description of sifting and reworking of silences. However, in 
referencing Lacanian psychoanalysis directly, Jameson points to both the inherent 
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failures in this process and the ugly or unsavory—the "noxious"— that creates the 
ideological folds:  
The utopian impulse, therefore, calls for a hermeneutic, for the detective 
work of a decipherment and a reading of utopian clues and traces in the 
landscape of the real; a theorization and interpretation of unconscious 
utopian investments in realities large and small, which may be far from 
utopian. The premise here is that the most noxious phenomena can serve 
as the repository and hiding place for all kinds of unsuspected wish 
fulfillments and utopian gratifications; indeed, I have often used the 
humble aspirin as the unwitting bearer of the most extravagant longings 
for immortality and the transfiguration of the body.376  
 
Jameson goes on to offer Walmart as his noxious example of present-day Utopia. In 
Walmart, there is the expression of unification through the standarizing UPC or the 
shipping container and the advance of capitalism of its size and monopoly transform the 
market qualitatively, that "which abolishes the market by means of the market itself."377 
Like Levitas, Jameson is on the hunt for the future that is in the present, but searches by 
way of a dialectical relation where ambivalence is transformed into points of positive and 
negative viewed simultaneously. As stated above, the attention to the form of Utopia (in 
this case, as the enclave of Walmart) and the dialectic prevails over the content. In 
attending to the present in its complexity, the Marxian dialectic triggers the existential 
dimension without representing it explicitly.   
 By giving his attention to the despicable of Utopia, the "better" of Levitas matures 
from  the "good"/"bad" drama of a Lacanian Imaginary and its binary. Jameson's method, 
practiced with Walmart, is future-oriented, like Levitas's:  
This kind of prospective hermeneutic is a political act only in one specific 
sense: a contribution to the awakening of the imagination of possible and 
alternative futures, a reawakening of that historicity which our system—
                                                
376 Ibid., section "Wal-mart." 
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offering itself as the very end of history—necessarily represses and 
paralyzes.378  
 
While I can appreciate the need for a future (for it is a future that makes the present, in 
some respects, bearable), it is not the focus of my insertion of Utopia into critical 
religious studies so much as is the attention historicity. Critical religious studies offers 
historicity through its emphasis of historicization. This is the temporal edge of Utopia 
that I see active in critical religious studies. While historicization IS thought to be a 
deadening project, according to critics like Roberts or even Levitas's objective-seeking 
social theorists, the dialectic of Jameson makes the present a constantly renewing source 
for analytic potential.  
 Instead of the future as the home of Utopia, I would propose it is the present that 
Utopia addresses, where method relates the potentials of explanation and calls out 
instances of collective organization. My own account of Utopia acknowledges that utopia 
has been repressed but acknowledges this as an operation of capitalism. In regards to the 
repression of accounts of existential or lived dimensions of social life, Levitas is correct 
to note the strong anxiety stemming from critical social-science arguments but a Marxian 
approach to these questions is more successful in framing the repression as part of the 
larger problematic of representation.  
 As this dissertation has argued, these methods include seeing this occlusion as a 
problematic of representation that is tricky to overcome or perhaps impossible. The figure 
of Utopia represents social life as a totality and addresses its payoffs but concedes its 
limits and failures. Setting up a narrower definition of Utopia based on aesthetic form 
delivers the opportunity to glean the existential dimension from a dialectical encounter 
                                                
378 Ibid., section "Method." 
  239 
  
with the text. It also permits the jouissance of explanatory power that is both potential 
and risk of closure. In these narratives, the collectivity of Utopia is ushered in through its 
associations of a harmonious community or at least, a society where the subject has been 
reconciled to her subjectivation.  Instead, the desire for Utopia, as I have been 
treating it, is a longing that is met with satisfaction and frustration, possibility and threat. 
If there is a way in which Utopia educates, it is through showing how to sustain attention 
through the levels of contradiction and antinomy that present themselves in thought, in 
material conditions. Jameson offers this more sober account 
The desire called Utopia must be concrete and ongoing, without being 
defeatist or incapacitating; it might therefore be better to follow an 
aesthetic paradigm and to assert that not only the production of the 
unresolvable contradiction is the fundamental process, but that we must 
imagine some form of gratification inherent in this very confrontation with 
pessimism and the impossible.379  
 
Thus, in the figure of Utopia, the existential, lived dimension of social is not fully formed 
as an agent who possesses desire but is instead a subject transversed by desire, immersed 
in but not reducible to it. The psychoanalytics of Lacan name this subject through the 
language of the Other that delivers the Imaginary for identification, the Symbolic for its 
differential potentials, and the Real that resists representation all together. This 
formulation coincides with the social constructionist positions of critical social theory 
while still permitting the actuality, the reality of the subject's perspective within the 
social. 
 I turn now to consider how an historicized desire can function to limn the 
attachments to Imaginary narratives of fullness or emptiness like Utopia represents. I 
consider how Tomoko Masuzawa uses Freudian repression more deftly than Levitas has 
                                                
379 Jameson, Archaeologies, 84. 
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done and how claiming Utopia as a desire funds critical religious studies and thus, can be 
an opportunity to have an "encounter" with "incongruity" that Roberts argues is integral 
to the field.  
 
II. Desire in Critical Religious Studies—Masuzawa 
 
Desire, in its colloquial use, connotes passion or strong feeling. Yet, this surface 
level, dime-store Romance sense of desire is not as useful as psychoanalytic models. 
Relating desire to Utopia has, thus far, involved reading against those utopian scholars 
deploying it without much reference to its psychoanalytic meanings. It also has involved 
Jameson's Marxist-Lacanian approach of reading backwards through literature. Desire is 
difficult to address head on—a claim further supported by Tomako Masuzawa in her text 
In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origins of Religion. In this text, Masuzawa 
argues that desire is a result of repressive forces—prohibitions of social and 
representational dimension. In an effort to limn this difficult term, I track Masuzawa's 
project to show how desire signals a limit of representation. Using it to describe how 
origin functions for religious studies scholars, Masuzawa points to the dissolution of 
certainty in knowledge production. This corresponds with my own argument that desire, 
as used in utopian studies scholarship, signals subjective attachment that is otherwise 
prohibited or difficult to sustain in social constructionist models of analysis. I first 
examine how the term "interests" displaces desire as a category in social construction 
because of desire's connation of innate drives. I then examine Tomoko Masuzawa's use of 
psychoanalytic and deconstructive methods in order to demonstrate how desire can serve 
as a term in critical, historicizing projects. Through her work, I argue that that there are 
strong comparisons between how origin and Utopia function discursively to signal the 
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limits of representation and demonstrate that critical religious studies benefits from 
unseating its certainties through psychoanalytic terms.  
Desire is not a word commonly used in ideology critique, though it is common to 
post-structuralist approaches.380 Subjective "interests" have been the primary term for 
thinking about desire. As I discussed in Chapter One, Craig Martin, in his Introduction to 
the Critical Study of Religion, makes the clear distinction between interests and desires. 
In his account, socially-given identities precipitate interests. As opposed to desires which 
are short-term, interests are desires extended in time and space such that those with more 
social capital are in positions to satisfy more of their social interests. In short, Martin 
reads desires as subjectively held but socially given "interests" that represent those 
groups by which the subject is formed. As seen in Chapter Two through Levitas and E.P. 
Thompson, desire may be used to indicate a strongly-held interest that connects a subject 
to latent political potentials. While Levitas recognizes the psychoanalytic portent of the 
word via Bloch and Marcuse, she herself is skeptical of psychoanalytic essentialism and 
seeks a historicizing corrective.381 Levitas turns back to Miguel Absensour and E.P. 
Thompson to find examples of desire that animates subjects even as they are situated 
within social milieus. I agree with Martin interests deserve attention and with Levitas that 
                                                
380 Indeed, it is common to Gilles Delueze and Félix Guattari in their counter to psychoanalytic narratives 
in Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983). Foucault explicitly uses pleasure to avoid Freudian associations.  By no means is 
Freud and Lacan the only way to discuss desire, or even how there might be a desire for Utopia. Another 
route would be through Luce Irigaray's critiques of Freud and Lacan for their positing of desire as phallic 
lack. Other routes exist through this terrain of desire.  In considering how it might be to work more 
explicitly with Foucault and Masuzawa and the bourgeois subject within Utopia would be with Laura Ann 
Stoler's Race and the Education of Desire : Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of 
Things (Durham : Duke University Press, 1995). She only touches on Utopia in her project as it too, is 
invested in the bourgeois subject constructing itself a grammar of race. There is much more to say about 
how Utopian desire is racialized but this will have to wait for another project. 
381 Levitas, Concept, 8.  
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there is value in preserving desire that is not essentialized instinct or collective 
unconscious. 
 
Repressed Wish for Origins 
As I outlined in Chapter One, Tomoko Masuzawa adds psychoanalytic 
perspectives to her method of historicization in re-reading the archive of the field of 
Religious Studies. Her text, In Search of Dreamtime, demonstrates this method. Counter 
to Mircea Eliade's own claim that Religious Studies has abandoned its search for origins 
of religion, Masuzawa proposes that this perspective has only been repressed. Masuzawa 
uses "origin" to mark the scholars' relations to the indeterminacy of knowledge 
production generally, noting where origin is mobilized around unknowns. Origin is 
always a reconstructed narrative of temporal difference, reconstituted as either a time of 
fullness or a void. Masuzawa calls origin an "object of intense desire" because it serves to 
compensate for what is fundamentally unknowable. Where origin either can refer to a 
plenum or a nothingness, it is inflected with libidinal energy and attachment, drawing to 
it fantasies and projections generated from the present. It is further cathected because of 
its inaccessibility via knowledge and then, is "hyper-cathected" through its prohibition in 
religious studies scholarship, according to Masuzawa's interpretation, thus becoming an 
object of desire. "In short, the fundamental contradiction endemic to the concept (qua 
everything and nothing), as well as this logical double-bind of desire and prohibition that 
defines and determines its function, together make an impossible object-idea out of 
'origin.'"382  
                                                
382 This phrase is from her shorter rehearsal on origin in the study of religion in her chapter "Origin," 210. 
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It is important to note how Masuzawa's account of desire is constrained to 
Freudian terms of repression. Desire is synonymous with wish, an idea or representation 
that is excited with psychic energy because of its relationship to the drive for pleasure. 
This is pleasure of the diffuse sexual variety of Freud that connects bodies to objects of 
satisfaction. Wishes are mostly sublimated, tracked into other forms of satisfaction 
because of the fragmentary quality of the wish or its prohibition, either internally 
(psychically) or socially. When the wish cannot be sublimated, the result is neurosis from 
repression of the wish. Other results of repressed wishes are psychosis or hysteria, where 
the wishes are distorted or irrecoverable. Masuzawa does not claim that that there is an 
innate desire for narratives about origins but instead that religious studies scholars have a 
particular relationship to origin narratives because of the construction of the field of 
scholarship, both in its quest for the origin of religion itself by scholars like E.B. Tylor or 
through its interest in narratives or myths of origin, in such scholars as recent as Mircea 
Eliade.  
Seen from the perspective of the modern scholar, then, it is precisely the 
difference in the management of the desire for origins—that is, whether to 
embrace this desire and to form a whole system of beliefs and practices 
around it, or to renounce this desire and to build science at a critical 
distance from it—is what distinguishes the subject (the scholar, or 
"Western man," as Eliade calls "him" explicitly) and the object (the 
religious person, "the premodern," the "archaic," the "primitive") of this 
scholarship383 
 
Masuzawa positions desire as a major term for critical religious studies by historicizing 
desire and showing the overlaps of the discourse of religious studies and Freud, along 
with the material conditions informing these discourses. One such historical condition is 
                                                
383 Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15. 
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the mechanical reproduction of images in photography.384 Another such condition is 
those of colonialism and its dispersal with the early interest in theorizing origin in 
religious studies that then is sublimated through a study of origin myths of so-called 
"primitives." Masuzawa's attention to desire distinguishes her project from other critical 
methods that reread the field and point to the problems of claiming a universal longing 
for the sacred, to the strained binary of archaic/modern, to the authorization of certain 
conduct or to assumed, unexamined phenomenological methodologies. Through the 
frame of desire for origins, Masuzawa can show how religious studies scholarship 
operates a series of repressions. In this way, Masuzawa's project is more a study of 
repression than desire itself.  
Origin and Utopia 
 Having examined the figure of utopia (what I designate as a particularly modern, 
formally-inflected Utopia) since Chapter One, and considered "origin" through 
Masuzawa, I am able to link more directly "origin" and "Utopia." Having reviewed 
conceptual and literary perspectives, I conclude that what makes Utopia compelling is its 
framing of logical and social contradiction at the level of its form. In this way, Utopia 
functions like origin does in becoming an object of intense desire because it too, signals 
the double-bind of representing a prohibited object. I have counted Utopia as formalized 
fantasy. This separates it from other theorists of utopia who have broader definitions and 
label communitarian groups or ruptures in time or experiences of transcendence as 
"utopian." My articulation of Utopia as a form that sets up a spatial comparison of 
                                                
384 Ibid., 13-20. She relates the desire for origins to proliferation of copies through photography. There is a 
drama or dance ongoing with origin/copy, beginning/repetition—a drama recorded by Walter Benjamin 
who notes the repetition-without-origination of photography.  
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similarity and difference expands on the ambivalence that Utopia holds for these thinkers. 
By emphasizing its formal aspect, Utopia turns from a feeling to a fantasized object that, 
like origin, is cathected like an object.  The ambiguity of how "real" Utopia is, along with 
how "perfect" it might be, how plausible is should be, how "natural" or non-supernatural 
it is, or how its ideality displaces or nulls other Utopias, signals how Utopia marks a 
place of indeterminacy and holds cultural attachments. Like origin, Utopia appears 
conceptually possible but is fundamentally unknowable. Like origin, Utopia substitutes as 
both fullness and void in a point of time or space. In this way, Utopia expresses, like 
origin, the "fundamental contradiction" of being both everything and nothing. Using 
Masuzawa, I would say that, like origin, Utopia grows as an object of desire to the degree 
it is prohibited from its knowability. Capitalizing Utopia is my way of distinguishing 
myself from a generalized used that resists how "utopia," like "origin," is used 
discursively by moderns to project their own desires and to universalize them.  
 Origin and Utopia can also be related by how they use narrative temporality to 
orient the present. While other scholars make work of Utopia's temporal directions—
either past or future—my project sets up Utopia as primarily an object in space. As I have 
claimed, Utopia is a particularly modern thought/literary form responding to early 
modern material conditions of global exploration, mercantilism, early capitalism, and 
nation-state formation, and is an outgrowth of intellectual movements of scholasticism 
and humanism. This makes Utopia not a promise of fulfillment in the future (or the 
recollection of a Golden Age or Eden) as much as a human project, subject to a Reality 
Principle of sorts, where the only "magic" is that of the resolution of social of tension, 
absent of any supernatural influence. In following the convention of modern Utopian 
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literature, I narrow Utopia to its spatial dynamics. This reduces its associations to time, 
and thus to teleology. Thus, the proximate aspects of Utopia privilege comparison over 
normativity. This does not mean that Utopia does not have a normative edge but that its 
primary role is generative, not prescriptive. This distinction serves to direct how it is that 
the desire for Utopia in critical projects focus primarily on the effects of comparative 
norms and not regulative ideals, as some kinds of utopia imply.  
 
Desire for Utopia 
 
The desire for Utopia could be mapped as a case of Freudian repression but I 
argue that is better considered through Jameson's Marxist-Lacanian materialism. Utopia's 
fall from popularity has been argued as a consequence of twentieth century politics, its 
dispersal across capitalism, or, as Levitas argues, a repressive force with scholarship 
away from normativity. Jameson contends that capitalism's expansion and its late-stage 
appearance in culture as postmodernity has swallowed up the possibility of thinking 
Utopia. Reading this as Masuzawa does origin, Utopia has faced prohibition by 
capitalism's reach, further excluding it from conversation or consideration. A Freudian 
psychoanalytic reading of utopian studies could also be applied, pointing to the 
disjunctions and confusion in definition as a case of repression. However, as I presented 
in Chapter Three, Jameson's Lacanian formulation mixed with Marxist materialism 
provides a better means for seeing that desire is primarily movement and circulation that 
folds in ways to produce culture. In short, I have demonstrated the necessity and 
usefulness of linking link desire and Utopia without resorting to innate drives. I find that 
Jameson and his use of Lacan’s psychoanalysis is more useful precisely because it 
attends to subjectivity as an unfixed, endless process without devolving into an account 
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of innate drives. Also, instead of pretending to be able to describe experience through 
social theory, Jameson raises it as a question, holding it as a point of inquiry that cannot 
be resolved or directly addressed. Lacan is useful for this because his account of 
subjectivity is one that is sustained only through the Other of language, where the subject 
is not self-possessing and desire is situation of lack.  
 Thus, it is Masuzawa's analysis of discourse, her association of discourse with the 
affective attachments, and her unseating of scholarly knowing subjectivity that is more 
relevant to my examination of desire than the determinations of psychoanalytic terms or 
motions per se. Masuzawa insists that historical consciousness and confidence of the 
modern interpreter was never as stable as it appeared, and through her deconstructive 
method, she directs her reader’s attention to the postmodern undoing of this assumed 
stability, thereby deftly presenting the very project of theorization as uncertain and 
fragile. As the texts of her esteemed scholars come under her careful and generous 
treatment, the "strangeness of time appears sometimes on the textual surface" and her 
readers too are brought into the strangeness of temporality and in so doing, become 
"estranged" from the image of "Western man" that these figures hold up for scholars. As 
Masuzawa undoes familiar temporalities, she undoes familiar subjectivities:  
Somehow, we are estranged from that picture [of "Western man"], from 
the image of him standing, confronting the panorama of global history 
before his eyes, as if he alone were riding on the neck of Chronos. 
Perhaps we begin to imagine a new picture, just as the moment when we 
feel our own ground giving way, drifting irrevocably to time and to 
history.385 
 
Her work addresses the instability of subjectivity, draws her figures with sympathy and 
thus, obliquely accounts for the existential dimension by way of following her figures 
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through the breaks in their texts, as if in following the turns, ruptures, and leaps that is the 
subjective experience of time.  
From this perspective, what is most relevant from Masuzawa to my discussion of 
the desire for Utopia is first to consider that scholarly interest is guided by affective 
attachments to explanation. Critical religious studies is not exempt from these 
attachments. Masuzawa reads the formative voices in the field not to unseat them but to 
unseat the dominant interpretative strategies. The same criticisms hold: problems of 
western exceptionalism, Christian hegemony disguised as secular pluralism, and an 
ahistorical essence of religion are addressed. She uses the method of psychoanalysis to 
attend to how scholars, too, are subjects made through the folds of these discourses and 
thus, cannot just overturn them or believe they can exceed their history. Masuzawa's 
work is a methodological innovation within critical religious studies for its way of 
inscribing critical scholars within the spheres of theories that have been mainly been used 
on "religious others."  
 
III. Desire for Utopia in Critical Religious Studies 
 
My own innovation is to bring the insights about desire and origin from 
Masuzawa to bear on the figure of Utopia and how it, like origin, is at work in the field of 
religious studies. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Utopia has only thinly been related to 
psychoanalysis in utopian studies recently yet still deploys its terms of "dream" and 
"desire." Where scholars like Levitas have connected Utopia and desire, it has been to 
draw out the subjective or "warm stream" of Marxist critique in contrast to the "cold 
stream" of Althusserian structuralism. The exception to this has been in the work of 
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Fredric Jameson. As I examined in Chapter Three, Jameson does not try to marry these 
two streams through a concept of Utopia but holds them together as a problematic of 
representation for critical social theory. He proposes a materialist analytic of language to 
deliver the existential, lived dimension of social life obliquely through the examination of 
cultural objects. His formal method matches the concerns of critical religious studies as it 
is a dialectical approach that attends to ideology critique and historicization.  
By way of Jameson and his frame of a problematic, I propose that Utopian desire 
can function as a critical lens for better assessing the dilemma within critical religious 
studies of representing human life (or "experience") as both socially constructed and 
particular. As I have demonstrated, there is no simple way to resolve these two orders 
into one representation and remain invested in project of critical analysis. From the 
constructivist point of view, experience is a part of a humanist liberal paradigm that 
should be deconstructed along with the notion of a stable subjectivity. Also, claims to 
"religious experiences" are problematic for their claims to exceptional experience and 
also for the accessibility by scholars. 386 As Russell McCutcheon avers, experience is 
invoked often rhetorically as a " a substantive if indeterminate terminus for the relentless 
deferral of meaning."387 Hidden in claims to experience is an implication of "should," by 
McCutcheon's account. McCutcheon admits that there is "experience," but that it should 
be treated as "virtually transparent" for the way that is so embedded in social life.388 This 
is McCutcheon's way of resisting the liberal privatization of experience. Such concerns 
                                                
386 This summary of experience for religious studies is rehearsed in Benjamin Fong and considered again in 
Jason Blum, "Retrieving Phenomenology as a Method for Religious Studies," Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, 8, no. 4 (Dec. 2012): 1025-48.  
387 For McCutcheon, the rhetoric of experience equals the end of signification: "a substantive if 
indeterminate terminus for the relentless deferral of meaning." McCutcheon, Critics, Not Caretakers, 8. 
388 Ibid., 9. Experience is the "localized depository of complex and often virtually transparent messages 
communicated through, and made possible by, social life.” 
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prompt critical scholars to declare their works as projects of "redescription," as J.Z. Smith 
proposed, in addition to the task of description, thereby removing the scholar from the 
presuppositions of knowledge or claims to shared experience. In Bloch's terms of the cold 
and warm streams of Marxism, critical religious studies has chosen the cold stream. 
Tyler Roberts argued as much in his charge that social constructionism is overly 
locative. The criticisms of phenomenological methods as crypto-theological and a broad 
suspicious tone in the academy has separated religious studies scholarship from its 
affirmative, humanist aspects, according to Roberts. While Roberts does not explicitly 
support a revival of experiential language, he seeks a humanistic approach that thinks 
itself as "responsive." Roberts lifts examples of scholarship that "make possible 
acknowledgement of and forms of concerted attention to the flux and excess of 'life.'"389 
He defends the claim that while the hermeneutics of suspicion expanded knowledge of 
human motivation in valuable ways, it has " withered into method weakly supported by 
an ideology of knowledge for knowledge's sake."390 Roberts concludes his argument in 
Encountering Religion pressing for an account of human life by religious studies 
scholarship that moves beyond demystification and instead allows encounter, 
incongruity, and affirmation. In short, Roberts reports on an absence of humanistic 
inquiry in critical methods, a dearth of thought that supports transformative experiences. 
                                                
389 These ideas are woven from the penultimate page of Roberts's text: "As genealogists and historicists, we 
know how to reduce religion to social context and how to explain religious practices and ideas in terms of 
power, conflict, and identity. There no doubt is much to unmask in religion , as in other human activities. 
When the hermeneutics of suspicion emerged in the nineteenth century, our sense of who we are and of the 
possibilities for understanding human motivation, action, and society was expanded in valuable ways. But 
that affirmation has lost its force, withered into method weakly supported by an ideology of knowledge for 
knowledge's sake. As a result, critical suspicion increasingly fails to 'press to the limits of experience': 
human life becomes reduced to power and interest and for many it is no longer clear how we can remain 
intellectually honest while making moral or religious claims upon one another or how we can affirm the 
traditions and forms of life that make us, in large part, what we are. When demystification comes to define 
the study of religion, an the academic enterprise more generally, we lose sight of what it means to find an 
affirm our place in relation to others." Roberts, Encountering Religion, 232. 
390 Ibid., 236. 
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 As I have argued, the figure of Utopia contributes to critical religious studies for 
its signal of this conflict of presenting the humanistic discourses that Roberts proposes 
alongside of the critical prohibition to "experience." Calling it a desire for Utopia signals 
the ambivalence towards this project. As outlined above, hypercathected objects like 
origin and Utopia become signals for the obstacles of representation by scientific-
scholarly means. Introducing Utopia in the way that I have defined—an aesthetic figure 
based on its history within Western modernity—delivers a means to reflect the ambitions 
to representation of social totality and collectivity as they stand in critical methods. 
Calling it a desire for Utopia shows this project as one charged affective and libidinal 
investment, material through and through. Thus, scholarly efforts at representing social 
totality or collectivity in terms of social construction, social formation or otherwise is not 
an objective project. It is also not merely a case of interests. To contend that social 
construction depends on a desire for Utopia is to situate or locate (as Roberts might say) 
without overly determining the subject within this location. To argue for a desire for 
Utopia within social constructionist methods is to introduce the project of analysis as an 
aesthetic, and thus, a site or deposit of attachments.  
 By way of conclusion, I want to include an image of Utopia from Jameson that 
shows its imbrication with the explanatory investments of theory and method. In facing 
the present conditions of capitalism and its ability to reify and then commodify and re-
sell back to us the best of our Utopian ideas, it is incumbent on the theorist of Utopia to 
face these conditions with some form of optimism.  
What human relations might be without commodification, what a life 
world without advertising might look like, what narratives would model 
the lives of people empty of the foreign bodies of business and profit—
such speculations have been entertained from time immemorial by 
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Utopian fantasists and lend themselves to at least an a priori, external, and 
purely formalistic characterization. We can, in other words, say what a 
properly Utopian literature might look like even if we are utterly incapable 
of writing one ourselves. But the Utopian literature of the past was largely 
positive, or even affirmative (in a bad Frankfurt-School sense); its "dreams 
of rest" (Morris) bore all the earmarks of compensation and denial, 
repressing what its fantasy mechanisms were unable to process, leaving 
out the negative and the body, suffering and death, as well as everything 
that cannot be solved in interpersonal relations. But the truth value of 
fantasy, the epistemological bon usage or proper use of daydreaming as an 
instrument of philosophical speculation, lies precisely in a confrontation 
with the reality principle itself. The daydream can succeed as a narrative, 
not by successfully eluding or outwitting the reality principle but rather by 
grappling with it, like Jacob's angel, and by triumphantly wresting it from 
it what can precisely in our or its own time be dreamt and fantasied as 
such.391  
 
As I have argued, the difficulty of representing subjective, existential perspectives within 
critical religious studies can be sustained through engagements with cultural products as 
aesthetic objects, thick with the affective attachments and pleasures that narratives of 
closure provide. Explanatory projects and rediscriptions are Utopian even as they resist 
the contents of Utopia, forming themselves as enclaves for thinking within the streams of 
History and alongside the buzz of the phantasmagoria. I offer a challenge to critical 
religious studies to recognize its Utopian desires in its fantasies of explanation and 
speculations on the constructedness of subjects. As it confronts and integrates aesthetics 
into its methods and objects of study, it will serve to offer not subjects as transparent but 
faceted. As scholar-subjects consider the folds of their constructions and perceive them as 
aesthetic products, there will be more occasion to catch the refractions of social life that 
strike as the complex tumble of existential life. 
                                                
391 Jameson, Seeds of Time, 74-75. 
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